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THE GERMAN-POLISH NONAGGRESSION PACT OF 1934

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By the time of Hitler's accession to power the world had become accustomed to regarding German-Polish antagonism as a constant of international politics. The reborn Polish State had encountered from the outset the unfeigned hatred of its western neighbor, from which it sought protection in the alliance with France, the guardian of the Versailles system. The Germans, with their customary thoroughness and pertinacity, set themselves to the destruction of Poland—"one of the main pillars of the Versailles Treaty."[1] They waged a long-drawn out economic war against Poland;[2] the League of Nations was flooded with petitions emanating from the German minority in Poland[3] and with appeals from the Free City of

[1]General von Seeckt's memorandum for President Ebert and Chancellor Wirth (July 1922) in Friedrich von Rabenau, *Seeckt, aus seinem Leben* (Leipzig, 1940), II, 317; Julius Epstein, "Der Seeckt Plan," *Der Monat*, I, No. 2 (November 1948), 48; John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945* (New York, 1954), 136; Sir Lewis Namier, *In the Nazi Era* (London, 1952), 8. There were many officers in the German army, some of whom later testified before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, who regarded a war with Poland as "a sacred duty though a sad necessity," in order to wipe out the "desecration" brought about by the creation of the Polish Corridor. Cf. statements given at Nuremberg by Field-Marshal von Blomberg, dated November 7, 1945 (*IMT Documents*, PS-3704), and General von Blaskowitz, dated November 10, 1945 (*ibid.*, PS-3706). See also *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, 3rd Series, II (H. M. Stationary Office, 1949), 687-688, 2nd series, I, 490-1, 563; Wheeler-Bennett, 228, 302, 304, 329, 356; Herbert von Dirksen, *Moscow-Tokyo-London: Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy* (Norman, 1952), 19 ff., esp. 31; Namier, 47.

[2]Ferdynand Zweig, *Poland between two Wars: A Critical Study of Social and Economic Changes* (London, 1944), 11, 41, 99; J. Taylor, *The Economic Development of Poland, 1919-1950* (Ithaca, 1952), 117-118; Charles Kruszewski, "The German-Polish Tariff War (1925-34) and Its Aftermath," *Journal of Central European Affairs* (October, 1943).

[3]F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (2 vols., London, 1952), I, 157-8, 406-8, 410, 447-8. See also League of Nations, *Official Journal*, esp. v. X, No. 1 (Geneva, January, 1929), 68-69. Stresemann envisaged the treatment of minorities to be a subject full of possibilities of a skillful speaker at a plenary session of the League . . ." Eric Sutton (ed. & trans.) *Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries, Letters and Papers* (3 vols., New York, 1935-40), II, 504.

Danzig[4] which engaged in endless quarrels with Warsaw; all available means were employed to influence the ruling circles and public opinion in other countries.

With the outlook in Europe becoming increasingly gloomier in the early thirties, Marshal Józef Piłsudski, having consolidated his dictatorial régime in Poland, decided to map out a new course for Polish foreign policy. His ambition was to increase Poland's importance in the councils of Europe, concomitant with her avowed status of a great power. Without ending her French alliance, Poland began to assert her "independence." France was weakening, yielding too much to Britain, and seemed less dependable as an ally. His objective was, first of all, to bring about an improvement in the relations with Poland's two great neighbors, yet not to become too attached to either of them, maintaining a balance between the two. This policy of even balance, of remaining midway between Moscow and Berlin, complemented the policy of independence. "The policy of Warsaw should never be dependent upon Moscow or Berlin."[5] As far as possible the relations with both of them should be regulated independently of Paris, Geneva, or of any other outside center, with regard only to Polish interests, for in "the desperate situation [in the past] there was not to be found any Power in the world to bring us assistance . . ."[6]

To bring about a rapprochement with the Soviet Union Piłsudski had only to respond to its overtures. On February 9, 1929, Poland signed the so-called Litvinov Protocol, and on July 25, 1932, after long negotiations, the Soviet-Polish nonaggression pact was concluded.

If Russia showed a willingness to improve her relations with Poland the opposite was true of Germany, where the growth of the revisionist anti-Polish campaign paralleled the rapid aggravation of the political crisis. Piłsudski had always been an advocate of good neighborly relations with Germany and had repeatedly tried to improve them, but on the basis of the existing territorial *status quo*. In December 1927, he approached Stresemann at Geneva.[7] At the same time he said to Briand: "Today our [Polish-German] relations are very cool. I do not doubt, however, that in a few years someone will come to power in Germany, a statesman who will understand that two Powers like these, in the interests of both, should find the way to neighborly relations, based on mutual respect and confidence."[8] Several overtures for a German-Polish treaty were made by his Foreign

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[4]Walters, I, 140, 301, 453-5; Ian F. D. Morrow, *The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish Borderlands* (London, 1936) 67-180; Emily Allyn, "Polish-German Relations in Pomerania and East Prussia," *The Quarterly Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America* (April, 1944), 21 ff.

[5]Colonel Joseph Beck, *Dernier Rapport: Politique polonaise 1926-1939* (Neuchâtel, 1951), 283.

[6]*Ibid.*

[7]*Ibid.*, 4-5.

[8]K. Smogorzewski, "Poland's Foreign Relations," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, XVII (July, 1938), 112; also *idem*, "Między Zachodem a Wschodem," *Przegląd Współczesny*, LXV (April, 1938), 83.

Minister, August Zaleski, but to no avail.[9] The revisionist campaign reached a state of frenzy in 1932—the year of one presidential and two *Reichstag* elections—all parties vying with each other in the use of revisionist slogans.

It is interesting and very like Piłsudski that, confronted with the rising tide of anti-Polish emotion in the Reich, he should have instructed Alfred Wysocki, Polish Minister in Berlin, "to ascertain the attitude of the main political parties toward Poland and to orient himself as to the possibility of improvement of inflamed relations between the two countries."[10] In 1931-1932 Wysocki met with important German politicians and found out —what was obvious to everyone—that nothing short of a frontier revision with Poland would be acceptable.[11]

Piłsudski was not too much disturbed over the growing crisis in Germany; on the contrary, he viewed it with satisfaction, even though it led to the mounting tension with Germany because he thought that it contributed to the weakening of "the aggressive power of that state in the external sphere,"[12] and, consequently, to the change of the relation of power in Poland's favor. He did not think much of the German paramilitary organizations which, in his opinion, lacked "the worth of the genuine soldier."[13] Taking it all in all he considered the situation as becoming increasingly favorable for a long-sought rapprochement with Germany.

The best way to achieve this, in his opinion, was to impress the Germans with strength—he knew their respect for it—without, however, going too far, and to show them that Warsaw was not to be intimidated by their frenzied propaganda. For this purpose he ordered the *Wicher* demonstration in Danzig on June 14, 1932.[14] The electoral successes of the Nazis did not disturb him—Hitler and his men "were nothing but windbags."[15] To help him steer the new course of Polish foreign policy he entrusted the Foreign Ministry to Colonel Józef Beck (November 2, 1932), one of his most favored aides. Count Jan Szembek became the new Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and was sent at once to Paris and London for consultations, and to Berlin "to give an expression to the conviction that if no sensible 'modus vivendi' was found it might come to unforeseen complications."[16]

With Hitler at the helm it was generally expected that the impetus of the Nazi dynamism would be channeled first of all against Poland. And the

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[9]Auguste Zaleski, *Discours et déclarations* (Varsovie, 1930), 216-17.

[10]J. Lipski, "Przyczynki do polsko-niemieckiej deklaracji o nieagresji," *Bellona* (Jan.-June, 1951), 32.

[11]*Ibid.*

[12]*Ibid.*, Piłsudski to Wysocki, June 7, 1932.

[13]*Ibid.*, 32-33. Piłsudski to Wysocki, June 7, 1932.

[14]Beck, 17-18; Jules Laroche, *La Pologne de Piłsudski: Souvenirs d'une ambassade 1926-1935* (Paris, 1953), 107-8; T. Morgenstern, "Wejście O.R.P. 'Wicher' do Gdańska w 1932 r.," *Bellona* (Jan.-March, 1953), 44-48.

[15]Laroche, 113. Piłsudski to the French Military Attaché Colonel d'Arbonneau, October 26, 1932.

[16]Lipski, 33. Cf. Beck, 28.

first actions of the new régime did not augur anything else; the anti-Polish agitation continued unabated. Germany entered a new election campaign and the good campaign tactics required that the anti-Polish line be played up. For instance, Hitler's speech in Königsberg was considered by many in the West as "a declaration of war against Poland."[17] Yet Piłsudski did not believe the new German leader to be driven by an anti-Polish complex, as his predecessors had been.[18] Consequently he told Beck, who was to address the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Diet on February 15, 1933, to disregard the "overexcitement of the European press" and when speaking of Germany "to be firm but also calm and moderate in [his] terms, without letting it be understood that the future admitted only of negative possibilities."[19] Beck declared in his speech that "nobody as yet modified the statute of Europe by words," and concluded that the Polish-German relations "are very simple: our attitude with regard to Germany will be exactly the same as Germany's attitude toward Poland."[20]

On the day Beck made his speech Danzig took the high-handed action with regard to harbor police. Piłsudski waited until the end of the German election campaign and redressed the situation on the morrow of the election day (March 6) by the unauthorized reinforcement of the Polish garrison on the Westerplatte peninsula in the harbor of Danzig. "A test of psychological order . . . a warning addressed to the Chief of the Reich," he called it.[21] Danzig made strong protests and tempers rose high in Berlin. Poland refused the League High Commissioner's demand to withdraw the unauthorized military detachment. The emotion at Geneva, where hope was still alive for the success of the Disarmament Conference, even though another deadlock had ensued, "surpassed all expectations."[22] The German press reported concentrations of Polish troops in the "Corridor," stressed the strength of the Polish army, and warned the population to "avoid provocation to Poland at this juncture."[23] The German Minister in Warsaw, von Moltke, opined that the Westerplatte act had been intended "to give warning to the advocates of revision of treaties in Europe."[24] Finally, on March 13, the League succeeded in resolving the conflict by a compromise with Poland and Danzig undertaking to restore the situation *de facto,* which had existed prior to February 15.[25]

Four days before the settlement of the Westerplatte affair, disturbing news reached Warsaw about an impending shift of Italian policy. The

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[17]The second part of Lipski's "Przyczynki," *Bellona* (July-September, 1951), 8.

[18]Beck, 24.

[19]*Ibid.*

[20]Józef Beck, *Przemówienia, Deklaracje, Wywiady, 1931-1937* (Warszawa, 1938), 58-59. The German translation *Beiträge zur europäischen Politik: Reden, Erklärungen, Interviews 1932-1939* (Essen, 1939), 42-43.

[21]Beck, *Dernier Rapport,* 25.

[22]*Ibid., 26.* See also *German White Book,* Nos. 21-23; Lipski, 34; Laroche, 120-1.

[23]*Documents on British Foreign Policy,* 2nd Ser., IV (1950), No. 262 p. 452. Sir H. Rumbold's telegram of March 10, 1933

[24]*German White Book,* No. 24, p. 44.

[25]For the minutes of the Council meeting see League of Nations, *Official Journal,* XIV, No. 4 (April, 1933), 626-9, 634-40. Also Beck, *Beiträge,* 53.

Polish Ambassador reported from London that Mussolini was said to be prepared to end his opposition to the Anschluss and was urging territorial concessions to Germany in the East and even a "partition of Czechoslovakia."[26] There was little doubt that this departure on the part of Rome would create a new situation in European politics parturient to grave developments and threatening to foil Warsaw's designs. Piłsudski and Beck held the view—a quite correct one—that Hitler, in contrast to his predecessors, placed his native Austria first in his revisionist program, well before the Polish Corridor.[27] And they were resolved to take advantage of this favorable shift of Berlin's main direction of interest, assuming, at the same time, Italy's continued opposition, together with France and the Little Entente, to the absorption of Austria by Germany. Hence the unexpected prospect of Italian friendship toward the new German régime—based principally on ideological affinity—alarmed Warsaw. It had to move with celerity before her strengthened international position would make Germany less willing to come to an agreement with Poland. Piłsudski found a competitor in Mussolini.

To examine the ground and to sound out the new German government, it was proposed to send Józef Lipski, then Director of the Western Department at the Foreign Ministry, to Berlin. On March 14, Lipski notified Wysocki of his forthcoming Berlin visit immediately following Beck's return from Geneva. Yet for some reason the project was dropped.[28]

Meanwhile Warsaw also had cause to worry about the turn of events at Geneva. To prevent the collapse of the disarmament conference, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald came with a new plan stipulating the reduction within a period of five years of the Soviet army to 500,000 men and of the French, Italian and Polish armies to 200,000 men each, and the simultaneous increase of the German army to 200,000 men. Even though the British plan gave no one real satisfaction, it was accepted as a basis for the proposed disarmament convention. In Warsaw's view it would weaken the European system to the advantage of Russia and Germany. However, nothing came of these proposals, and in October Germany withdrew from the conference and the League.[29]

On the morrow of presenting his plan MacDonald, accompanied by Simon, paid a visit to Rome (March 18), during which Mussolini put forward his Four Power Pact proposal—a kind of Directory of Europe of four powers: Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Britain endorsed it in principle. Poland reacted violently: the question of her prestige and even more, that of her security was involved. "The cartel of Great Powers"—as Piłsudski dubbed it—did not augur anything good for Poland. In its original form the pact envisaged the possibility of territorial revision, and there was

[26]Lipski, II, 3-4. K. Skirmunt to Beck, March 9, 1933.
[27]Beck, *Dernier Rapport,* 29; Laroche, 141.
[28]Lipski, II, 5.
[29]John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Pipe Dream of Peace: The Story of the Collapse of Disarmament* (New York, 1935); 103 ff.; Laroche, 145, 197.

little doubt as to what that meant. As Italy[30] and Britain would surely back up Germany, Warsaw could not reasonably expect that an isolated France would hold out indefinitely.[31]

Regardless of the changes introduced into the original draft and the Franco-British efforts to reconcile the Pact with the principle and procedure of the League, Warsaw maintained to the end its unswerving opposition not only to the content of the Pact but above all to its very principle.[32] Beck declared to the French Ambassador on April 6 that it would be better for Poland to withdraw from the League, because, for her, isolation would be less dangerous than the peril of constant interventions into her affairs. "If a state, alone or with others," said he vehemently, "wants to take possession of a single square meter of our territory the cannon will speak! One knows that in Berlin . . . I am afraid that this is not sufficiently known in London and in Rome, nor even in Paris . . . It was the foreign interventions that led to the disappearance of the old Poland." And he concluded significantly: "It is preferable to come to elucidation [with Germany] now than after two or three years of the consolidation of the Hitler régime."[33]

II.

Thus the Four Power Pact provided Beck with a good opportunity to apprise Paris of the possibility of elucidation with Germany. However, the decision to seek a clarification of the Polish-German issues was not occasioned or provoked by the Pact, for it had been taken long before Mussolini launched the Pact. In fact, for some time that had been the principal objective of Polish foreign policy, Beck's February speech and the Westerplatte action having been steps in that direction. Yet the impact of the Pact on Warsaw was immense;[34] it became clear beyond any doubt that the West had set its heart so much upon conciliating Germany that it was resigned to sacrifice the *status quo* in Eastern Europe; the time was certainly running out fast and Warsaw was spurred to redouble its efforts to attain its aim.

At the beginning of April Piłsudski decided to sound out Hitler directly, and for this purpose Szembek, as his special emissary, was to visit Berlin in

[30]Skirmunt's dispatches and Mussolini's conversation with the League's Secretary General Avenol made it known to Warsaw that revisionist ideas were taking hold of the Duce's mind. Lipski, II, 4-5. For the British attitude on the Polish Corridor question see the dispatch of the Czech Chargé d'affaires in London, Černy to his Foreign Office, March 21, 1933, in Friedrich Berber (ed.), *Europäische Politik 1933-1938 im Spiegel der Prager Akten* (Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Instituts für Aussenpolitische Forschung, VIII, Essen, 1942), 21.

[31]Cf. *ibid.*, 23. Czech Minister in Paris Osuský to Beneš, March 31, 1933. On the Polish attitude to the Pact see Laroche, 121-131, 200; Beck *Dernier Rapport,* 39-43,268-71; Lipski, II, 5-7. Piłsudski showed his displeasure to the originator of the Pact by having the recently appointed Ambassador to Rome, Count Jerzy Potocki, resign in protest. Laroche, 122; Beck, 42; Lipski, 5. He also suggested a combined action against the Pact to the Little Entente Powers—likewise opposed to the Pact—but it was not realized. Beck, *Dernier Rapport,* 41-42, 270; Lipski, 6-7.

[32]Lipski, II, 6; Beck, *Beiträge,* 59.

[33]Laroche, 123.

[34]Laroche, 121 ff., 200.

order to hold with the Chancellor and "only with him personally a conversation of a decisive importance," covering "matters of paramount weight."[35] This emphasis on a personal contact with Hitler is of special importance; here was an attempt to avoid the channel of the German Foreign Ministry because of its traditionally hostile attitude toward Poland.[36] On April 4 (two days before his conversation with Laroche) Beck instructed Wysocki, by a top secret message, to arrange the meeting.[37]

Wysocki answered on April 6 that a meeting with Hitler could be arranged only through Foreign Minister Neurath; he also warned that from the political standpoint such a meeting might be inopportune for Hitler, and one had to reckon with the eventuality of refusal.[38] To this possibility Wysocki again drew attention in his telegram of April 8, stating that "Hitler—preoccupied with the transformation of Germany, absorbed with filling of all offices and, connected with this, conflicts within his own party and the government—will not want now to bind himself by any declaration in the matter of relations with Poland, for that would be handing a weapon to his rightist allies and would jeopardize him with public opinion." In a letter dated April 9, Wysocki questioned the opportuneness of the proposed conference under existing conditions, believing Hitler to be yet too weak "to risk anything that could injure him in the eyes of Hugenberg and Prussian nationalists for whom every even most innocent attempt at the amelioration of the Polish-German differences is crime and state treason." Moreover, the Minister feared that Germany could exploit the conference for propaganda purposes to the detriment of Poland, and suggested limiting the conversation to a concrete subject, for instance Danzig.

Beck acknowledged Wysocki's misgivings and on April 18 notified him of having given up Szembek's visit and of choosing a more "natural form," namely Wysocki's interview with Hitler, which should be focused on the Danzig problem. The Minister was instructed to draw Hitler's attention to the fact that a number of voices ascribed to him an intention to interfere "in Danzig's affairs against the rights and interests of Poland." "We do not see such an action on the part of the Chancellor," Wysocki was to declare, "but we would like to ask whether he would not consider it appropriate to forbid publicly activities of this kind. That would remove all suspicions on the part of Poland. Non-clarification of his position would create unnecessary—in our opinion—difficulties and would force us to draw certain consequences."

"As the minimum of a positive result of your *démarche* I would regard publishing a communiqué in the German and Polish press stating that the

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[35]Lipski, II, 9.

[36]*Ibid.*, 9-10. Cf. interesting dispatches of the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold, to Foreign Secretary Henderson on July 3, 1930, and February 26, 1931. *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 2nd series, I, 490, 563. Rumbold was convinced that the Polish frontier dominated all other considerations in German thinking on foreign policy.

[37]Lipski, 9.

[38]*Ibid.*, 10.

Chancellor is opposed to any activities against the Polish rights and 'intérêts légitimes' in the Free City of Danzig."

"The Marshal attaches very great weight to this conversation in view of the necessity to determine our Danzig policy, which to an important degree will depend on the outcome of the conversation . . ."

". . . the question at issue concerns a concrete situation for today, i. e. for the nearest future and not a principal general discussion of the Danzig problem."[39]

The conclusion of the instruction gives ground for the proposition that Piłsudski might have contemplated another show of force.

Warsaw wanted the audience to take place at the earliest possible time, but that could not be arranged in spite of several personal interventions at the Wilhelmstrasse by Wysocki and his aides. Hitler did not agree to receive the Polish Minister until April 28, but even that was immediately postponed and the date was finally set for May 2.[40]

The delay was probably due to the Wilhelmstrasse. As Warsaw rightly conjectured, Hitler differed from his Foreign Ministry on the question of the German-Polish relations, as well as on many other points of foreign policy.[41] He was as anxious to see the improvement of relations with Poland as Piłsudski was on the other side, with this important difference, however, that while the Marshal sought a permanent rapprochement, Hitler was interested only in a temporary one for the period of the German military build-up. Dirksen writes in his memoirs that when as German Ambassador to Moscow he came to report to Hitler (sometime in March or April), the latter listened, asked a few questions, and expressed his desire to maintain friendly relations with Russia, provided they would refrain from interfering in German internal affairs. "Then an episode occurred which [writes Dirksen] I have never forgotten. Hitler rose, went across to the window, and, gazing into the park of the Reichskanzlei, remarked dreamily: 'If only we could come to an agreement with Poland! But Piłsudski is the only man with whom that would be possible.' I replied that this would be possible only if Germany were to renounce her claim to the 'Corridor,' and that this claim, upheld by the entire German Nation, had united the German people in the years of internal strife. But Hitler refrained from discussing the subject any further."[42]

In the light of recent German accounts it appears that in the spring of 1933 Hitler was very apprehensive concerning Polish intentions.[43] And with good reason, for the tension between Poland and Germany mounted. "Incidents" multiplied. Headlines appeared in the German press: "Poland incites to war." Tempers in both countries rose to the highest pitch. The semi-official *Gazeta Polska* printed articles by prominent Piłsudskists warn-

[39]*Ibid.*, 10-11.
[40]*Ibid.*, 12.
[41]Gordon A. Craig, "The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop," in *The Diplomats*, 406-36.
[42]Dirksen, 110.
[43]See note 49.

ing that Poland was ready for any eventuality.[44] There was talk in the circles close to Piłsudski of the possibility of a preventive war, which was reported—probably intentionally—to the Germans.[45] Rumors were afloat that Warsaw proposed such a war to Paris. The anti-German agitation reached such a high point that the German legation in Warsaw had to be guarded day and night in order to protect it against hostile demonstrations.[46] A partial mobilization was reported and on April 21 a force of 35,000 men paraded in full battle order before Piłsudski at Vilna.[47]

The tension must have reached a critical point to alarm even so experienced, so imperturbable and so self-possessed a diplomat as Count von Moltke, who, having lost his habitual composure, "visibly disturbed and very anxious," paid quite an unexpected visit to Laroche on the morrow of the Vilna demonstration (April 22.) He told his host that he was worried about the excited state of mind in Poland caused by repeated affirmations that in case of need Poland was ready to defend her rights by force. He believed this to have been encouraged by the Government, which "sought more to excite the minds than to appease them." "The Polish Government wanted either to force the German Government to renounce revisionism or to create incidents as a justification for recourse to arms." The real purpose of his visit was to learn what was the attitude of the French Government. Laroche did not believe that the Poles entertained any aggressive designs against Germany and emphasized the strictly defensive character of the Franco-Polish alliance.[48] It is not known yet whether that assurance alleviated Moltke's fears. The talk in Piłsudski's entourage of preventive war reached him, of course, and he also heard that a suggestion to the same effect had been made to Paris. According to the former Secretary of State Meissner, Moltke's reports made Hitler fearful lest the Polish suggestion find a response in the French Rightist quarters. The diplomatic and Reichswehr circles were particularly alarmed.[49]

The tactics adopted by Piłsudski in this diplomatic offensive deserve notice. Here was a demonstration of a classic dual policy: on the one hand secretly sounding out Berlin for a rapprochement, and, on the other, putting out an impressive display of popular anger, of exhibition of force, of

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[44]Robert Machray, *The Poland of Piłsudski* (London, 1936), 324; Laroche, 126.

[45]Lipski, II, 11. In the Army circles the talk about a preventive war continued even after the Hitler-Wysocki interview. Berber, 24. Czechoslovak Minister in Warsaw Girsa to Beneš, May 10, 1933.

[46]Laroche, 125.

[47]Konrad Heiden, *One Man Against Europe* (London, 1939), 59.

[48]Laroche, 125-26.

[49]Otto Meissner, *Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler* (Hamburg, 1950), 335; Fritz Hesse, *Das Spiel um Deutschland* (München, 1953), 22-23; Axel Fr. von Freytagh-Loringhoven, *Deutschlands Aussenpolitik 1933-1941* (10th ed., Berlin, 1942), 30; Heinrich Brüning, "Ein Brief," *Deutsche Rundschau,* LXX, Heft 7 (July 1947), 2-3. In a letter to Stanisław Sopicki, dated November 5, 1949, and published in *Niepodległość,* IV (1952), 170, Brüning writes that the German diplomatic and military authorities had the information that Piłsudski had approached France with the view of bringing to bear a military pressure on Germany. "I was urged [he states] both by the *Reichswehr* and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to point out energetically to Hitler the magnitude of the impending danger."

canards and wild rumors for all the world to see in order to intimidate Berlin and to make it receptive to the Polish overtures. Piłsudski succeeded: Berlin became concerned and agitated. Actually, the idea of a preventive war never *seriously* entered the Marshal's mind. First, Poland was, for both economic and military reasons, in no position to embark single-handedly upon a war—any war; second, to count on a French participation at that time would have been an act of sheer insanity—only condemnation by the League of Nations could have been expected (it should not be forgotten that Western statesmen were still exerting themselves to save the Disarmament Conference from collapse); third, since Piłsudski neither wished to force out Hitler nor believed that Germany was seriously violating the treaty disarmament stipulations there was simply no reason for starting a preventive war. The rumors of a preventive war had purposefully been spread as a kind of smoke screen in a carefully planned diplomatic move.[50]

Yet Hitler could not have been completely sure that the Polish dictator was bluffing. Anyway that was not important, for he was about to change the German policy. He needed a temporary rapprochement with Poland, as well as with other powers (excluding for tactical reasons the Soviet Union), during the period of building up his power, and posing as a confirmed lover of peace he was ready not only to grasp any outstretched hand but even to extend his own.[51] The Polish threats of a preventive war facilitated, if anything, this unexpected turn-about by disturbing the militantly anti-Polish circles in Germany.

III.

The Hitler-Wysocki interview of May 2 marked a turning point in the inter-war history of the German-Polish relations. Wysocki pointed to the disturbing increase of tension between the two countries and to the fact that Polish public opinion was particularly alarmed by the attitude of the National Socialist Party in Danzig. He drew the Chancellor's attention to Poland's vigilance with regard to her rights in Danzig and to her determination to defend to the last her access to the sea. "It would, therefore, be

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[50]These are the conclusions of the present writer's article "Did Piłsudski Attempt to Initiate a Preventive War in 1933?" to be published in *The Journal of Modern History*.

[51]"He wished above all to allay the suspicions of Europe and to avoid foreign complications which might involve sanctions or a preventive war against Germany. Meanwhile he would find time to transform her along National Socialist lines and to restore her to her former strength. What more striking proof could he give of his peaceful intentions than to terminate a conflict which no one before him had been able to resolve and which was a cause of unending anxiety to all Europe? Indeed, subsequently, he never failed to invoke this magnificent alibi, claiming that no man had served the cause of peace with greater sincerity and liberality of spirit than himself." François-Poncet's British colleague Rumbold thus concluded his prescient dispatch to Sir John Simon sent on April 26, 1933: ". . . the outlook for Europe is far from peaceful . . . . It would be misleading to base any hopes on a return to sanity or a serious modification of the views of the Chancellor and his entourage . . . . I cannot help thinking that many of the measures taken by the new Government of recent weeks aim at the inculcation of that silence, or *Schweigsamkeit*, which Hitler declares in his memoirs to be essential to military preparations." Rumbold's *War Crisis in Berlin* (London, 1940), 346-52, cited in Franklin L. Ford, "Three Observers in Berlin: Rumbold, Dodd, and François-Poncet," *The Diplomats*, 447.

highly desirable that the Chancellor should declare, in any form he considers suitable, that neither he nor the Government of the Reich has any desire to encroach upon Poland's rights and interests in the Free City of Danzig. I am convinced that such a statement will have a reassuring effect on the anxious and highly excited public opinion of Poland, but it will also be a warning to those German quarters who, sheltering behind the authority of the Chancellor, are often acting against us on their own responsibility."

Hitler replied in a lengthy speech that he did not "understand the reasons for the concern of public opinion in Poland." Nothing had been said by him or any member of his Government that would have justified this concern. "The Government of the Reich, under the leadership of the Chancellor, have not the least intention of violating existing treaties, and regard them as binding; they respect the obligations and rights which those treaties impose and confer upon the Reich. Germany, however, will not recognize that Poland has any rights in Danzig which would exceed the bounds of existing treaties." The Chancellor was a pacifist. Being himself a fervent nationalist he understood Polish nationalism. He did not "share the view which questions Poland's right to exist;" on the contrary, he recognized and understood that right. "Poland, for her part, should also endeavor to understand the rights and interests of Germany." He reflected "seriously on the dangers to Europe and, therefore, to Poland, which might arise from . . . the astonishing fertility" of the Russian nation. At the conclusion of the audience Wysocki proposed that in order to bring an end to this dangerous state of affairs it would be desirable to issue a communiqué "confirming the peaceful intentions of the Reich Chancellor towards Poland." Hitler agreed.[52]

A draft of the communiqué handed by Wysocki to Neurath stipulated that "Having regard to the situation established by the treaties, the Chancellor is opposed to the activities aiming at the rights and legitimate in-

[52] *Polish White Book*, 11-13. It is interesting to compare Wysocki's account of the conversation with that of Neurath. The latter—as it appears in the *German White Book* 47-48—is not only much shorter but also fundamentally different. According to Neurath "The Chancellor replied to M. Wysocki by stating that, in the first place, he was forced to deny that Poland had any particular claim to Danzig. If uneasiness prevailed in Poland, he could say only that there was even greater cause for such uneasiness in Germany, where there was a constant feeling of being threatened on account of events in Upper Silesia, the concentration of troops on the frontier, and the occupation of the Westerplatte in Danzig. Owing to the shortsightedness of statesmen, malevolence and lack of insight, the frontier between Germany and Poland had been fixed in such a way that, as long as this demarcation held good, a peaceful coexistence of the two peoples was practically inconceivable . . . . If, at the time when the Treaty of Versailles was signed, people had not been wholly unable to think clearly, Poland herself ought never to have consented to the establishment of a corridor through German territory, for it was obvious that such a corridor would inevitably give rise to a continual state of tension between Germany and Poland. It would have been much wiser to have chosen the outlet to the sea, to which the Minister had referred as an inalienable right on Poland's part, on the other side of East Prussia." If Hitler had said all this, it would have been most unusual, a most serious violation of his duty, for Wysocki not to report it to Beck. And no trace of the Führer's remarks, as reported by Neurath, is to be found in the official communique.:

terests of Poland in the Free City of Danzig." Hitler preferred a more general formula, to wit: "The Reich Chancellor emphasized the firm intention of the German Government to adhere strictly in their attitude and their actions to the terms of existing treaties. The Chancellor expressed the wish that the two countries should dispassionately examine and deal with their common interests." Wysocki did not expect this and, before accepting it, had first to obtain the agreement of Warsaw. Soon, however, Neurath began to make difficulties, suggesting a much weaker version. Yet finally Hitler's original draft was accepted by both sides, Warsaw expressing its satisfaction, with the understanding that Moltke was to be received by Beck on May 4, and an identical communiqué was to be issued in Warsaw.[53]

The communiqué dumbfounded the world. Beck received Laroche on the same day as Moltke, and apprising him of the Hitler-Wysocki interview said, clearly anticipating possible interpretations: "I am not concerned with the kind of interpretation which the German Government may give to this conversation; it is only the result that matters and this is putting an end to the tendentious rumors as harmful to Poland as they are to the peace. It is however just as important that the French Government should be completely informed as to our motives. Those who accuse the Polish Government of desiring a preventive war, an idea which it has never even contemplated, could just as well accuse it of throwing itself into the arms of Germany."[54]

Two days later Laroche had a long talk with Lipski. He positively appraised the Hitler-Wysocki meeting as bringing about a tranquilization in the German-Polish relations, but expressed an apprehension that Hitler would turn against Austria—the weakest point—in case he needed an external success. Laroche believed the Anschluss to be just a question of time, for he doubted that either Italy or France would intervene. He inquired whether Warsaw had not promised a *désintéressement* in the Anschluss question in return for a change in Berlin's Polish policy. Lipski assured him that no such understanding had been made.[55]

The capitals of Europe received the prospect of an improvement in the German-Polish relations with mixed feelings and sometimes with reserve.[56] The West's attitude toward Hitler's régime had already become increasingly hostile. In an interesting telegram of May 16, reporting on his conversation with Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Sir Robert Vansittart, Ambasador Skirmunt informed Warsaw that Vansittart had received his account of the Polish-German relations with some scepticism. Sir Robert emphasized an unusual unanimity of British public opinion in its negative attitude to Hitler's Government and was certain that the speech Hitler was to make next day would be received with disbelief "because there was al-

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[53]Lipski, 15-16. For the text of the communique see *Polish White Book,* 13; *German White Book,* 48.

[54]Laroche, 128.

[55]Lipski, 18-19.

[56]Lipski cites (pp. 17-18) parts of several dispatches from Polish diplomatic representatives reporting reactions abroad.

ready enough of platitudes and Germany must demonstrate acts."[57] There is little doubt however that Vansittart was far ahead of his Government in recognizing Hitler's true intentions.

During the two weeks after the publication of the communiqué further course of action was mapped out in Warsaw. On May 16 a long instruction written by Lipski was transmitted to Wysocki. At the outset Lipski recapitulated Warsaw's reasons for approaching Hitler, namely: first, the mounting tension in the Polish-German relations; second, the rumors of Poland's intention to provoke a preventive war; and, third, the necessity of underlining with regard to international opinion Poland's independent position. Warsaw noted that as a result of the Polish initiative the situation was clarified, the tension between the two countries subsided, and—what Beck especially emphasized—Poland's importance was revealed to German public opinion, a factor which the German dictator had to take into account in his policy. The prestige of Poland was also much enhanced on the international forum.

Yet, as a further conciliation with Germany was concerned, a great caution ought to be maintained. This caution was dictated by the confused internal situation in Germany, by the increase of hostility in the West toward the Hitler régime, and as well by the desire of the Polish Government not to fetter its freedom of action in such a complicated international situation. For the time being Piłsudski preferred to wait; Wysocki was instructed to avoid new talks with regard to press relations, especially to refrain from sounding Goebbels on this matter. At the same time the instruction noted with satisfaction that the temper of a large part of the Polish press had been toned down, and that further efforts in this direction were being made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Poland was to continue to support the Jewish petitions to the League of Nations against the persecutions in Germany (the number of the Jewish Polish citizens resident in Germany ran into tens of thousands). A more favorable reaction toward Poland in international Jewish circles was signalized.[58]

Lipski had written to Wysocki on the eve of Hitler's speech to the Reichstag (May 17) which even though it significantly lacked the customary anti-Polish references could hardly be considered a forward step on the path of the German-Polish rapprochement. It contained a suggestive passage: "A reasonable approach to European problems could then [in 1919] have furnished a solution in the East which would have fully met with both Poland's intelligible claims and Germany's natural rights. The Treaty of Versailles did not furnish this solution."[59] Clearly, the German dictator would not flout German public opinion too abruptly, would not all of a sudden stop attacking that treaty which he had become a past master of assailing. Apparently if Piłsudski was proceeding slowly and cautiously—also partly

[57]Lipski, 18.
[58]*Ibid.*, 20-21.
[59]*German White Book*, 49.

on account of public opinion—so was Hitler. Thus with the tension between them lessened both sides assumed a waiting attitude.

The diminution of tension between Poland and Germany did not cause any deterioration in the Russo-Polish relations. On July 3, 1933, Poland signed—with Russia's other neighbors—the London convention for the definition of aggression, and her relations with the Soviet Union were good, better than at any time in the past, although still lacking in warmth.[60]

In preparation for a further move on the diplomatic chessboard Piłsudski decided to make some transfers of Polish diplomats, to send Wysocki to Rome and to replace him with Lipski in Berlin. On July 13 Wysocki had a farewell interview with Hitler, who ran over the recital fast becoming common to him. "The Chancellor thanked me first of all [Wysocki reported] for a certain measure of confidence shown to his Party and the Government, which, so long as he was at their head, could not have any aggressive designs against any State, nor therefore against Poland. The Chancellor further affirmed Poland's historical right to existence and development. . . [But] He was also of the opinion that the authors of the Treaty of Versailles had created the so-called Corridor in order to set an enduring abyss between Germany and Poland, two countries endowed with many conditions for living in neighbourly peace and harmony. The Chancellor also told me he had given orders in Danzig that quarrels with Poland were to be avoided, and he was prepared to believe that the atmosphere created there would give the best of results." And unavoidably he dwelt at some length on the Russian specter.[61]

Hitler's orders to Danzig indeed brought about an almost immediate easing of its relations with Poland. The National Socialist Party of Danzig had achieved a complete victory in the May elections, and its leaders adopted on Hitler's orders a conciliatory attitude toward Poland. In an unusual move a Senate delegation, headed by Rauschning and Greiser, respectively president and vice-president of the Senate, paid a visit to Warsaw at the beginning of July, voicing the necessity of a Polish-Danzig collaboration. "I am very happy [Piłsudski told them] that you have chosen the only reasonable method of conceiving our mutual relations. I hope that you have not come here as enemies because that would end badly, more badly than you imagine."[62] Direct Polish-Danzig negotiations resulted in four agreements (of August 4 and September 18), regulating the use of the Port of Danzig by the Poles and acknowledging the rights of Polish citizens in Danzig; in return, Poland undertook to share her trade equally, as far as possible, between Danzig and Gdynia.[63] On September 22 Polish Premier Janusz Jędrzejewicz returned Rauschning's visit by going to Danzig, where mutual congratulations were exchanged.

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[60]Beck, *Dernier Rapport,* 37-39; Henry L. Roberts, "The Diplomacy of Colonel Beck," *The Diplomats,* 606-607.

[61]*Polish White Book,* 15-16.

[62]Beck, *Dernier Rapport,* 27.

[63]Machray, 333; *German White Book, 180.*

Next to the Danzig question the main obstacle to a *détente* in German-Polish relations was the tariff war between the two countries, which had been going on for eight years. Von Moltke stated in his report to the Wilhelmstrasse of August 30: "The German-Polish commercial war which even as recently as last autumn could be described as stationary warfare, has lately resumed the character of an offensive war. To do away with this aggravation and in addition to re-establish more normal and improved commercial relations would, more than anything else, contribute in a superlative degree to a *détente* in German-Polish political relations. . ."[64] Moltke's suggestion was accepted by his Foreign Ministry; he was instructed to sound the Polish Government on this matter which led to the opening of economic negotiations at the beginning of October and to the signing of an agreement on March 7, 1934.[65] The Polish-German relations were visibly improving.

IV.

Soon after Hitler's accession to power Beck had been charged by Piłsudski to make a careful appraisal of Hitler's régime, and he reported his findings in an interesting memorandum which he prepared in September, 1933, before his departure for Paris where he paid an official visit on September 20-21, and for the League's General Assembly. He thought that the Nazi régime needed a period of peace to carry out promised revolutionary changes in Germany, and he attached great importance to the fact that its leading personalities were non-Prussians—Hitler himself being an Austrian—mainly interested in the completion of the national unification of the German people. In view of this he concluded that "we found ourselves before a unique opportunity for redressing our situation in the European equilibrium."[66] Piłsudski apparently agreed with these considerations and conclusion.

Thus the architects of Polish foreign policy viewed with great satisfaction the developments in Germany as offering them "a unique opportunity" for enhancing the prestige and importance of Poland in the councils of Europe. They believed that the new régime's preoccupation with the virtually revolutionary transformation of Germany—which in their opinion was to take a long time and to encounter great obstacles—would weaken that country in external affairs.

It is true that the pro-German sympathies in the West waned as the Nazi government began to impose an undemocratic régime by violent methods. The growing aversion in the West to the new German régime was accompanied, however, by the anxiety and fear of conflict which one tried to avoid at any price. The conviction was engendered by the chronically inflammable state of German-Polish relations that the "Corridor" question could above all cause an explosion. It was felt quite generally that some

[64] *Ibid.*, 50. This intensification of economic warfare referred to by Moltke was above all due to a boycott of German goods by Polish Jews.
[65] *German White Book*, 50.
[66] Beck, *Dernier Rapport*, 29.

unknown and far-away Poland ought to yield at last to Germany in the name of European peace, and stop prolonging the atmosphere of uncertainty. There was spreading in France opportunism and pacifism even bordering on defeatism.[67]

The effect of this atmosphere was first and above all registered in the economic field. The capital market in the West was always very sensitive to the possibility of political entanglements in Central-Eastern Europe. In the early thirties, due mainly to the growing German-Polish tension, foreign capital shunned Poland, which gravely increased Poland's difficulties during the depression. Polish corporations found it practically impossible to secure foreign capital, and the flight of international short-term credits and of gold created an extremely difficult situation.[68] In the Paris financial circles the Polish "Corridor" was reportedly written off as doomed. It was also reported that the director of the Franco-Polonaise Bank in Paris was complimented at the shareholders' meeting for not investing in Poland in 1932.[69] As in 1933 Poland was at the lowest ebb of the depression, a *détente* with Germany appeared most urgent for economic reasons. Not only the volume of trade between the two countries could have been expected to expand substantially, but also the prospects of obtaining foreign exchange in the international capital market would be much brighter, it seemed.

These considerations were weighty enough—and there were others. As Hitler was the first statesman at the helm in Germany who seemed to reciprocate Piłsudski's desire for an improvement of relations between Berlin and Warsaw, the attitude which the ruling circles in Poland assumed toward him differed greatly from that of the West. There is little doubt that Piłsudski preferred Hitler to a Stresemann, a Schleicher, or even a Brüning. It is possible that he saw in him the statesman who was to adopt a new approach to Poland and of whose eventual coming he assured Briand back in 1927.[70] Among the Piłsudskists much was made of the fact that Hitler was an Austrian; some of them hoped that with him at the helm the spirit of Austria—whom they liked to contrast with Prussia—would gain an ascendancy in the affairs of Germany over that of Prussia. The memory that in the First World War they had fought at the side of Austria might have been a factor in the shaping of this attitude. They believed that Austria and Southern Germany lacked the anti-Polish complex of Prussia.

Piłsudski anticipated that Hitler would focus his attention on Austria, and he considered this very advantageous from the Polish standpoint. Relieved of German pressure, of the German revisionist drive aiming at her western borders, Poland would automatically become a much more im-

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[67]Lipski, 7-9.

[68]In the view of one of Poland's leading economists "One of the most difficult problems arose in connection with the continuous withdrawal of short-term credits, accentuated especially in 1930 and 1931, and its devastating effects on banking and credit markets. The balance between the inflow and outflow of short-term credits amounted in 1930 to 531 million złoty, and in 1931 to 402 million." Zweig, 60.

[69]Lipski, 9.

[70]See p. 4f.

portant, sought-after and wooed force in international politics, particularly if Berlin brought pressure to bear elsewhere.[71] Another very favorable aspect of the Hitlerian policy was its anti-Communist bent which heralded an end to the Rapallo policy. Nothing could be more welcome to Warsaw.

V

Soon after his arrival in Geneva for the League's General Assembly meeting, Beck was asked by Neurath to meet Goebbels. Their long conversation held in a very friendly atmosphere amply corroborated Beck's views expressed in the memorandum for Piłsudski.[72] Goebbels, who had come to Geneva on a special mission, met with a most hostile reception there;[73] Beck's friendliness thus provided a marked contrast to the general attitude of hostility. There followed an interview with the Polish Foreign Minister published on October 5 in a German paper, in which Beck expressed his hope that "Germany and Poland would soon regulate, in a spirit of mutual esteem and confidence, the questions of a practical kind that arose from their being neighbors—particularly economic problems, largely agrarian, affecting both countries."[74]

On October 14 Germany announced her withdrawal from both the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, because she could not get her "equality" recognized. Piłsudski felt that the new situation thus created weakened Poland's security, [75] and his first reaction to Hitler's action was to find out about the progress of German rearmament. On October 21 he held a military conference, attended also by Beck and Szembek, and ordered a report on the state of German rearmament. He also decided upon asking the French for their information on the matter, but considered it necessary to draw their attention to the fact that this work is secret, that we are not journalists nor in the service of journalists and that we are not sounding

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[71]When on September 1 Laroche drew Beck's attention to the detachment with which certain Polish journals seemed to view the perspective of the *Anschluss*, Beck replied that the initiative did not belong to the Polish Government as not directly interested. "It will be difficult to prevent the *Anschluss*," he said, "unless France and Italy mobilize." Laroche, 35. Beneš rendered his estimate of the new course of Warsaw's policy in an interesting document of April 18, 1934. In his opinion this policy was actuated by the decline—and the expected further decline—of France's power. In Warsaw's anticipation "Poland's power and importance will therewith be valued so much higher, of necessity she will stress so much the more her independence, and thereby win particularly in England a higher position and greater importance. The *Anschluss* will be in any case consummated, Germany will be kept busy in the South and Poland will thereby be relieved in the North." Berber, 32.

[72]See p. 17f.

[73]"The assembly applauded and cheered as Chancellor Dollfuss, who was then stoutly defending Austria's freedom against the Nazi menace, entered the hall. Goebbel's entrance met with hostile murmurs and derisive laughter; nor did the German Minister of Propaganda achieve greater success with the foreign journalists to whom he attempted to represent the Third Reich as an essentially pacific state. Undoubtedly Hitler felt the hostility shown his lieutenant to be an affront to himself." André François-Poncet, *The Fateful Years, Memoirs of a French Ambassador in Berlin 1931-1938* (New York, 1949), 104.

[74]Beck, *Beiträge*, 70-71.

[75]Laroche, 141.

the alarm."[76] The information obtained from the French army intelligence agreed, in general, with that of the Polish intelligence.[77] Apparently, the progress of Germany's rearmament was, as yet, not such as to disturb him; nonetheless he declared to the French Military Attaché that the new situation made it necessary for Poland to be more vigilant.[78]

Although this was only an exchange of information and he did not sound the French on anything, there is little doubt that this approach was also meant as a gesture assuring the French that in spite of the coolness which had developed in their mutual relations, the Poles remained faithful to the alliance and were very much concerned about any possible German rearmament. It is significant that the approach was made in the moment of consternation created by Germany's withdrawal with the Disarmament Conference and the League; this was an indication that France could always count on Poland.

Here it should perhaps be noted that Piłsudski greatly underestimated the possibilities of German recovery; surprisingly, Hitler's astonishing achievements during his first months in power did not seem to impress him too much. On October 10, 1933, he stated to Rumanian Foreign Minister Titlulescu that "the internal difficulties of Germany were going for a long time yet to make it impossible for her to wage war, and he added that in the question of disarmament one had to take a firm stand."[79] There is no indication that during the year 1933 Piłsudski was ever seriously worried about the growing German power or believed in a speedy regeneration of the German military strength.[80]

The time seemed now favorable to resume the negotiations with Germany. Four days after Germany's withdrawal from the League the new minister Lipski presented his credentials to President Hindenburg and declared that he would strive to improve Polish-German relations in accordance with the principles enunciated by Hitler in the May conversation with Wysocki. Hindenburg responded by noting a friendly adjustment of the interests of the two countries.[81] At the end of October the French ambassador in Berlin, François-Poncet, learned that the Wilhelmstrasse studied the possibility of a nonaggression pact with Poland. On November 2 Laroche raised this question directly with Beck, who declared that he had heard some rumors on this subject at Geneva. "Should such an offer be made—he continued—we would study it seriously to see if it is not simply a maneuver intended to break the Franco-Polish front. We would be careful

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[76]Comte Jean Szembek, *Journal, 1933-1939,* trans. by J. Rzewuska and T. Zaleski (Paris, 1952), 2.

[77]Laroche, 136-137.

[78]*Ibid.,* 141.

[79]*Ibid.,* 135.

[80]Piłsudski was convinced that a war would not come for a long time as the post-war generation was incapable of waging one. Laroche, 28, 113. The highest Army conference called by Piłsudski in the spring of 1934 to consider Poland's security did not see any imminent danger but believed that Russia constituted the greatest potential danger. Beck, *Dernier Rapport,* 65. See also Szembek, 2-3.

[81]Machray, 337.

not to accept any text that would involve the risk of weakening our commitments, that would affect in any way our alliance with France."[82]

At the beginning of November Lipski was called to Warsaw to report to the Marshal and to receive important instructions. On November 10 Laroche asked Beck about Lipski's visit and was told that it concerned the general relations between Germany and Poland. In Laroche's opinion the attitude to be adopted in case of a German offer was considered. Three days later Laroche inquired as to what Moltke, after his return from Berlin, said to Beck. "Nothing much [Beck answered], there are always difficulties regarding the commercial agreement." As to the project of the pact Moltke "did not whisper a word and I wonder if these rumors . . . have not been launched by the Czechs."[83]

On returning to Berlin Lipski asked for an audience with Hitler, to whom in the presence of von Neurath he delivered the following message from Piłsudski on November 15: Poland's security rested in bilateral relations with other states, reinsured by their common membership in the League. Germany's withdrawal had deprived Poland of the second element of security; it was also causing considerable nervousness. The Marshal was responsible for the security of his country. But he "did not wish to cloud the atmosphere between the two countries by the adoption of measures having in view the strengthening of Polish security. Before doing that, [he] desired to raise in all loyalty with the Chancellor, the question whether he did not see any possibility of compensating the loss of this element of security, in direct Polish-German relations."

In replying, Hitler "Spoke rapidly and poured out a flood of ideas, through which his desire to establish good relations with Poland continually emerged"; even though these "relations had not been established on an ideal basis, especially as the result of the Treaty of Versailles, which was calculated to render them difficult. The Chancellor affirmed none the less, very emphatically, that he had no intention whatever of effecting any change by resort to war." "Any war would only result in bringing Communism to Europe . . . Poland is an outpost (*Vorposten*) against Asia. The destruction of Poland would be a misfortune for the States which would consequently become neighbours of Asia." "The Chancellor . . . had no aggressive intentions whatever in regard to Poland." "He observed that in his view it was necessary first and foremost to exclude the very idea of the possibility of war from Polish-German relations . . . observing that it would be possible to put this idea in treaty form."[84]

The following joint press communiqué was issued: "Discussion of German-Polish relations revealed the complete agreement of both Governments

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[82]Laroche, 137.

[83]*Ibid.*, 138.

[84]*Polish White Book*, 16-19. Von Bülow's short minute of the conversation—as published in *German White Book*, 51—differs materially from Lipski's report. According to Bülow Hitler was supposed to say that he was "compelled to insist that by the Treaty of Versailles a situation had been created which was intolerable for Germany and would forever be a source of sorrow to every German." On April 19, 1939, Hitler said to Ruman-

in their intention to deal with the questions affecting both countries by way of direct negotiation, and further to renounce all application of force in their mutual relations, with a view to strengthening European peace."[85]

Piłsudski was pleased with the outcome of the Hitler-Lipski interview. In the conversation with the French Military Attaché on November 24 he did not doubt the sincerity of Hitler, "the man who is in the best position for changing the methods and the mentality which the Reich government has inherited from the Prussians. He is free from their rigidity, he comes of the people . . ." Moreover, Piłsudski thought that Hitler's troubles were not at an end. "Therefore, one should continue to be cautious," he concluded, "but I would like to see him stay in power as long as possible."[86]

With a German-Polish agreement in sight, special care was taken by Warsaw to reassure Paris. On the morrow of the Hitler-Lipski meeting Beck invited Laroche to give him full information,[87] stressing that neither the Franco-Polish relations nor the alliance were in any way affected, and that there had been no question of armaments, Lipski having been instructed to decline any discussion of the latter subject. Beck added "confidentially" that Hitler had expressed a very strong desire to establish the same pacific relations with France.[88] On November 22, at the reception given by Madame Piłsudska, the Marshal demonstratively conversed for nearly one hour with Laroche and the Rumanian Minister only—the representatives of Poland's allies—disregarding other diplomats in violation of the rules of protocol.[89] Two days later he received General d'Arbonneau in the presence of the Polish Chief of the General Staff to speak to him "as army to army" and to state emphatically that the Polish army was not to be reduced by a single man.[90]

On the same day on which the Marshal was expressing his sentiments to General d'Arbonneau, Neurath instructed von Moltke to submit to Piłsudski the draft of a German-Polish Declaration of Nonaggression, without "the traditional concepts and somewhat outworn formulas," but no less binding than any pact. For Moltke's personal information—which, of course, was not to be disclosed to the Poles—Neurath pointed out that "the wording of the declaration as suggested by us in no way implies the recognition of Germany's existing eastern frontiers, but on the contrary articulates the fact that by means of this declaration a basis shall be created for the solution of all problems, i.e. also territorial problems."[91]

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ian Foreign Minister Gafencu: "But, after all, why this unimaginable massacre? In the end victor or vanquished, we shall all be buried in the same ruins; and the only one who will profit is that man in Moscow." Grigore Gafencu, *Last Days of Europe, A Diplomatic Journey in 1939* (New Haven, 1948), 78.

[85] *Polish White Book*, 19.

[86] Laroche, 141.

[87] But Laroche noted that this was after the fact and not before, that Poland wanted to treat alone—"independently." The Soviet Minister in Warsaw thought that Piłsudski feared that direct negotiations between Berlin and Paris were going on. *Ibid.*, 142.

[88] *Ibid.*, 139.

[89] *Ibid.*, 140.

[90] *Ibid.*, 141.

[91] *German White Book*, 52.

This offer of a nonaggression pact Germany was apparently willing to make to all her neighbors. On the day Moltke was instructed to make the offer to Piłsudski, Hitler had an important interview with François-Poncet. After the withdrawal from the League Hitler had repeatedly approached France, pointing out that direct negotiations on the disarmament problem would accomplish more than any other method. Paris, pressed by London, agreed to negotiate.[92] To the French ambassador Hitler proposed a convention for the limitation of armaments provided that the humiliating state of inferiority for Germany be ended, that she be authorized to rearm on a moderate scale by obtaining the right to raise an army of 300,000 men, based on conscription and short-term enlistment. "This army [said Hitler] was to possess armaments of like quality to those of other nations, their quantity would remain open to debate. Germany would furthermore accept the establishment of international control. Since she sought to attack no one, she was ready to conclude nonaggression pacts, valid for ten years, with all her neighbors . . . "[93]

Moltke saw Piłsudski on November 28, the date of the audience having been fixed with "extraordinary speed. . . contrary to the prevailing custom," clearly signifying "a special mark of attention." "The conversation . . . was of a definitely friendly character." Piłsudski agreed "with the fundamental ideas of the German proposal, [and] approved in particular (though in his own characteristically drastic mode of expression) the choice of a new form for the declaration, especially the absence of paragraphs which he evidently detests."[94] It is astonishing that he should have shown such a marked preference for the German proposal, because Laroche gathered from the conversation with Beck on November 30 that evidently Warsaw understood that the purpose of the German formula was to avoid the territorial problem.[95] Nevertheless in their conversations with Laroche and d'Arbonneau, Piłsudski and Beck gave an impression of being completely convinced that Hitler acquiesced in the Polish frontiers.[96]

Moltke further reported that Piłsudski had objected to mention in the declaration of "the Locarno Treaty of arbitration, which was regarded with disfavor in Poland." As various persons would have to express their opinion on the draft, this the Marshal "pointed out repeatedly . . . would occupy a considerable time.[97] He "emphasized that he also wished to put German-Polish relations on a friendly and neighborly basis, but stressed with a bluntness such as I have hardly ever experienced among Polish politicians, that the thousand-year-old hostility of the Polish people toward the Germans would give rise to grave difficulties in carrying out this policy. Con-

[92]François-Poncet, 117.
[93]*Ibid.*, 117-118.
[94]*German White Book*, 53.
[95]Laroche, 143.
[96]*Ibid.*, 140-141.
[97]On the morrow of the Hitler-Lipski interview Beck declared to Laroche that if it came to negotiating a nonaggression pact with Germany, such a negotiation would be of a "long duration." *Ibid.*, 139.

sequently, this policy must not be based on sentiment but solely upon common-sense considerations." Moltke—with far less frankness—denied that a similar situation existed in Germany, stressed "the need for a systematic policy of rapprochement," and claimed that effective steps had been taken with regard to the German press. "Piłsudski replied . . . by expressing his infinite contempt for the press, with which he wished to have nothing to do, but he admitted that something could be gained by influencing political organizations."[98]

VI

Piłsudski forewarned that the examination and revising of the draft would take a long time. Before taking the final step he wanted to see what turn international politics would take after emerging from the temporary deadlock, and above all to prepare the French and ascertain their reaction. the forthcoming visit to Warsaw of French Foreign Minister Paul-Boncour promised a welcome opportunity for that. The Marshal was particularly concerned about the Franco-German disarmament negotiations.[99] The Franch, on the other hand, were showing a lively interest in the German-Polish conversations. Regarding these Beck intimated to Laroche on December 11 that he did not expect anything important to occur before the end of the year.[100] When asked by Laroche ten days later whether anything new had come to pass between Warsaw and Berlin, he replied in the negative, adding that "one should see clearly into the German game and it is necessary that the French and Polish Governments safeguard the contact."[101] Laroche had no doubt that "the Polish Government viewed with suspicion the negotiations on armaments with Hitler. Piłsudski feared nothing as much as a solution modifying to our detriment the proportion of forces between France and the Reich."[102]

As the parliamentary debates in Paris necessitated the postponement of Paul-Boncour's visit, Beck decided to discuss the situation with Laroche instead. He had been kept posted by the French regarding their negotiations with Germany, and he knew and approved of the French negative attitude to the German proposals. Yet now on December 30 he expressed a fear to Laroche that as a result of English pressure the Versailles disarmament clauses could be thrown overboard, thus placing Poland in a state of "flagrant inferiority vis-à-vis Germany." He feared future intentions of Germany, although believing that for the time being she had neither the "pluck" nor the means for their realization.[103] It was obvious that Marshal Piłsudski opposed disarmament. In a rather unusual move, considering his dislike of the Czechs, Beck also made a long exposé of the Polish policy to Czech Minister Girsa, declaring that Hitler acted more like a German than

[98] *German White Book*, 53-54.
[99] Laroche, 142, 145.
[100] *Ibid.*, 144.
[101] *Ibid.*, 145.
[102] *Ibid.* Laroche to Paul-Boncour, December 23, 1933.
[103] *Ibid.*, 145.

as a Prussian, danying the rumors of any territorial exchanges and compensations in the Ukraine, and affirming that the alliance with France continued to be the essential basis of Polish policy, the Polish Government desiring only to reconcile it with the independence of action appropriate for a Great Power like Poland. After reporting this to Beneš, Girsa returned from Prague with an offer of a friendship pact together with military collaboration.[104] But Beck, confronted with the concrete offer, temporized, promising to give his answer personally to Beneš at Geneva.[105]

By the time Beck received the Czech offer, Warsaw had already decided to follow up the negotiations with Berlin, and on January 9, 1934, Lipski presented to Neurath a revised text of the nonaggression declaration. Neurath at once objected to the stipulation that the declaration would not apply to questions "which according to international law lie within the exclusive competence of States."[106] A number of conferences took place between Gaus, Legal Adviser of the German Foreign Ministry, and Lipski, who insisted that "this was merely intended to exclude the possibility of interference in the internal affairs of either country."[107] Lipski writes that "When on January 13 Beck passed through Berlin on his way to Geneva [he was President of the forthcoming session of the League], the fate of the agreement was as yet undecided. Serious difficulties arose in my talk with Gaus on January 16, which made Piłsudski summon me to Warsaw."[108] Finally on January 20, after Lipski's return from Warsaw, it was agreed that "this declaration does not extend to those questions which under international law are to be regarded exclusively as the internal concern of one of the two States." Gaus opined that "This wording has an advantage over the previous wording in that it no longer excludes the possibility of a diplomatic discussion of the minorities question between Germany and Poland, for the minorities questions are undoubtedly not questions which according to international law might be regarded exclusively as the internal concern of a state."[109]

The German-Polish Declaration, signed in Berlin on January 26, 1934, announced that the two Governments would "settle directly all questions whatever which concern their mutual relations." If that proved impossible

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[104]*Ibid.*, 146. In a letter to Namier, dated April 20, 1944, Beneš stated that "three times in the course of 1932 and 1933 I officially offered Beck a treaty between Poland and Czechoslovakia, which would have developed into military co-operation. I never received any reply." L. B. Namier, *Europe in Decay* (London, 1950), 283. Beneš repeated in his memoirs that he made such a proposal to Beck at Geneva. Edvard Beneš, *Paměti, od Mnichova k nové válce a k novému vítězstvi* (Praha, 1947), 37. But Beneš was not quite frank. A recently published record of a conversation at Geneva between him, MacDonald and Sir John Simon on March 13, 1933, (at the time of the Westerplatte affair), reads as follows: "Speaking very confidentially M. Beneš said that he feared an incident between Germany and Poland. He had had a long talk quite recently with M. Beck. He told him that Czechoslovakia would not make an alliance with Poland against Germany, because he thought it would be very dangerous to give Germany clear cause for fearing encirclement." *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 2nd series, IV (1950), 521.

[105]Laroche, 146 to Paul-Boncour, January 8, 1934.

[106]*German White Book*, 54.

[107]*Ibid.*, 55.

[108]Namier, *Europe*, 282, n. 1. Lipski's letter to Namier.

[109]*German White Book*, 55.

in some cases they would "seek a solution by other peaceful means," but under no circumstances would "they resort to force in the settlement of such disputes." The Declaration invoked only the Pact of Paris of 1928;[110] it specifically stated that the international obligations which had previously been undertaken by either of the two Governments toward a third party were not in conflict with it or affected by it. This was a reference to the Franco-Polish alliance and Poland's obligations contingent upon its League of Nations membership. The Declaration, valid for a period of ten years, was to contribute to the "well-being" of the contracting States, and "of the other peoples of Europe as well."[111]

Piłsudski and Beck were very well pleased with the Declaration; the objective which they had sought was finally achieved; their policy was crowned with what looked like a remarkable success. On the morrow of the signing of the Declaration Beck expressed to Moltke "gratitude and lively satisfaction," and added that "after the failure of international conferences and pacts, a courageous policy revealing a spirit of leadership could create a profound impression, especially when it responded to a general longing for peace." The event, he said, had made a greater impression on Polish public opinion that he expected, and it also had a good reception abroad.[112]

However, the Declaration was far from being acclaimed in French official circles. The French were undoubtedly taken aback. They naturally expected to be at least informed beforehand, if not consulted. Yet Piłsudski ordered an absolute secrecy in the last phase of the negotiations with Berlin, believing that to be necessary for their successful conclusion. Lipski received instructions to "keep the matter strictly secret, and that also towards the *corps diplomatique* . . . The German Government, too, at that time insisted on strictest secrecy. There was in Germany, especially among the Prussian nationalists, serious opposition to a *détente* with Poland . . . "[113] Following his instructions, Lipski denied, when questioned by François-Poncet and Czech Minister Mastný, that there was anything afloat.[114] So did Beck. He did not breathe a word about the resumption of negotiations either to Laroche before leaving for Geneva or to Paul-Boncour at Geneva,[115] and denied categorically that that was the case when asked directly by Beneš.[116]

But once the declaration had been signed, Warsaw made an effort to conciliate the French to give full explanations. On January 29 the French

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[110]The semi-official *Gazeta Polska* commented that neither the Covenant of the League nor the Locarno agreements excluded a possibility of war; only the Kellogg-Briand pact did so. Laroche, 148.

[111]*German White Book,* 56; *Polish White Book,* 20-21.

[112]*German White Book,* 57. A year later Beck said to Szembek that he regarded the German pact as "the greatest and most valuable achievement" of Polish foreign policy. Szembek, 41.

[113]Namier, *Europe,* 282, n. 1.

[114]*Ibid.,* 283; François-Poncet, 113-114.

[115]Laroche, 146-147.

[116]Beneš, *Paměti,* 39; Namier, *Europe,* 282. In his letter to Namier, Beneš also stated that "In the autumn of 1933 Hitler sounded me in Prague as to whether Czechoslovakia would conclude with him a pact of the type which he subsequently offered to Poland. I

ambassador was received by Piłsudski himself, in Beck's presence, in a two-hour audience. He was assured that nothing should be sought in the Declaration besides what was actually there. The fidelity to the French alliance was strongly affirmed. Poland safeguarded absolute freedom of action, be it with regard to Austria, the relations with Russia or the Baltic States. Asked whether Poland would still have freedom of decision in the presence of German rearmament, if, for instance, France demanded the application of article 213 of the Versailles Treaty regarding the investigation, Piłsudski affirmed that she would, but added "not without irony, that the uncertainty of the French policy and its incessant concessions render such hypotheses unlikely." When Laroche protested, the Marshal declared that "he had hesitated, had dragged things on, but that the Franco-German negotiations had made him decide to expedite them because if the [French] proposals were accepted by Germany, France would openly abandon the peace treaty."[117] That was the clue. Piłsudski feared that France would agree to the revision of the treaty leaving Poland in the lurch, in the most disadvantageous diplomatic position. He repeated to Laroche that he "remained flatly opposed to the rearmament of Germany, and if France decided to oppose it, it would not be he that she would find in her way." Later he gave similar explanations to the minister of Poland's second ally, Rumania, and remarked that "one could not pretend anymore that the relations of Poland with Germany were a menace to the peace,"[118] a clear allusion to the press campaign in the West.

To demonstrate that the Polish-German rapprochement did not have an anti-Soviet character and to keep Poland evenly balanced between Germany and the Soviet Union in accordance with Piłsudski's formula for Polish foreign policy, in the middle of February Beck paid a well-timed visit to Moscow—the only visit of a Polish Foreign Minister to the Soviet capital in the inter-war period. According to his chief of the cabinet "the first day [of the visit] was glacial, the second hot, the third very hot."[119] Beck was well pleased with the visit.[120] Litvinov declared that the rapprochement between Poland and the Soviet Union had largely occurred since Beck had taken the direction of Poland's foreign affairs.[121] In the official communiqué both ministers stated "the lasting decision" of their Governments "to continue their endeavors for a further improvement of mutual relations between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as also for a *rapprochement* between the peoples of both States."[122]

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rejected this proposal and immediately informed Paris, London, *Warsaw*, Belgrade and Bucharest of the situation." *Ibid.*, 281. Here again Beneš overstates the case because Hitler was offering the pact to nearly all his neighbors at about the same time; this was then his general policy.

[117]Laroche, 148-150.

[118]*Ibid.*, 150.

[119]*Ibid.*, 152.

[120]Beck, *Dernier Rapport*, 55-57. Beck stresses the point that he was the first European minister to pay an official visit to Moscow.

[121]*Polish White Book*, 176.

[122]*Ibid.*, 178.

"The amours of Poland do not last long," whispered Count von Moltke to the Rumanian minister,[123] A simple sally, but how well it expressed the impossibility of maintaining a policy of balance between the two great neighbors without arousing the suspicions of the one or the other.[124]

VII

The pact "settled none of the moot points separating" Poland and Germany. "It was rather the equivalent of a provision not to touch upon them for a period of ten years, and, in the interval, to adopt a friendly attitude in their mutual relations."[125] This Piłsudski hoped would inaugurate an era of a more permanent rapprochement by displaying to both sides the advantages of good neighborly relations. He clearly realized, of course, and bluntly said as much to von Moltke, that the process would be slow: a thousand years old antagonism and prejudice cannot be gotten rid of in a short period of time. He believed that to make a start the most important thing was the change of atmosphere in official relations. However, he remained opposed to German rearmament—his utterances to the foreign representatives leave no doubt on this point[126]—and he apparently did not think that the pact would in any way hamper Warsaw's freedom of action if Germany was to embark on rearmament. As it actually happened, Poland did nothing to oppose German rearmament, but then Piłsudski was already dying of cancer and the minds of his collaborators were preoccupied with other things. They would not spoil good relations with Germany by taking a more active stand on the issue. This was a cardinal mistake: allowing Nazi Germany to rearm proved deadly both for Poland and for the post-Versailles-Europe. In that crucial March of 1935 the self-styled "realists" of Warsaw behaved exactly like the wishful thinkers of Paris and London. Perhaps the prospects of success for any Polish initiative or action were less than slight but there was the last chance and they did not even consider trying.[127]

With each year Warsaw was increasingly more reluctant to adopt an anti-German attitude on any issue because the détente with Germany was

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[123]Laroche, 152.

[124]This is shown by a remark of Szembek to the Polish Ambassador to Russia Grzybowski on December 10, 1938: "It is exceedingly difficult for us to maintain a balance between Russia and Germany. Our relations with the latter are entirely founded on the theory of the leading personalities of the Third Reich that, in the future conflict between Germany and Russia, Poland would be the natural ally of Germany. In these conditions, the good-neighbor policy, which has its origin in the 1934 accord, could easily appear to be but a pure and simple fiction." Szembek, 386-387. As Roberts rightly observes, "The simple intention of riding two horses at once can lead to some exceptionally strenuous acrobatics." Roberts, 599.

To what extent Beck had been fascinated by this system of balance is indicated by the fact that even after it lay in ruins he wrote: "This system pleased some and displeased others, but it did inspire much respect in the world. Even if the press of this or that country did insinuate that we sought scheming combinations, which certainly was not the case, when it came to the European governments they saw themselves obliged to reckon with Warsaw in a wholly new fashion." Beck, *Dernier Rapport*, 57.

[125]François-Poncet, *The Fateful Years*, 111. See also Freytagh-Loringhoven, 28.

[126]See pp. 19f., 24.

[127]Cf. Beck, *Dernier Rapport*, 37; Szembek, 46 ff.; Laroche, 204-209.

advantageous from an economic standpoint, and, above all, improved the diplomatic position of Poland, as had been envisaged by Piłsudski and Beck. French Foreign Ministers (Barthou, Laval and Delbos) began to visit Warsaw and to court Poland—nothing like that had ever occurred before. So did the others. It is doubtful whether the Pact conduced in any way to Piłsudski's opposition to Barthou's eastern security plan. He was not a believer, to begin with, in the feasibility of a collective action; he suspected it of being a device to involve Poland in the areas in which her interests were not important, to align her definitely on the side of Russia—and this conflicted with his policy of even balance—and, above all, to enable France to get out of her obligations resulting from the alliance of 1921. Did not Briand say after his return from Locarno: "Ces pactes d'assistance doivent être exécutés par tous ou par personne."[128]

For the five years following the signing of the pact the rulers of Poland lived in a make-believe world. They prided themselves on being realists while in fact embracing illusions. However, the advantages reaped from the pact—illusory as they were—did not last long; their bright hopes were dashed to the ground. Gafencu, Rumanian Foreign Minister at that time, reports that on April 17, 1939, Beck said to him: "I confess that I have wrongly estimated the importance of the Polish factor in Hitler's foreign policy."[129] Beck was soon to discover also how terribly he had erred in his estimation of Hitler and of the dreadful power forged into existence by him. Otherwise, he would not have been deceived so much and for so long. The German Chancellor was indeed "not bound by the conceptions or arguments of which he made use. His mind was free, and his words had wings. The systems and doctrines he advanced were to serve his aims, not to hamper his movement. When he gave assurances, they bound the assured, not himself."[130]

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[128]Georges Bonnet, *Défense de la Paix*, I (Geneva, 1946), 140.
[129]*Op. cit.*, 47.
[130]*Ibid.*, 52.

MANDATORY DELIVERY QUOTAS IN CZECHOSLOVAK AGRICULTURE

by Frank Meissner

THE LAW of supply and demand works itself out through prices. Prices are, therefore, the major tools which help us to allocate resources. This seemingly simple procedure is not perfect, of course. At times we feel that public interference will do a better job of allocating. This, at least, is our justification for administrative pricing. Yet normally we prefer the "invisible hand" of free enterprise to do the adjusting.[1]

In a Communist country the reverse is true. The State Planning Boards determine, on behalf of the people, the needs in the most important sectors of society. These needs can be social and political, as well as economic in character. The administrative pricing system is then used as a tool which aids in the achievement of goals which have been deemed beneficial for the state. The invisible hand is permitted to operate only when it does not interfere with public planning.

Public pricing, invariably resulting in discrepancies, is the objective in setting up the whole apparatus. OPA as well as OPS were thus established in emergencies, when we wanted to arrest the laissez-faire tendency towards price increases. Our objective was to prevent a runaway inflation, and when the emergencies were over, we discarded price controls.

In socialistic societies, like Russia and her satellites, public pricing is a permanent feature of the system. Capital formation, or call it economic growth if you please, is carried out according to schedule—the famous Five-Year Plans. These countries do not import investment capital from abroad, but have to rely on domestic sources. In comparison with Western economies their investment rate is extremely high and because of these ambitious plans for capital accumulation, the governments invariably run into difficulties. The people are not willing to save enough, yet the plans have to be fulfilled. Forced savings is the remedy.

Here is how forced savings are being squeezed out of agriculture. The government removes labor from farming to the cities; however, the "new" industrial workers have to be fed. In order to assure sufficient food supplies, the government creates a food purchasing, processing and retailing monopoly.[2] The profits made by the state in this food distributing business are used for capital investments.

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[1]"All the new and old sources of supply will combine into a mighty river of agricultural commodities, which will lend vitality to our economy, establish our independence of the capitalistic countries, . . . ensure a constant increase of the living standards of all the workers . . . and improve the defense potential of our nation." Josef Vaska, "Principles of the New System of Purchasing Agricultural Commodities in Czechoslovakia" (Zásady nového systemu výkupu, zemědělských výrobků v CSR), *For a Socialized Agriculture* (Za socialistické zemědělství), Prague, January 1953, p. 41.

[2]This does not imply that all farm commodities move through governmental marketing channels. It should be remembered that farmers are permitted to sell their surplus commodities (in excess of mandatory quotas) directly to consumers in regular city

The state is obviously interested in making as much profit as possible, o it buys cheaply and sells high. "The cooperative sector of [agriculture] s well as the individual farmers do in this way contribute to the needs of ociety."[3] That is simple enough. Trouble arises when farmers don't want o sell to the government. They can make more money in selling directly to he consumer, thus avoiding the excessive middleman's (the state's) margin. The government is, however, determined to get the food. If the farmers lon't deliver voluntarily, they simply have to be forced by the coercion tool, 'mandatory delivery quotas". Each farmer is then assigned a certain quan- ity of farm commodities which he has to sell to the state at the fixed ceiling rice.

It is the objective of this paper to look into some of the criteria which uide the Czechoslovak authorities in the job of determining individual uotas.[4] Although conditions in Czechoslovakia will be discussed primarily, nost of the observations will apply, with small variations on the theme, or other satellites as well.

The Soviet Example

To provide some historical perspective, the Soviet experiences will be riefly reviewed. During the civil war following World War I, peasants in Bolshevik-occupied territories were forced to deliver to the state all their surpluses." The main source of state acquisition of farm commodities in he period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) was a tax in kind, supple- nented by state purchases in the "free" market. In 1923 state purchasing be- ame the primary method by which farm commodities were sold to city onsumers. The govèrnment tried at the same time to promote contractual leliveries for some agricultural raw materials. During the period of the in- ensified industrialization efforts (the five-year plans), contracts slowly be- ame the major purchasing arrangement.

The Contract was an instrument by which the state became obligated o provide machinery, seeds, and fertilizers to individual villages or settle- ients which in their turn had to deliver "appropriate" amounts of farm ommodities. This was a rather effective weapon which, by discriminatory tate allocations of yield enhancing production factors, hastened the pace of ollectivization of agriculture. After kolkhoz farming had been firmly stablished, mandatory deliveries of farm products became the main source f government purchases. Contractual arrangements were retained only or marketing of fiber and other industrial raw materials grown on the land.

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arkets at prices determined by supply and demand. Statistics indicating the extent to hich farm commodities move without state interception are not available. The import- nce of this free trading has no doubt increased considerably since Stalin's death.

[3]Imrich Rubik, "K tvorbe, cien polnohospodarskych vyrobkov" (About Agricultural rice Making). *Planované hospodářství* (Planned Economy), Prague, March 1954, p. 188.

[4]A tentative draft of a separate parer analyzing the price fixing process is already repared.

[5]For a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet agricultural marketing institutions, see lubbard, Leonard E., *Soviet Trade and Distribution* (London, Macmillan and Co., 1938), p. 46-51, 91-100, 139-187, and 289-306.

In the early days of the mandatory deliveries, individual quotas for crops were based on the available arable acreage, and quotas for animal products were established according to the number of livestock kept on the farms. This soon proved to be a rather unfortunate arrangement, as it slowed down the expansion of arable acreage, and of livestock herds. In order to evade the imposition of larger delivery quotas kolhozes would intentionally underestimate their acreage and livestock number, thus causing great discrepancies between acreages shown in cadastral records and acreages reported to the authorities. This "disappearing" land became known as "black acreages."

In 1940 the quota allocation system underwent a thorough revision. Henceforth, the quotas were to be based on fixed norms determined once and for all on the land entrusted by the state to the individual kolkhoz. Similarly, with animal products each head of livestock or poultry would be "mortgaged" with a certain delivery obligation. These quota allocation criteria have been used ever since.

Most of the people's democracies, or captive countries, as we would prefer to call them, profiting from Soviet experience, have slowly introduced the "fixed norm" system.[6]

Delivery Quotas During World War II.

The Nazi occupants imposed in 1940 a system of mandatory deliveries of agricultural commodities in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia—the two western provinces of present Czechoslovakia. Commodity Group Authorities (C.G.R.'s), the chief executive agencies for state marketing, were established as public corporations whose board of directors was composed of representatives of the Czech economy. Agricultural trade was handled by seven such C.G.A.'s: (1) grain, (2) potatoes and starch, (3) beets and sugar, (4) livestock, meat, and fish, (5) milk and fats, (6) hops, malt and beer, and (7) horticultural products and wine. The C.G.A.'s set the delivery quotas, carried out collection and distribution of the commodities, and were the enforcement agencies for law and order within their jurisdiction.[7]

Let us shortly review the provisions as they applied to the various commodity groups: 1) Each farmer was permitted to keep enough bread grains for consumption by his own household plus the necessary seed. The re-

[6]In Bulgaria, the grain delivery quotas have since 1950 been based on fixed amounts per hectare, according to the natural fertility of the soil. In Rumania, milk deliveries are also based on acreage. In Hungary, grain, oilseeds, potato, meat, and egg quotas are determined in a similar manner. In Poland, the arable acreage is computed in terms of a "standard hectare" on which grain quotas are fixed. In eastern Germany, delivery obligations of grain, legumes, potatoes, milk and eggs are computed on a combined potential of arable as well as total farm land.

[7]For a comprehensive discussion of governmental food procurement and rationing in the present territory of Czechoslovakia see chapters on the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, and on Slovakia in *Management of Agriculture and Food in the German-Occupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe* by Karl Brandt and Associates (Stanford University Press, 1953).

ıainder had to be delivered to the state. 2) In the case of potatoes a :gional quota was assigned by the Bohemian-Moravian Commodity Group .uthority for Potatoes and Starch. The local potato committees made as-gnments to individual farmers. The area under cultivation, the size of the ırm, the average yield per hectare, home consumption, the number of hogs, ıd normal shrinkage and waste were all taken into consideration. To as-ıre that processing factories would have proper amounts of industrial otatoes available, exclusive supply territories were assigned to each plant. fter the quantity quotas were established, the farmers had the advantage knowing in advance that after he had fulfilled his quota he could freely ispose of the excess. Sugar beets were handled in essentially the same way potatoes. The initiating of controls in meat marketing, however, caused nsiderable difficulty, as Czechoslovakia was traditionally a meat importer. 'hen foreign supplies were cut off a wide gap between the rationed demand ıd the available supply soon led to a complete breakdown of the free pur-ıase of slaughter animals by independent butchers. In order to honor nsumer ration cards, livestock had to be expropriated. In the fall of 1940 eat delivery quotas were assigned to individual farmers. Heavy fines for ort delivery were imposed, but the Germans soon realized that coercion ould get them nowhere. In 1943 a new system for the purchase of meat ıd animal fats was introduced, involving less compulsion. The individual livery quota for meat and fats was expressed in Units of Milk Equiva-nts (UME),[8] which consolidated the separate quotas of beef, pork, milk ıd oilseed. The farmer was thus given a more flexible framework within hich to make his production adjustments.

The standard quota amounted to approximately 1,000 UME's per ctare of land in agricultural use. In the absence of a uniform fertility ting for farm land, it was necessary to make local estimates of produc-vity. The cadaster valuations gave a certain clue to the appraisal. The livery quotas assigned according to this system were consequently based the value of the land, rather than on acreage. The farmer was issued a nd of passport into which all deliveries were promptly entered, thus pro-ding ready proof of quantities and time and place of deliveries.

Deliveries in excess of quotas were encouraged by extra bonuses and nalties were imposed on deliveries short of the quota. The profitability the farm was thus directly dependent on the delivery performance. rmers operating at below-average efficiency were penalized chiefly by the liction of fines. Such holdings have usually the greatest production ntentials so that improvement in yields is relatively inexpensive. "The

[8] One kilogram (2.2 pounds) of milk with 3% of butterfat became the basic UME. e following general transformation schedule was established:

One kilogram of	*UME's*
beef	6
pork	5
mutton	6
rapeseed	6
wool	100

Ibid., p. 284.

double-barreled scheme of profitable prices . . . . and [effective] penalties . . . . boosted deliveries by plugging up leakages of supplies into the black market."[9]

On the whole one must admit that the Germans were eminently successful. The delivery quotas based on Units of Milk Equivalent provided a system flexible enough to minimize administrative interference with the management of individual farms. The production patterns were rather easily controlled by appropriate changes in the relative prices of the various commodities. "Yet the basic political and racial persecution and ruthless use of arbitrary secret-police power soured the achievement and were probably also responsible for . . . . the actual decline in crop . . . . [acreage and yields]. Political ruthlessness and inhumanity . . . . wiped out the memory of positive achievements by the German agricultural administration, ... [and] generated . . . . overwhelming hatred for *all* Germans . . . . "[10]

Mandatory Contracts

The German administrative setup was taken over by local national committees after the liberation of 1945. Many of the committees were soon infiltrated with Communists and much politicking arose around the yearly quota allocations. As commodities in excess of quotas could be sold on the free market at price levels sometimes four or five times higher than what the state paid (Table 1), it was no wonder that everybody attempted, more or less legally, to get as small a quota as possible. Yet the over-all requirements were to be fulfilled because the state felt obliged to honor the food rations.

The local national committees were in a crucial position. Influential members of the committees were frequently tempted to misuse their quota assigning powers, and the fixing of high quotas for disliked neighbors soon became an effective tool in the "unilateral solution" of personal quarrels. The system probably harbored more arbitrary haphazardness than equity.

There was no end to confusion. The March 1949 Bulletin of the International Institute for Collaboration in Agriculture and Forestry (Prague) complained that the Two-Year Plan did not have a chance to be fulfilled properly because details of the plan did not penetrate "to each parish and each single farm. The [new] contracts put the whole planning [process] into a different light. [Without contract enforcement it would] never be possible to discover those who neglect or sabotage, nor would it be possible to give the appropriate assistance and well-earned advantages to honest and careful farmers . . . . [Henceforth] figures [will testify as to the exact obligations of] both sides: the farmer and the State."

The IAI Bulletin was referring to the Five-Year Plan Law, passed late in 1948, which provided the enabling statute for mandatory contracting. It "authorized the issuance of Cabinet decrees having the force of law, and it

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 285.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 295. Italics mine.

vas such a decree issued in January 1949, that officially set up the general ontracts system for the purchase and delivery of agricultural products.[11]

Production contracting thus "replaced"[12] in February 1949 the delivery uota system, which the Germans had originally introduced during World Var II. The system of mandatory contracting assured the farmers a certain right to outlets"[13] provided they lived up to the delivery obligations. The tate guaranteed to purchase the quantities of commodities for which con-racts had been signed, and promised delivery of commercial fertilizers and ther necessary means of production. The legions of individual crop regu-ations were consolidated into one unified system, the Ministry of Agri-ulture deeming it easier to supervise its contracts entered into individually vith some 1.4 million small and medium sized producers. It is true that one ontract covering the entire production of a farmer would be easier to ad-ninister than if special contracts were made for each crop, yet 1,400,000 ontracts still require a tremendous policing job. The system was soon to e further simplified, i.e. centralized.

Parallel to the new contracting system the collectivization idea was of-cially born in April 1949. The independent farmer was to be forced slowly nto a kolkhoz straight jacket through the four types of Unified Agricultural ooperatives (UAC's). There are four stages of the socialization process:

> Type I entails farmers' cooperative associations as we know them in the Western countries. All existing farm co-ops are automatically included in this category. No model by-laws or new interpretations were required.
>
> Type II collectively carries out all field work, though the boundaries between individual fields can remain untouched. An average yield per acre is computed, and the crop is pro-rated to the participants according to their acreage contribution.
>
> Type III requires the complete consolidation of land, plus sale of machinery, seed, supplies, and livestock to the association. The cooperative pays a rent for the use of the land, with the member retaining his private residence, a garden plot, and some few head of livestock.
>
> Type IV is, for all practical purposes, a prototype of a Soviet Kolkhoz. By turning over his land to the UAC, the member forfeits, except for his right of inheritance, his fee simple, and proceeds are divided ex-

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[11] D. W. Douglas, *Transitional Economic Systems* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 53), p. 275.

[12] Legalistically speaking, a farmer enters voluntarily into a contract, while a delivery uota is assigned to him. The point is that the "voluntariness" of the contract is purely titious. If the farmer does not volunteer to sign the contract, he will be assigned an ppropriate" mandatory quota anyway, and when it comes down to enforcement, there no difference at all. The term "replaced" is therefore misleading. "Renamed" would semantically far more appropriate. Henceforth, we will therefore use the somewhat culiar term of "mandatory contracting" so as to emphasize the spirit rather than the ter of the institutional setup.

[13] "Mit diesem Kontraktsystem gestand man den Bauern ein gewisses Recht auf satz zu." Bruno Kiesewetter *Die Wirtschaft der Tschechoslowakei seit 1945* (Deutsches stitut für Wirtschaftsforschung, West-Berlin, 1954), p. 54.

clusively on the basis of labor units contributed by individual members.[14]

It is interesting to note that the UAC idea is not only being applied in the socialization of satellite agriculture. The Chinese "Mutual Aid" Societies and producer cooperatives are virtual replicas of UAC's.[15]

Finally, in 1951, individual contracts were replaced by a system of contracts which the local UAC's signed, on a yearly basis, with the state authorities on behalf of the whole village. This proved an effective tool in pushing socialization. The Communists openly admitted that the "new system forced the small and medium peasants, who formerly kept away from UAC's, to participate in the collective negotiation of delivery obligations. Thus, even these peasants were getting used to collective thinking and collective work. This was an effective aid in the transfer of the masses of small and medium peasants into cooperative farm production."[16]

The criteria for determining the magnitude of the contracted quotas were hectares of arable land for plant products and number of animals for milk and meat. The experience with this system was dismal. The honest and progressive peasant who improved his land and enhanced acre yields was assigned higher and higher quotas as the productivity of his land in-

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[14]For a comprehensive discussion of the UAC see my article, "The Socialization Process in Czechoslovak Agriculture," *Journal of Farm Economics* (February, 1953), pp. 88-98. Other features dealing with the subordination of the private farming sector into the overall structure of the Five-Year Plan are described by E. Koenig, "Planning in Czechoslovak Agriculture," *Foreign Agriculture* (September 1952), pp. 157-160.

[15]H. L. Lieberman ("Glimpses Behind the Bamboo Curtain," *N. Y. Times Magazine*, Jan. 30, 1955, p. 28), reports that:

"On the ground that the present 'isolated, conservative and backward individual economy' cannot meet the demand for food, the Chinese Communists have proposed to overcome the deficiencies by collectivizing the land step by step. The purpose is to concentrate the small "land-reform" holdings into bigger plots as a means of introducing mechanization.

"In laying the foundation for agricultural collectivization, the Government has set up 103 mechanized state farms, eighty-three state-owned livestock farms and more than 2,000 locally sponsored 'public farms.' There are also a number of Soviet-style kolkhozes. But the fundamental approach in the phased march toward 'socialized agriculture' has been 'mutual aid.' Three types of 'mutual-aid' teams exist in Red China.

"First, and most elementary, is the team which pools its labor, livestock and tools for temporary cooperative work only during the busy seasons. Second, there is the year-round team which introduces elements of group planning and profit-sharing on common projects. Third, there is the 'producers' cooperative,' which involves pooling land as well as labor, livestock and tools. There are also state-sponsored 'supply and marketing cooperatives.'

"Although 'mutual-aid' teams remain important, the primary effort is not being devoted to the organization of agricultural 'producers' cooperatives' in the present new step toward collectivization. There are now about 225,000 of these cooperatives, with an average of twenty families in each unit. By the start of this year's spring sowing, the Government expects to have 500,000 of these land-pooling cooperatives. Its rural timetable envisages cooperative pools embracing more than half of China's cultivated land and more than half of its peasantry by the end of the first five-year plan.

"This phasing appears to project a general drive to hitch the Chinese peasants to Soviet-style kolkhozes in the midst of the 1958-62 plan. In effect, this would mean expropriation of the capital shares the peasants have contributed to the 'producers' cooperatives.'"

[16]Vaska, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

TABLE 1

Average Prices of Some Basic Food Items
(in Czechoslovak Crowns per Unit)

Food item	Unit	1937[a]	1950			1952			June 1 1953
			Rationed	Free	Free as per cent of rationed	rationed	Free	Free as per cent of rationed	
Rye bread	pound	5.72	N.R.[a]	11.00		17.60	35.20	200	6.16
Coarse wheat flour	pound	6.38	N.R.[a]	28.60		37.29	85.36	228.91	13.20
Pork chops	pound	26.62	110.00	418.00	380.00	113.52	627.66	552.91	65.78
Lard	pound	31.13	143.00	528.00	369.23	147.62	1029.16	697.17	79.20
Potatoes	pound	1.65	N.R.[a]	6.60		4.72	11.22	237.21	1.69
Skim milk	quart	1.75	4.45	17.60	395.51	4.77	10.18	213.42	2.12
Eggs	dozen	8.40	39.60	73.20	184.85	43.20	109.80	254.17	13.2
Industrial workers average earnings	crowns per month	225		4,543			5,326		1,138

[a] Not rationed.

Source: Adopted from table on Average Prices of Basic Consumer Goods, *News from Behind the Iron Curtain*, July 1953, p. 20.

The conversion ratios are as follows: (a) 2.21 pounds = 1 kilogram; (b) 1.06 quarts = 1 liter; the precurrency reform official exchange rate was 50 Czechoslovak crowns to 1 United States dollar. The present rate is 10 crowns to 1 dollar.

creased. Similarly, the quotas on livestock products would be higher for the efficient farmer with animals of superior utility. The inefficient and indifferent farmers got away with relatively small quotas. Comparing the levels of "official" and free market" commodity prices (Table 1) "it is easily realized that this system [of excessive quotas assigned to the efficient producers] essentially discouraged increased production."[17]

This "intolerable" situation was to be remedied by a series of statutory provisions and governmental decrees, the first of which came in May 1952. The drastic currency reform provisions of June 1953, as well as some of the post-Stalinian measures (the New Course) can be considered as a continuation of the urge towards increasing efficiency.

The Ministry of Purchasing—[18]

The crystallization of the contracting procedures was achieved on May 27, 1952, with a government decree (Sb. No. 18) which created a new cabinet rank—Minister of Purchasing (Minister Vykupu). On July 15, 1952, another decree (Sb. No. 39) specified the functions of the new ministry. The new system was given a trial run in the 1952 grain harvest. An act of October 30, 1952, has established the regulations for mandatory deliveries of farm commodities. Criteria for the determination of individual delivery quotas were published in a governmental decree of November 4, 1952. The series of decrees in combination with the enabling act has four basic official objectives:

1. To increase agricultural production which so far was left behind the industrial developments. "Individual UAC's as well as peasants, who are still privately managing their farms, should be encouraged to increase their production fast and efficiently [this implies specifically] . . . . increases in arable acreages and enhancement of acreage yields; increases in livestock numbers and enhancement of productivity; disclosing hidden agricultural production potentials in conformance with the needs of (the) . . . . . economy.
2. "Should delineate the particular delivery tasks so as to prevent speculation. This will limit and suppress the village rich.
3. "By exact formulation of the principles behind the fixed delivery norms the relation of the members of UAC's and privately farming peasants on the one hand, and the state on the other, should be clearly defined. This would strengthen . . . . their confidence in the administration of the people's democracy.
4. "Should abolish all the shortcomings of quota fixing, prevent arbitrary allocations by local officers and establish an orderly and equitable system."[19]

Delivery quotas are imposed upon: (a) Farms owned by public corporations (b) unified Agricultural Cooperatives and their members,

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] The situation changes so fast that it would almost be a full time job to keep track of the new orders and regulations. At the time of writing (Spring 1955) no basic changes have occurred, the New Course notwithstanding. Thus only the 1952 statute is discussed in considerable detail.

[19] Vaska, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

c) Independently farming peasants, (d) All owners of farm land or owners of livestock.

The following products were made subject to compulsory delivery: rain, legumes, oilseeds, potatoes, "technical crops' (sugar beets, chicory, emp, flax, hops, and tobacco), hay, straw, vegetables, the major fruits apples, pears, cherries, apricots, peaches, plums, walnuts, blueberries, ooseberries, and grapes), medical seasoning and aromatic plants, meat, ıilk, eggs, and sheep's wool. The Ministry of Purchasing held the discreionary power of extending this list to any other agricultural commodities r by-products if and when it appeared to be in the interest of an orderly istribution of food and fiber.

The delivery obligations imposed upon firms operating as public corporations (state farms, agricultural enterprises run by different ministries, ational enterprises, township and county owned farms, and estates manged by local national committees) were so large that there was little posbility of accumulating surpluses which could be advantageously sold in ıe "free" market. The entire production of the workers after deductions ır seed and subsistence, was to be delivered to the state at fixed prices, genrally far below retail prices. Far below' means that the difference between ıe f.o.b. farm price and the retail price covered by several times the mounts which could normally be ascribed to handling and middlemen rofit margins. The excessive farm-to-market margins thus constitute a kind f turnover taxation, with the proceeds contributing to new capital investıents.

All the farms administered by the public sector of economy were ırthermore obliged, after proper allowance for planned investment, to dever to the Ministry of Purchasing any realized surplus production above nd beyond their plans. This is still true in 1955, although the regulations re not very rigorously enforced.

The individual quotas are determined by the Ministry of Agriculture ı consultation with local organs representing the individual.[20] Each comunity has an aggregate quantity delivery obligation, which is established ı conformity with the over-all production plan for the agriculture secır of the national economy. The individual farmer has not much a say-so as to what part of this aggregate obligation he will have fulfill, as the fixed delivery norms are allegedly an objective criterion ır such allocations. If the overall structure of the delivery quotas is nsidered, it becomes evident that they are fixed liabilities with which the ıdividual enterprise is burdened. In a way, it is an arrangement diametcally opposite the quotas assigned to tobacco, cotton and wheat farmers in ıe United States[21] It has been shown that the inherent value of this quota

[20]The UAC automatically acquires powers of attorney for individuals living under e jurisdiction of the community for which it was incorporated.

[21]J. E. Mason, "Acreage Allotments and Land Prices," *Journal of Land and Public ility Economics* (May 1946), pp. 176-181. The case of milk is analyzed in my unpubhed manuscript, "Shipping Permits and Farm Values in the Rochester Milkshed."

privilege is being capitalized into the value of the land. In Czechoslovakia, if a hypothetical free land market were in existence, the absence rather than the presence of a quota would probably tend to be capitalized in the land value.

The delivery norms operate as a progressive income taxation system. The larger the farm, the larger, relatively speaking, the basic per-unit quota.[22] Farmers classified as "village rich" are taxed an extra 10 per cent above and beyond their respective bracket standards. This, in turn, is just another way in which the larger independent farmers (the "village rich" in communist phraseology) are being taxed out of business. These attempts fit into the over-all framework of "class struggle."

TABLE 2

Quota Assignment Brackets

Bracket number	Bracket limit hectares[a]
I	above 20.0
II	15.1 - 20.0
III	10.1 - 15.0
IV	5.1 - 10.0
V (a)	3.6 - 5.0
(b)	2.1 - 3.5
VI	0.6 - 2.0
VII	up to 0.5

[a] One hectare equals 2.47 acres.

Source: Vaska, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

The most emphasized point of the fixed, per-production-unit quotas is the production-encouraging feature. It is maintained that the individual farmer, who, by virtue of his initiative and industry, achieves above-quota yields, can sell these surpluses for the higher prices generally prevailing in the free market.[23] This is in contrast to the former method of quota allocations, which were automatically enhanced any time a production increase was ascertained. Yet, one wonders how long these quotas can be expected to remain "fixed." In a basically capitalistic country like Denmark, assessments for the progressive land tax are reviewed each fifth year in order to provide for the consideration of the man-made improvements of the land. Similarly, the Walter Reuther engineered wage agreements between the United Auto Workers, CIO, and the car manufacturers contain a clause which each year increases automatically the wage level by a certain amount so as to assure the workers the benefits which accrue to labor as a consequence of productivity enhancement. In connection with these develop-

[22]The per-hectare norms for mandatory deliveries of grain, potatoes, meat, milk, and eggs which apply to members of UAC's of Type II and independent farmers are divided into seven size groups. The relative quotas increase progressively with increased acreage, according to the seven brackets shown in Table 2.

[23]For a more detailed discussion of the pricing procedures see my forthcoming "Price Determination in Czechoslovak Agriculture," *Rivista di Economia Agraria* (Rome).

nents, one might venture the prediction that the constant increase in popu-ation as well as the increases in per capita food consumption standards will ooner or later demand adjustments of the presently prevailing quota lia-ilities. The same effect can, of course, be achieved by other means too, as, or instance, "voluntary" agreements to have the quota increased. In fact, he frequent occurrence of special emergency deliveries makes the "fixity" rovisions fictitious. The letter of the law is meaningless.

Exemptions

A careful study of the exemption provisions of the 1952 act gives some nsight into the ways in which operational advantages are bestowed upon JAC's of Types III and IV. UAC's are thus assigned generally smaller uotas, ". . . . . because these cooperatives are in a period in which they ttempt to broaden their mass production basis. They are particularly at-empting to enhance livestock and poultry numbers, and are consolidating nd strengthening their structural framework."[24]

Members of UAC's of Types III and IV, who have garden plots in ex-ess of the 0.5 hectares recommended by the official model by-laws, carry two uotas, one determined by their membership in a UAC and administered y the corporation, the other assigned to the garden plot at the same rate as hose applying to independent farmers with similar acreage. This provision s an expression of the traditional campaign against excessive garden plots. t was Russia's experience that peasants devote relatively much more work nd care to their own plots and neglect communal work in the kolkho. 3. A liscriminatory tax (heavy quota) is therefore placed on excessive garden lots, thus encouraging the farm to turn over all his land to the UAC and etain only 0.5 hectares for growing some fruits and vegetables for his own ousehold.

Delivery norms for grain, potatoes, meat, milk, and eggs are differenti-ted according to the four major agricultural production belts[25] into which he administrative districts (okresy) fall. The current regional distribution f livestock numbers is also considered so as to prevent disruption of lanned development goals. There exists, therefore, a possibility that reg-onal quotas are temporarily inconsistent with the apparent production otentials.

Once the norms are established for a certain production belt, they ap-ly generally to all okresy situated within that belt, and where belt over-

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] The ecological characteristics and locations of the four main production belts (sugar eets, grain, potatoes, and pasture) and their subdivisions are described in William Hor-aly, *Agricultural Conditions in Czechoslovakia, 1950* (Chicago, University of Chicago ress, 1951), pp. 1-42.

For a comprehensive analysis of the regional structure see: J. Simon, "Geonomie aších polních plodin . . . . ." (Geonomy of our Farm Crops . . . . .), *Věstnik Česko-lovenské Akademie Zemědělské* (Bulletin of the Czechoslovak Academy of Agriculture), lovember 15, 1944, pp. 384-419, and M. Y. Nuttonson, "North American Agro-Climatic nalogues of Prewar Czechoslovakia . . . . . ," *Foreign Agricultural Report No. 18* OFAR, J. S. Dept. of Agriculture (February 1947), pp. 2-6 plus three unnumbered charts and map.

lappings occur within the jurisdiction of a single administrative region, readjustments for individual villages can be established. No okres can, however, have more than five norms applicable inside its boundaries and no differentiation is permitted inside individual villages. This simply means that equally sized farms in a community do have to deliver the same per unit quantities of produce, regardless of what their production orientation might be. The aggregate quota assigned to an okres has to be fulfilled. The subdivision into production belts of the area of an okres cannot be used as a pretext for lowering the overall quota. Individual quotas are to be redistributed according to a kind of "ability to pay" criterion, with ability supposedly providing an index of the inherent productivity of the farm.

Reclaiming Abandoned Land

The postwar expulsion of some three million Germans plus the industrialization at the expense of farming led to the mass abandonment of land,[26] particularly into the Sudeten border districts. The government decided to reclaim some of the abandoned submarginal lands in order to combat the effects of decreased production. This policy was clearly stated by Prime Minister Viliam Široký at the Tenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party held in June 1954 in Prague. He pointed out that by 1957, 320,000 people are to be drawn back into agriculture. Farming is to be made a desirable career, and what Mr. Široký calls "suitable social conditions and preconditions of a rich cultural life" are to be created in the countryside. The government realized, however, that Mahomet would refuse to go to the mountain; the mountain had to go to Mahomet. Thus we find the Ministry of Agriculture offering considerable concessions to all UAC's which would undertake the task of bringing back into cultivation some of the fallow land. Most of this acreage is in the relatively poor range land of the Sudeten border districts from which the German population was expelled in 1945-46. The concessions consist of lower delivery quotas, (see regions VIII, IX and X in Table 3), approximately twenty per cent lower charges for custom work performed by State Tractor Stations, fifteen per cent lower taxes, cheaper fertilizer, and several other incentives.

The reclamation exemptions do not pertain merely to the border regions. Czechoslovakia has not the typical American type of farm on which lands surround the homesteads. Farm houses are concentrated in villages and peasants have their land split in many small plots all around the community. Much acreage goes into the strips which divide the neighboring properties. Field consolidation is encouraged as one of the means of increasing arable acreage. Members of Type II UAC's who have plowed up the dividing boundaries between the individual plots in the first year following the consolidation of their fields are liable for ten per cent less than

[26]The extent of these movements is discussed in L. Feierabend, *Agricultural Production in Czechoslovakia* (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, mimeo. ser. No. 33, June 14, 1954).

TABLE 3

Mandatory Delivery Quotas for Milk, 1953
(in liters per hectare of farm land)

Production region	UAC's of III and IV Types	Size of privately owned farms in ha. 2-5	5-10	10-15	15-20	
I	600	780	760	740	720	700
II	540	700	680	660	640	620
III	480	620	600	580	560	540
IV	420	550	530	510	490	470
V	360	480	460	440	420	400
VI	300	420	400	380	360	340
VII	240	360	340	320	300	280
VIII	190	300	280	260	240	220
IX	150	260	240	220	200	180
X	110	180	160	140	140	140

Source: A. Rožehnal, *Dodavkové povinnosti zemědělských výrobků* (Mandatory Delivery Quotas for Agricultural Commodities), (New York, July 1953) p. 15.

their usual grain quota. The catch in this provision is the condition that a quantity of grain equal to the ten per cent exemption has to be delivered by each member to a mutual fund of the UAC. The consolidation thus constitutes no tangible gain to the individual member.

Members of UAC's of Types II, III, and IV who have a garden plot not larger than determined by regulations of the official model by-laws plus independent small holders farming less than 0.5 hectare are assigned delivery quotas only for wheat and eggs, and milk if they have a cow. This delivery obligation is waived if:

1. The household, beyond man and wife, consists of the following dependents:
   (a) Two persons older than 65 years for men, 55 years for women. This apparently applies to retired parents living with their children.
   (b) Three or more children below 15 years of age.
   (c) Two children below 15 years plus a man above 65 years or a woman above 55 years.
2. Members are employees of public organizations and institutions, national or cooperative enterprises, or retired persons who are not equipped for livestock keeping.

The Assessment

"The new system of purchasing of agricultural commodities is bringing about a revolutionary change in the method and technical process of assessing the delivery quotas."[27]

[27]Vaska, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

Although one might disagree with this rather glib usage of the term "revolutionary," it has to be admitted that considerable changes have occurred. Formerly, it was the sole responsibility of the local national committees to assign delivery quotas to UAC's and their members as well as to independent farmers. The Ministry of Purchasing and its officers were merely fulfilling a supervisory function. They had to see to it that the actions of the local national committees should not be inconsistent with the Official policies declared by the government and the Communist Party. The new act tends to introduce a centralization of the assessment process.[28] The function is taken away from the jurisdiction of the local organs and becomes the sole responsibility of the official representative of the Ministry of Purchasing (Okresní Plnomocnik Ministerstva Výkupu), who usually resides in the county seat. The representative sends a written assessment to every agricultural firm liable for deliveries, and in the case of farmers classified as "village rich," a delivery "order" rather than a mere "assessment" is issued.

"Improper assessments" can be appealed within seven days after issuance and can, in the first instance, be reconsidered by the representative of the Ministry of Purchasing appointed to the particular county. In the second instance, the regional (Krajský) representative of the Ministry, after consultation with the county national committee (Okresní Narodní Výbor) can review the county ruling. The regional decision is final and cannot be appealed. The discretionary powers of delivery enforcement assigned to the county purchasing officer are practically limitless.

The New Course Intermezzo

Following Stalin's death, the collectivization screws were somewhat loosened: the level of mandatory delivery quota assessments was decreased by about one third and more consumer goods were made available. It appeared that the tremendous push for heavy industry was to be reversed.[29]

The Czechoslovak Branch of the New Course seems, however, on the verge of an "agonizing reappraisal," if one can judge by recent clues from Moscow. On Monday, January 24, 1955, an important article appeared in the Moscow *Pravda*, written by Dmitri Shepilov, the editor, who no doubt received the blessings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Shepilov laid down what he called the "general line of the party" which he expressed in the following terms: The tasks of the Communist party were the "maximum satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural needs of the working people. And the party solves these tasks in a Marxist fashion—on the basis of the forced development of production forces, of the production of the means of production of modern industrial equipment on the basis of steadily raising the productivity of public labor."

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[28]The research and Publication Service (Czechoslovak Section) of the National Committee of assessment basis for a Free Europe has collected the statutes establishing the different commodities. See A. Rozehnal, *op. cit.*, p. 54

[29]For an interesting discussion of the New Course developments, see Research staff of Free Europe Press, *Satellite Agriculture in Crisis* (New York, F. A. Prager, 1954), p. 130.

In other words, according to Mr. Shepilov, the party's policy is to give st priority to production of industrial machines and tools, to employ that uipment in steadily raising the output per worker and thus assure the ength and military security of the country and satisfy the material needs its people. Mr. Shepilov scathingly rejected proposals of "bourgeois oes" that production of consumer goods should proceed at a rate equal the production of capital goods, or even outstrip it. The *Pravda* editor l not mention anyone of greater importance as having been involved in iat he described as an effort to revise party policy, but said that "if such ews became widespread it would do great harm to the whole cause of ommunist construction."

Coincident with the publication of Mr. Shepilov's article it was anunced that Anastas I. Mikoyan, at his own request, had been relieved of s duties as Minister of Trade, a post in which he had been responsible for ny years for trying to satisfy consumers' demands. Commentators abroad culated on the connection between the two events but their suppositions ceived no confirmation from official Soviet quarters. Mr. Mikoyan reined as Deputy Premier and member of the Presidium of the Central mmittee, one of the country's ten top leaders.

The party decisions, which according to Mr. Shepilov had been disted by "revisionists," were made in 1953. In August of that year Georgi Malenkov who had succeeded Stalin as Premier told the Supreme Soviet the U.S.S.R. that "on the basis of success achieved in the development heavy industry we are now fully in a position to sharply increase production of consumer goods." He added that "hitherto we were not in a position to expand light industries at the same rate as heavy industries. We now able to do so." This speech was followed by a party and government cree in August inaugurating a campaign for an immediate and substantial e in farm production.

A further decision in October said that "on the basis of successes nieved in the development of heavy industry there are all conditions for ganizing a sharp rise in the production of consumer goods."[30] This "conner goods policy" is apparently to be reversed. It usually is only a matter days before the satellites follow Moscow's new lead. At the time of writ (February 1955) no specific appraisals of the impact of this outlined vision of the New Course can yet be made.

Conclusions

The present paper discusses the new developments in the institutional up of agricultural marketing in Czechoslovakia. Actually, concentration s been only on the first lap of the farm-to-customer journey of agricultal commodities. In American terms, this would be designated as the oducer's selling and the wholesaler's purchasing functions, the wholesaler

[30]The quotations are from C. Daniel, "Soviet is Turning Back to Stalin's Iron Rule," *w York Times*, January 30, 1955.

in this case being the official purchasing agency authorized by the Ministry of Purchasing.

Up to 1952, the individual farmers were assigned, or contracted for, commodity deliveries. Quantities were reapportioned yearly according to the most current production data. Considering that prices in the free market were and are several times higher than the official prices paid for mandatorily delivered commodities, this arrangement proved inconsistent with attempts to enhance farm production. Knowing that their quotas will be increased following every yield improvement, farmers were given no incentive. The excessively high quotas, in fact, encouraged evasion attempts. Arable land acreages and livestock numbers were intentionally underreported, giving rise to phenomena called "black hectares" and "black cows."

This unwholesome situation was to be remedied by the series of governmental decrees plus a new purchasing act passed in the May-October 1952 period. The provisions were called revolutionary because the methods by which compulsory delivery quotas were to be determined underwent some changes. Individual farm enterprises were to be assigned fixed delivery quotas, which allegedly were not to be amended (increased) as a result of increased productivity. This then means that any surplus can be sold on the free market for considerably higher prices, thus supposedly taking advantage of the farmers' inherent capitalistic inclinations to encourage higher production.

It is very unfortunate that there are no available data on the actual magnitudes of the delivery duties by which land and farm animals in the different production belts have been encumbered. This would give some hint of the severity of this form of taxation. The mere study of the "exemptions" section of the statutory provisions provides, however, a good indication that this legislature is to a great extent designed as another tool by which the independent medium sized and larger farms are to be forced into collective farms. The wording of the act is brutally frank on this point.

Another important innovation seems to be the transfer of assessment authority from the local national committees to the county and regional representatives of the Ministry of Purchasing in Prague. This new centralization device gives the government a firm grip over local affairs and should prevent deviations from the delivery tasks which the over-all National Planning Board has assigned to the regions inside the framework of the five-year plans.

A perusal of the rules and regulations, variations of which do apply in one form or another in all captive countries, indicates the staggering amount of paper work such procedures must imply. It is interesting to note that the Red Tape issue was also one of the major complaints in the present production quotas on wheat, corn, and cotton in the United States. The great difference between the two controls is to be found in the causes, however. The capitalistically minded American farmer produces so much that the surpluses imperil the prices. In Czechoslovakia, the allegedly socialistic

onomy produces so little that the shortages are imperiling the nutritional vels of the whole nation.

The socialistic attempts of the Czechoslovak government to "bribe" the pulation into higher production in most sectors of the economy did not ove overly successful. This was probably the main motivation behind the credibly drastic monetary reform of May 1953, which confiscated a large rt of savings, wiped out a great part of the internal debt of the govern- ent as well as blocked private accounts deposited in the World War II fiat oney, and lowered the real value of wages in relation to prices by ap- oximately eleven per cent. These measures, by means of the threat of arvation, force many retired workers and housewives into the labor market. he independent farmer had to begin again from scratch. His savings gone, e had hardly any alternative beyond joining a UAC. Although UAC's do njoy special privileges as compared to independent farmers, life as a mem- er is not easy either. Official prices paid for commodities sold in fulfillment the compulsory delivery quotas and contracts do not cover much beyond e costs of production. Family exemptions provide enough food to keep e farm peple on a subsistence level, so, if any cash should be made avail- le for the purchase of textiles and other non-food consumer goods, it can me only from the sale of surplus production. The combination of market- g and monetary reforms was supposed to bring about a part of the anned production increases but the cure was so severe that the life of the atient was endangered in the process. The 1953 summer rebellions in Pil- n and Moravská Ostrava seem to indicate that there was a limit to the mount of unnecessary hardship people were willing to tolerate.

President Klement Gottwald died as a consequence of a cold which he ught at Stalin's funeral in Moscow. After his death, the régime, in an vious bid for popular support, started on a New Course. Production of nsumer goods was emphasized. The pressure for collectivization was dim- ished; in fact some farmers were premitted to leave UAC's and return to ivate operations. These are no doubt merely temporary concessions fully nsistent with Lenin's motto "three steps back, five steps forward."

Late in 1954 there was obvious pressure for a return to the heavy- dustry policy and if developments in the Soviet Union can be considered dicative of things to come in the satellites, the point of reversal of the New ourse has been reached. On January 24, 1955, Dmitri Shepilov, editor of e Moscow *Pravda,* recalled that Stalin once said that slowing down the te of industrialization "means falling behind. And the backward are aten."

Shepilov's history-making article coincided with the resignation of nastas Mikoyan from his post as Minister of Foreign Trade. The official nouncement emphasized that the resignation was voluntary and it seemed vious that there was no purge when, two days later, Mr. Mikoyan ap- ared with other Soviet leaders at a reception in the Indian Embassy. As r. Mikoyan had been widely known as a champion of more consumer ods his resignation was generally assumed to mark the end of the con-

sumer goods campaign. The printers ink had hardly a chance to dry on the news about Mikoyan's resignation when the troubles were pinned down to the agricultural sector. Malenkov was chosen as the leading scapegoat to carry the guilt for the consequences of the inherently bad public relations which the Bolsheviks always have had with the peasant masses. Lately Ivan Alexandrovich Benediktov, Minister of Agriculture, and Alexi Ivanovich Kozlov, Minister of State Farms, were assigned roles of co-scapegoatism. Krushchev seems to be reverting to toughness.

It was merely a question of two weeks before President Zapotocký followed suit and declared that the Indian Summer of plentiful consumer goods was officially over. But, instead of announcing another tightening of the collectivization screws, Mr. Uher, the Minister of Agriculture, pleaded for help of the "medium farmer who is usually a good and experienced manager and organizer".[1] The regime needs his aid in trying to solve the agricultural crisis. So, we are encountering a New Apple-Polishing Course toward the independent farmer. How long this honeymoon will last is anybody's guess. One thing is certain, however, the collectivization gospel still holds.

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[1]Quoted by L. Feierabend in "Zemědělská Bilance za Rok 1950 (Balance Sheet for the 1954 Agriculture) *Czechoslovak Review,* March 1955, p. 16.

)MMUNISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

by J. Frankel

I.

VER SINCE the establishment of the Yugoslav state, national discontent has dominated its politics and provided the Communist movement with the most promising field of recruitment. Hence the importance of Communist solution of the national problem—it determined the Party's lization of the discontent and, after initial failures, made possible its al rise to power.

First Yugoslavia, or the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slo-nes, as it was called on its establishment, emerged from the First World ar with the most checkered national composition of all the new European tes. The union of the component nationalities was loose: many Serbs garded the new state as an enlargement of the kingdom of Serbia in which y were entitled to a privileged position, while the Croats and the Mace-nians and, to a certain extent also the Bosnians and the Montenegrins, re indifferent and even hostile. There was some armed opposition in greb and in Macedonia but it was soon suppressed. Many discontented ionalists came out in support of the newly formed Communist Party of goslavia (CPY), considering it a rallying point for the opposition. In 1920 elections to the Constituent Assembly they played a preponderant t in securing for the Party 58 seats and in thus establishing it as the third gest political party in Yugoslavia.

The Communists were, however, unable to utilize the revolutionary entialities of national discontent since they were ideologically ill-uipped. They had inherited from the preceding Social Democratic Parties undamental lack of appreciation of nationalism because the Serbian ialists had regarded it as a purely bourgeois cause of no interest to the kers, while the Austro-Hungarian Social Democrats had favored Bauer's ition of cultural autonomy, scarcely applicable to postwar realities. Con-uently, when finally united at its Second Congress held at Vukovar in 0, the Party ignored the problem and simply set itself the task to "con-ue to stand on the bulwark of national unity." As Tito has said, this roach was based on "a complete non-comprehension of the national blem."[1] Until 1920 the young Communist Party had nothing at all to on the question and therefore it rapidly lost to various nationalist and aratist groups the support arising from national discontent. The govern-nt found it relatively easy to check the Communist movement through ice measures culminating in the dissolution of the Party in 1921.

In contrast to its faulty evaluation of the revolutionary situation in

[1] *Istoriski Arhiv Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije* (Belgrade, 1950), II, p. 27ff.; J. Tito, *tical Report of the Central Committee of the CPY*, delivered at the Fifth Congress of CPY (Belgrade, 1948), p. 14.

other countries, the Comintern grasped the fundamental importance of the national problem in Yugoslavia. From the Second Conference of the Communist Balkan Federation held in Sofia held in 1922 they brought pressure on the Yugoslav Communists to acknowledge the Marxist formula in its Russian interpretation—the right to national self-determination including the right of separation. This formula involved or implied the disintegration of Yugoslavia or, at the very least, the separation of the Yugoslav part of Macedonia in order to include it in an independent Macedonian state to be established as a part of a Communist Balkan Federation. It was, of course, in line with Russian policy which aimed in the 'twenties at the revision of the Versailles system, and with the views of the Bulgarian Communists, influential in the Comintern. It was, however, unpalatable to the Yugoslav Communists and split them into a "right" and a "left" wing. The "right" wing, in defiance of the Cominform instructions, defended Yugoslav unity and followed the traditions both of the Serbian and the Austro-Hungarian Social Democrats. As authoritatively stated by the Secretary of the Party, Sima Marković, in his pamphlet, *The National Problem in the Light of Marxism,* published in 1923, they considered nationalism a bourgeois cause and advocated a solution by constitutional means, leaving Yugoslav unity intact.

The "left" wing accepted the Cominform formula but paid it lip-service only, hoping that it would be actually implemented only in the very distant future, if ever. They also did not fully grasp the importance of the national question and paid relatively little attention to the basic conflict between the Serbs and the Croats, preoccupying themselves with the less imporant Macedonian problem in which, however, the Comintern was more interested. Following a period of "rightist" leadership elected at the First Party Conference held in Vienna in 1921, the "left" wing came to power during the Second Party Conference, held in Vienna in 1922, but did not take a stand in principle on the national problem although it paid it "a little more serious attention." The Third Party Conference held in Belgrade in 1923 subscribed to the Comintern formula but balked at an express recognition of the Macedonians as a nation.[2] Considerable additional pressure, including repeated interventions by Stalin himself, were necessary before the Third Party Congress, held in Vienna in 1926, finally complied with the Comintern demands.

The struggle between the two factions was acute but apparently due to personal animosities at least as much as to a division on the national question. After 1926 discussion of this question ceased and the furious factional fights in the subsequent years were, as Tito says, "without any basis in principle whatsoever." The Conferences of the CPY held in 1928 and in 1934 relegated the solution of the national problem far back among the tasks of the Party. From 1934, after the Soviet Union had relinquished its revis-

[2]This is admitted in the editorial commentary of the *Istoriski Arhiv,* II, p. 474, n. 1 but glossed over by Tito in his *Political Report,* p. 27, in which he alleges that the resolution recognized the Macedonians as a people.

nist policies, the Comintern tacitly abandoned the idea of the dismember-ent of Yugoslavia.[3]

To sum up the interwar period, it is quite clear that there was nothing iginal or purely Yugoslav in the solution of the national question advo-ted by the Yugoslav Communists. On the contrary, the solution based the principle of self-determination including the right of separation was posed by the Comintern. The Yugoslavs accepted the solution in 1926 d did not dispute it later due not so much to full-hearted agreement as preoccupation with other more pressing problems, such as the struggle r power among their leaders and the difficulties of underground work der the dictatorship.

II.

The period from September 1939 until June 1941 is obscure. The CPY s not published its historical archives for this period and other official goslav sources gloss over the story, stating that the time was used for the eparation of the rising. There is no evidence to substantiate the claim vanced by the Yugoslav Communists that, showing more independence an other European Communists, they pursued an anti-German policy be-e the German attack on the Soviet Union, in particular that they took a nificant part in the anti-German demonstration on March 27, 1941.

Meanwhile, encouraged by the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and lowing the example of other suppressed nationalities in Europe, the oats and other Yugoslav national groups started strong anti-Serbian move-nts which endangered Yugoslav unity. The national problem became so ute that the important Fifth National Conference of the CPY, held in tober 1940, felt impelled to restate the Communist platform. The ex-pts from the resolutions of this Conference that have been made public eal that, at least in the autumn of 1940, the Party was fully supporting ese centrifugal movements, although it is not clear to what extent and th what aims.[4]

The Communists started guerilla warfare against the Germans and lians only after the German attack on Russia on June 22, 1941. They or-nized the so-called Partisans as a purely patriotic movement and soon naged to disguise the Communist character of their leadership.

Milovan Djilas, one of the most eminent Yugoslav theoreticians of the tional question, admits that the Party entered the war with only a vague neral program in the field, scarcely going beyond immediate brotherhood

[3] *Istoriski Arhiv,* II, pp .110-2, 219, 231, 247ff., and J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (London, 1920), pp. 220ff., and 221ff.

[4] M. Djilas, *Report on Agitation-Propaganda Work of the Central Committee of the Y,* delivered at the Fifth Congress of the CPY (Belgrade 1948), p. 13. The Yugoslav nmunists deny, however, the report that in March 1941 Tito issued a secret directive ering the dissolution of Yugoslavia into its component parts and support even for the ashi. (This is alleged by S. Glissold, *Whirlwind* p. 27. See also H. F. Armstrong, *o and Goliath* p. 26.

in arms and the slogan of *bratstvo-jedinstvo* (brotherhood-unity).[5] The most important Party document for the initial period of the war was Tito's article on "The National Problem in the Light of the National Liberation War," first published in September 1942 and later reprinted many times in Serbo-Croat and in translations. Here Tito squarely condemned Serbian oppression and stated that the liberation war and the national question were "inseparably joined." He declared that the several Yugoslav nations had the right of self-determination including that of separation, and qualified this right only in so far as to deny it to fascists like Pavelić.[6] Although only a statement of general principles, the article has had an enormous influence on the country.

The multi-national complications of the political scene in Yugoslavia and the atrocities committed by the Ustashi, the Chetniks and the Moslems, not only did not impede the Communist-controlled Partisan movement but, on the contrary, provided it with a vast reservoir of manpower.[7] The Partisans were the only all-Yugoslav organization actively opposing the enemies and their collaborators with a definite program of national toleration while the majority of the political parties were organized on a national basis and were able to attract the sympathy and even the active support of many non-Communists who could see no alternative to Communist leadership except mutual extermination of the Yugoslav nations.

Despite grave temporary setbacks in some parts of Yugoslavia, notably in Macedonia and in Montenegro, the Partisans scored great successes with their national program. Therefore, when laying the foundations for New Yugoslavia at the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (AVNOJ), held in the midst of fighting on November 29, 1943, at Jajce, Tito decided to proclaim the province of federalism:

> "On the basis of the right of all nations to self-determination, including the union with or secession from other nations, and in accordance with the true will of all the nations of Yugoslavia, passes the following decisions: . . ."
> "2. . . . Yugoslavia is being built on the federal principle which will ensure full equality to the nations of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina."
> "3. In accordance with the federal organization of Yugoslavia . . . organs of the people's authorities have been established in different lands of Yugoslavia in the form of National Liberation Committees and Provincial Anti-Fascist Councils of National Liberation."
> "4. National minorities of Yugoslavia will be secured in all their rights."

The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation elected at the Jajce

[5] M. Djilas, "On the Solution of the National Problem", *Članci 1941-1945* (Belgrade 1947), p. 233f. Djilas does not explain how this program has been arrived at. It appears to be a departure from the resolution of the Fifth National Conference.

[6] J. Broz Tito, *Borba za Oslobodjenje Jugoslavije 1941-1945* (Belgrade, 1947), pp. 122-131.

[7] Cp. M. Djilas, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-8.

ngress included representatives of all the Yugoslav nationalities and the ational Committee of Liberation (the Provisional Government) included Serbs, five Croats, four Slovenes, one Montenegrin and one Bosnian oslem. The newly elected Council declared that Yugoslavia would be sed on the principle of "national brotherhood and equality of all peoples ing within."[8]

Even the major opponent of the Partisans, Mihajlović, although a representative of the particularist Serbian patriotism, could not ignore the tional issue and vainly endeavored to emulate the Jajce Congress by nvening in January 1944 and the so-called St. Sava Congress in which, at st outwardly, all the Yugoslav nationalities were represented.[9]

III.

The Partisans continued their policy of Yugoslav unity after they had come established as the Government of Yugoslavia. They dealt summarily t generally on the basis of legal process with individual war criminals, ether Croats or Serbs, successfully eliminating communal reprisals and pressing national strife. A law promulgated in May 1945 and amended July 1946 prohibited incitement to national, racial and religious hatreds d dissension and provided for severe penalties for the infringement of provisions.[10]

New Yugoslavia was built on the federal pattern, as decided at Jajce. As ght have been expected from Partisan-organized and controlled bodies, Provincial Anti-Fascist Councils and the National Liberation Committ- s duly declared themselves for union, not for separation. In wartime con- ions there could be no question of plebiscites, elections or more widely presentative bodies but, as in the case of the Soviet Union, the right of aration existed only on paper. Admittedly, probably none of the Yugo- nationalities would have actually wished to exercise this right.

A federal system for Yugoslavia was not an exclusively Communist a. Several plans had been proposed by non-Communists in the early rs of Yugoslavia's existence.[11] However, the Federal Constitution pro- lgated on January 31, 1946, closely followed the Soviet Constitution of 6. Article One declared:

> "The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's State of republican form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, basing themselves on a right to self-determination which includes the right to separation, have expressed a will to live together in a federal state."

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[8] *New Yugoslavia,* published by the United South Slav Committee (London, 1944), 12-13, 18.

[9] Cp. S. Clissold, *op. cit.,* p. 22, and M. Martin, *An Ally Betrayed,* pp. 191-2

[10] *Službeni List,* 322, No. 36 of May 29, 1945, and 383, No. 56 of July 12, 1946.

[11] Cp. Ferdo Culinović, *Diktatura Kralja Aleksandra* (Belgrade, 1952). The recent ication of these two books indicates a renewed interest in the indigenous sources of ralism, coming to the surface four years after the break with the Cominform.

Article Nine proclaimed the principle of the sovereignty of the six Republics. A Council of Nationalities was established as the Second House in order to protect the rights of the Republics.

True to the Russian pattern, the constitutional forms were relatively unimportant since all actual power was exercised by the strongly centralized Communist Party which controlled all the branches of government.

In one significant respect the Yugoslavs departed from the Russian example—they never evolved a parallel to the "leading nation" position of the Great Russians within the Soviet Union and therefore, although based on the same theory and conducted within an identical institutional framework, their actual solution of the national problem was quite different. The departure was dictated by the circumstances in Yugoslavia. The only nation which could aspire to the "leading" position, the Serbs, did not reach absolute majority. Moreover, the Communist movement had been built on opposition to Great-Serbian oppression and had scored its wartime successes by stressing national equality. Hence national equality did not remain an empty letter. Not only local and Republican officers were recruited among the local population but the central authorities included a large proportion of representatives of the smaller nationalities. Membership in the Communist Party was distributed throughout the country[12] and the multinational team of wartime leaders occupied the positions of highest responsibility in the Politburo.

The Army also played an important unifying role. During the War of Liberation the rising in Serbia was led by Tito (half-Croat and half-Slovene), in Montenegro by Moš Piyade (a Serbian Jew), and in Macedonia by Vukmanović-Tempo (a Montenegrin). According to Tito, from a predominantly Serbian force at the beginning of the insurrection, by the Spring of 1944 the National Liberation Army developed into a pronouncedly all-Yugoslav institution with 44% Serbs, 30% Croats, 10% Slovenes, 4% Montenegrins, with representatives of other national groups.[13] Following wartime experiences, the Army maintained the tradition of recruits spending part of their military service outside their own Republics. Recruits from all nationalities mixed together and were subject to the same commands in Serbo-Croat, a language which might previously have been little known to some.

In the economic field the new régime pursued two goals: first, the elimination of inequality and the raising of the backward parts of Yugoslavia to the level of those more advanced; secondly, the establishment and direction of a unified socialist economy. Here the absence of a "leading nation" resulted in great benefits for the undeveloped Republics, since the extensive investment in them was financed by those more advanced.[14]

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[12]No statistical information is available on this subject but random observation in many parts of Yugoslavia has revealed the existence of Communist groups even in small uncollectivized rural communities. The majority of these groups were organized during or immediately after the war.

[13]Tito, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

[14]B. Kidrič, *On the Construction of Socialist Economy in the FPRY*, speech delivered

At a meeting at Pula in 1949 Tito formulated the economic problems the following words:

"There cannot be a correct solution to the nationalities' problem while one Republic is backward and another advanced, while one Republic or nationality advances at the cost of another nationality, while economic inequlity persists. Therefore we have provided in our Constitution that all nationalities, all our Republics, should develop uniformly."[15]

Yugoslav policy concerning education and culture followed the Russian escription, "national in form, socialist in content." At great cost maxium opportunity for cultural autonomy was given not only to the contuent nationalities but even to the smallest minority groups. Schools in inority languages were endowed, limited editions of school-books were inted for their use, cultural associations and activities were subsidized. here was no parallel to the policy of russification introduced in the Soviet nion in the thirties and persistently employed since.

It became public policy to consider the national questions as solved. eaking at a festive meeting of the Slovene Academy of Fine Arts on Noember 16, 1948, Tito stated the Party's attitude in the following words:

"The problem of nationalities has been regulated and even very well regulated, to the general satisfaction of all the peoples. It was regulated in accordance with the precepts of Lenin and Stalin. And the solution is the expression of our revolution . . . We have formally disunited in order to unite better in reality. On our actual community the rights of the great and the small nationalities are recognized on equal footing. There is no more with us the hegemony of one nation over another. And this is exactly what makes us firm and monolithic."[16]

In fact the Yugslav nationalities' program was so successful that, despite enuous propaganda since 1948, the Cominform has been unable to sway y national group against the present régime. However, the Party did not mpletely abandon the national question and its 1948 Program included item on "the strengthening of the equality of the Peoples of Yugoslavia."

Until 1948 the Yugoslav Communists often acknowledged their debt to arxism-Leninism-Stalinism and the Russian example. After their rift th the Cominform and the Yugoslavs began to differentiate between the ssian and the Yugoslav treatments of the national question. The Comorm accused the Yugoslavs of mal-treatment of minorities and of Serbian ploitation of Kosmet, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.[17] Tito urned full measure in his evaluation of the Russian record in his report the Sixth Congress of the CPY held in November 1952:

"The theory of the leading nation in a multinational state is an ex-

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the Fifth Congress of the CPY (Belgrade, 1948), and R. Čolaković, "The Solution of National Problem in Yugoslavia," *Kommunist*, 4-5, July-September 1950, pp. 61-2.

[15]Quoted by V. Smilevski, "Review of the Development of the Macedonian National blem", *Kommunist*, 1, January 1950, p. 108.

[16]J. Broz Tito, *Sur le Nationalisme et l 'Internationalisme* (Belgrade, 1948), pp. 7, 10.

pression of actual subjugation, national oppression and economic exploitation of other nations within the country by the leading nation . . ."

He followed with some of the notorious cases of genocide and national oppression in the Soviet Union and distinguished between the Russian and the Yugoslav solutions thus:

> "As distinct from the prosecution and extermination of entire nations in their country, we can point with pride to a community of equal peoples who govern themselves, where the weaker and more backward Republics receive assistance for speedier development from the stronger . . . As distinct from the Stalinist theory of centralization, the road of decentralization and democratization has been chosen, the withering away of the state of particular functions, by degrees, of course."[18]

Since 1950 the official treatment of the national question has perceptibly changed. The emphasis has gradually shifted from the particular elements to Yugoslav unity. Decentralization measures undertaken in the administrative and economic field do not, as might superficially be assumed, detract from the powers vested in central authorities and thus reinforce the People's Republics. The Republics are now able to exercise more economic initiative and are developing competition for a fuller share of investments and of foreign markets.[19] Often, however, the powers of the People's Committees and of the new Producers' Councils are carved out of the Republican and not the Federal sphere of competence. The New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia of 1953 fully acknowledges the diminished status of the Republics. The Council of the Nationalities is now superseded by the Council of Producers as the Second House and normally remains part of the Federal Council, sitting as a separate body only when proposals of constitutional changes or the federal economic plans are considered. The debate leading to the New Fundamental Law revealed that even in its previous form, as a fully-fledged Second House, the Council of Nationalities never played a significant role.[20] There is even less likelihood of its becoming active in its new humbler guise.

Yugoslavia is engaged in the process of national unification in which, according to the New Fundamental Law, the working people of the country are to exercise the power and to manage their social affairs as far as possible directly. The overall control in important matters is being exercised by the Federation rather than by the Republics. If this course continues, the Republics and the nationalities they represent will gradually lose their present position and will be relegated to politically unimportant fields. The

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[17]E.g. *For a Lasting Peace for the People's Democracy*, May 25-June 1, 1951.

[18]J. Broz Tito, "The Struggle of the Communists of Yugoslavia for Socialist Democracy", the Report to the Sixth Congress of the CPY, in the *Bulletin* of the C. C. of the CPY, November 2, 1952, pp. 19-20, 23.

[19]E.g.: In 1952 and 1953 considerable acrimony ensued from the dispute about the location of a projected national rayon factory; the commercial representatives from the various Republics offering in London the native brandy did not divulge to one another the prices quoted.

[20]*Borba*, September 6, 1953.

ndency towards centralization is common to all loose political structures, ether Communist or non-Communist; either they integrate and subdue e component parts or they will disintegrate. It is necessary, however, to ard against far-fetched historical parallels. The process of eliminating rticularist national loyalties from their important place in Yugoslav litics, even if finally to be successful, will necessarily be slow and subtle. bears no resemblance to the pre-war Great-Serbian oppression or to the eat Russian predominance within the Soviet Union. But it is noticeable d it is resented by some Yugoslavs, particularly among the Croats.

IV.

After this brief outline of the historical background, we may now turn the present situation.

In Yugoslavia today the large ethnic groups within the country are rmed nationalities, while the smaller ones, being part of national groups e majority of whom live outside Yugoslavia, are termed national minor-es. All Yugoslav citizens are simultaneously members of one of the na-nalities or minorities. The Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who ve remained partly undeclared, are being encouraged to choose their na-nal allegiance and to declare themselves either Serb or Croat.

According to the official estimate of the census taken in March 1953, the million Yugoslavs are divided as follows:

Serbs	42.0%
Croats	23.2
Slovenes	8.9
Macedonians	3.7
Montenegrins	3.0
Undeclared	5.8
Remainder	13.4
Total	100.0%[21]

As might be expected, the relations between the Serbs and the Croats, e two largest national groups, are of crucial importance in Yugoslav pol-cs. The Serbs, numbering over 7 million, are by far the largest ethnic oup but nevertheless are nowhere near the position of an absolute major-. Moreover, over a quarter of their numbers live outside the confines of rbia and usually differ in their interests and outlook from the Serbs living

[21]Census of March 31, 1953, *Estimating Census Figures,* (Belgrade, May 14, 1953), ble II, p. 17. Obviously there is a mistake about the percentage of the Macedonians, o according to the table, would represent only 3.7% and would therefore number less in 630,000. At the last census, taken five years earlier, the Macedonians amounted to % of the total population and numbered 810,000. They show the highest natural in-ase among all the Yugoslav nationalities and their present numbers are estimated at out one million. With regard to the subsequent demographic data the author is much liged to Professor Rudolf Bičanić of the University of Zagreb for having made avail-le to him the results of his researches.

in Serbia itself. In First Yugoslavia many of these so-called "prečani" Serbs were opposed to Serbian domination and advocated federalism.

Serbo-Croat relations are extremely complex and result from the interplay of many unifying and dividing forces, particularly racial, geographical, historical, and cultural.

The major factors for unity can be stated simply. They are racial affinity, as expressed in the identiy of language and similarity of customs; geographical proximity resulting in the intermingling of both nations; and the heritage of common opposition to Turkish aggression which prevented an early rise of separate national consciousness.

Perhaps the major dividing force is religion: the Orthodox Church, prevalent among the Serbs, and the Roman Catholic, prevalent among the Croats, are mutually distrustful. Furthermore, the historical and political traditions are partly divergent; both nations cherish memories of separate statehoods in the Middle Ages, although the memories are slightly nebulous with the Croats. In modern times the Serbs have acquired in their struggles against the Turks a fierce spirit of independence, while the Croats, relatively safe within the confines of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, have adopted a legalistic, easy-going attitude toward politics.

Different cultural influences—from Byzantium on Serbia and from Italy on Croatia—have resulted in the employment of different alphabets, the Cyrillic in Serbia and the Latin in Croatia.[22]

The ethnically mixed regions are claimed by both nations. This has created an intractable problem, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Serb and Croat elements are inextricably mixed with a politically inert Moslem population, ready to declare themselves for whichever side happens to predominate at the time.

Finally, as a result of all these divergencies, the two nations have developed different sets of values.[23] In First Yugoslavia the Croats harbored a justified grievance against Serbian domination. In the short period from 1924 until 1928 the King was able to enlist their limited cooperation, but after the assassination of the popular Croatian peasant leader, Stjepan Radić, relations deteriorated rapidly. Trying to maintain Yugoslav unity in face of hostile neighbors by which the country was surrounded, King Alexander leaned heavily for support on the Serbian element and Croatian dissatisfaction grew accordingly. The last-minute reconciliation attempt, the Maček-Cvetković Agreement of 1939 was too late to prevent the final rift and many Croats welcomed the invading troops in 1941.

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[22]This divergency began to play an important part with the spread of literacy in the nineteenth century. Morover, both nations habitually employ different sets of expressions to denote objects of daily use. The differences are such that during Pavelić's régime one Croatian professor was able to develop the theory that the two nations speak quite different languages.

[23]In a private experiment conducted by a professor of the University of Zagreb, a group of Serbs and a group of Croats were given a list of ten values to be marked in order of importance. There was full agreement within each national group but disagreement between the two groups.

The war record was gruesome. Pavelić and his Ustashi in "independ-:" Croatia exterminated many Serbs while the Chetniks paid back in id, and the prevention of wholesale reprisals after the war ranks among greatest achievements of the present Government. Whether effectively minated or only suppressed, the memory of wartime conflicts never played najor part in postwar Yugoslavia. On the surface at least it appears that e shadows of Pavelić's régime are gradually disappearing among the Serbs ile the Croats have little cause to harbour resentment against their treat-nt after the war.

The Government, endeavoring to solve impartially the points of con-t between the Serbs and the Croats, came under attack by extreme nation-sts, of both sides. Both could point to many instances in which the in-ests of their particular nationality had been sacrificed, but it is difficult accept any of their conflicting arguments that the sacrifices were being ide in the interest of the other nationality and not, as the Government ims, for the benefit of the country as a whole. The grievances arising from e delimitation of the Republics are no longer of great importance since th politically and economically Yugoslavia has progressed towards uni-ation. The Communists have solved the problem of Bosnia and Herzego-na by establishing it as a separate Republic, the only one of the six ople's Republics which is not the expression of a separate nationality.

The Serbs generally tend to identify themselves with the Federation, obably largely due to the tradition of the interwar years when they ac-stomed themselves to regard Yugoslavia as *their* state. In fact, while all e other nationalities have reason to be satisfied under the new régime, e Serbs could harbor a grievance over the loss of their predominance. The oats, although generally less ardent Yugoslav patriots, acknowledged the moval of discrimination. Even the staunchest Croatian nationalists can-t entertain the traditional ideas of a separate statehood wihout remember-g the compromising history of Pavelić's "independence" and without real-ng that, as a separate state, Croatia would not be economically viable.

The Serbs tend to take pride in the achievements of the Federation in veloping the economically backward areas. The Croats assume a much ore reserved attitude. They feel no grievance on that score since half of oatia is underdeveloped and the Republic's gains and losses from the licy of equalization are roughly equal. Some, however, express the opin-n, which seems unjustified, that the major development areas, Macedonia d Bosnia, are being developed for particularist Serbian rather than for l-Yugoslav interests.

Also concerning religious life, the Serbs have been able to accommo-te themselves to the new régime better than the Croats. The Orthodox urch which has traditionally identified itself with the Serbian state, is t in acute conflict with the Communist Government. The Roman Cath-ic Church in Croatia, by contrast, has retained its supranational, universal aracter. It is considered by the Government not a religious institution t an agent of the Vatican and, behind it, of the hostile Italian state. Ac-

cording to the Government the Church is quite intransigent, more so than in other Communist countries. It certainly serves as a rallying point for particularist Croatian patriotism, sometimes tinged with anti-Yugoslav sentiments. The conflict crystallizes around the person of Archbishop Stepinac, recently elected a Cardinal. The Church treats him as a saint and martyr while the Communists consider him a war criminal who has escaped just punishment.[24]

Although the Serbs and the Croats have been living within the confines of the same state for over three decades, a great gulf still separates Zagreb from Belgrade. The former unmistakably bears the stamp of the Austro-Hungarian Empire while the latter combines oriental elements with new Communist features. Cultural sources differ: the Croats have remained within the sphere of the German language and have never been fully affected by the Russian influence prevalent in Serbia, especially in the postwar years, until 1949. They generally regard themselves as culturally superior to the Serbs while the latter consider themselves the truer Yugoslav patriots and, in the cause of Communists, the truer Communists. A certain degree of integration has, however, taken place. While the anti-German demonstrations on March 27, 1941, were confined to Belgrade, the Croats did not dissociate themselves from the two major postwar demonstrations—against the Comintern in 1948 and against the Western Powers in October 1953.

It is difficult to gauge with any degree of certitude the present relations between the two peoples. Apparently the Serbs largely accept the official doctrine that the national question has been finally solved, but in Croatia one still often hears of the "Croatian problem." No doubt, this is partly because old habits die hard and the Croatian intellectuals find it hard to avoid seeing a "Croatian problem" in practically every aspect of social life, whether with or without justification; partly, however, because under the unruffled surface of daily life some of the old antagonism is still latent. A major outbreak is inconceivable under the present régime, but mutual animosities may manifest themselves in most unexpected situations. Even a disputed decision of the referee in a sports competition between a Serbian and a Croatian team may flare up to become a minor national conflict. The young generation is by no means immune from the jingoist virus.

V.

While the Serbs or the Croats could conceivably separate themselves from Yugoslavia's body-politic and establish independent states, this is not the case with the small Slovene nation. The Slovenes on their own could not withstand the pressure of their powerful German and Italian neighbors; for them the Federation is a matter of life and death. Therefore, on the whole, they are the staunchest Yugoslav patriots and are proud of having provided out of their small numbers several of Yugoslavia's national lead-

[24]The religious problem is of great importance even in present Communist Yugoslavia. According to the official estimates of the last census 86.4% (sic) of the population still adhere to religion. (*Estimating Census Figures, op. cit.*, table XI, p. 21).

particularly Vice-president Edward Kardelj and late economist Boris rić.

Being the most industrialized nation in Yugoslavia and having enjoyed highest standard of living, the Slovenes are now called upon to undergo greatest sacrifices in order to raise the economic level of the backward s of the country. They openly criticize the inefficient and the exaggerl features of the industrialization program but they remain confirmed heir Yugoslav patriotism.

Generally speaking, the Slovenes are much more outspoken but much resentful of the control from Belgrade than the Croats. Not being adnt to the Serbs, they have no direct conflict with them and the lack of quate resources. An illuminating case was the launching of a Slovene ion of the Party organ, *Borba*, in 1953. This created resentment among e Slovene intellectuals who felt that their own newspapers could not nstand the competition of the national paper commanding much greatesources and therefore a superior information service.

The difference between the Slovene and the Croat relations with the ent régime is revealed by the fact that while 60% of the Slovene Roman holic clergy have been organized in a clergy-association cooperating n the Government, Communist endeavors to establish a similar associa- in Croatia have so far failed.[25] Doubtless the Slovenes have much more ommon with the Croats than with the Serbs: they are predominantly nan Catholics and they show strong traces of the Austro-Hungarian lition. Slovene relations with the Croats have been generally friendly no major conflicts have arisen in the last few generations. Nevertheif a few ardent Slovenes may still harbor dreams of a Central European holic Federation, they were not attracted by Pavelić and would not enain the idea of joining an independent Croatia.

Then in the case of the Slovenes there enter international complicas. While the majority of Serbs and Croats live in Yugoslavia, many enes live in Italy and in Austria. Owing to the age-long denationaliza- policies pursued in these countries it is difficult to determine how ay—according to the high Yugoslav estimates half a million against 1½ ion Slovenes in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Slovenes are naturally coned with the fate of their compatriots. They bitterly complain about r treatment but while the Federal Government takes up their case nst Italy, the official policy of friendship with Austria prevents dehined intervention in the latter country. The Slovenes voice strong cism of the Austrian Government in specialist periodicals but, apparentwing to the official policy, not in their daily press. Apprehension that Slovenes mght accuse the Federation of being indifferent also to the of the inhabitants of the Free Territory of Trieste has probably been mportant factor in making Tito's position in his negotiations with Italy ntransigent one.

[25]Information received in August 1953 from Mr. Cankar, Secretary of the Association Dean of the Theological Faculty in Ljubljana.

International complications enter even more strongly in the case of the Macedonians. According to Yugoslav estimates, against the approximately one million Macedonians in Yugoslavia, there live perhaps half a million under Bulgarian and 200,000 under Greek rule. Greek and Bulgarian figures are considerably lower. There has been some dispute as to the separate nationality of the Macedonians. They do, in fact, merge with the South Serbs on the one side and with the Bulgarians on the other, but the dividing lines between other South Slav tribes are not always any clearer. The Yugoslav Communists have accepted with some difficulty the Comintern thesis of separate Macedonian nationality, but in New Yugoslavia the Macedonians enjoy as much autonomy as the Serbs or the Croats. They have full opportunities for the development of their national language and culture and are busy establishing a grammar-basis for a literary language and translating into Macedonian masterpieces of world literature.

The national movement is encouraged also in the Orthodox Church which is now in a state of semi-rebellion against the Patriarchate in Belgrade and has only recently given up vague ideas of an autocephalous Macedonian national church. The Macedonian clergy demand the appointment of Macedonians as eparchs and refuse to accept the Serbian nominees. They are at present managing their own affairs without any eparchs and are fully organized in a Government-supported clergy-association.[26] The national character of the church is further stressed by the use of the new translations of the Gospels into Macedonian.

The Macedonians draw enormous economic advantages from the Federation. Living as they do in one of the most backward parts of Yugoslavia which is endowed with great mineral riches, they receive copious funds for the development of mining and industry. According to one unofficial estimate they contribute 9% to the national budget but receive from it as much as 28%. No doubt the Macedonians generally appreciate their position. This does not, however, fully solve their national problem. The Federal Government now supports Macedonian grievances against Bulgaria but the official policy of friendship with Greece, prevailing since 1951, prevents a similiar Yugoslav attitude to that country. Meanwhile, the Macedonians claim, their brethren in Aegean Macedonia are subject to the old ruthless denationalization laws which have never been amended.[27]

The future of the Macedonian people and the question of their unification obviously depend on the development of Balkan politics in general. Separate organizations of refugees from the Bulgarian and the Greek parts

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[26]Information received in July 1953 from Mr. Stankovski, Secretary of the Association.

[27]At the time of writing two new developments regarding the Macedonian problem are not clear: (a) whether the government was introducing some pressure on behalf of the Macedonians in Greece. (cp. the intervention regarding a new land-statute, *New York Times*, September 1, 1953); (b) what was the significance of the elections in November 1953 when many candidates unendorsed by the Socialist Alliance of the Working People presented themselves to the electorate. Most of these candidatures were withdrawn at the last minute but a few unendorsed candidates were actually elected.

active in Skoplje; in the event of a Balkan conflict they could, no doubt, very useful.

The smallest Yugoslav nation, the Montenegrins, number only half nillion. They generally consider themselves a branch of the Serbian ion and answer in the affirmative to both questions—whether they are bs or Montenegrins. They are both. Their present position compares orably with their interwar economic exploitation; they have a full-ged Peoples' Republic of their own and they enjoy financial support n the Federation. Only rarely, as in the case of Djilas, does the tradition-nonconformity of the Montenegrin mountaineers clash with the new er.

Finally, there are several national minorities. Their largest numbers in the Republic of Serbia and are organized in two autonomous units—Hungarians, Rumanians and others in the Autonomous Province of the vodina, and the Shipetars, as the Albanians are now called, in the Auto-nous District of Kosovo and Methohija (Kosmet). The minorities enjoy tural and linguistic freedom, and, when living within the autonomous ts, also a degree of political autonomy. The treatment of minorities in goslavia has been successful and paid dividends after 1948 when the minform failed in its endeavors to foment national discord in Yugo-ia. Instead of forming opposition groups, the minorities now provide basis for the activities of political refugees from behind the Iron Curtain o are organized like the Macedonian refugees and could be similarly d in an emergency.[28]

While the other minority groups constitute only small portions of the al numbers of their respective nations, this is not the case with the Shipe-s who number 800,000 in Yugoslavia against about 1,200,000 in Albania. doubtedly until 1948 the Yugoslavs expected the eventual incorporation Albania in the Federation.[29] In anticipation of this event, they organ-l the territory inhabited by about two-thirds of the Yugoslav Shipetars an Autonomous District which could easily be joined with Albania. As esult of the Cominform split, the anti-Yugoslav party asserted itself ong the Albanian rulers and the fusion did not take place. The question eventual unification with the rest of the Albanian nation is not now cially mentioned, but again we find an organization of refugees from ania, obviously enjoying governmental support.

The Shipetars, who are one of the most backward and illiterate national ups in Yugoslavia, are now enjoying a great educational and cultural

[28]Official information on minorities is collected in the booklet by L. Stojković and š Martić, *Nacjonalne Manjine u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade, 1953). According to the ority of Western observers, this picture does not apply to Zone B where the Yugo-s are said to be bent on the weakening of the Italian element. (E.g. *The Times* ndon) March 13, 1954. The Yugoslavs, however, deny any official pressure for the exodus of the Italians which has taken place. Cp. Tanjug *Bulletin,* London, March 1954).

[29]Cp. V. Dedijer, *Jugoslovensko-Albanski Odnosi (1939-1948)*, Belgrade, 1949. Al-gh the author staunchly denies any annexionist intentions on the part of the Yugo-, the contents of this book fully confirm the opposite view.

uplift and a degree of autonomy under their own leaders. Their economic development lags far behind that of Macedonia or Bosnia but nevertheless they seem satisfied with their present position.

VI.

The conclusion which follows from the short survey is that the national problem of Yugoslavia is by no means finally solved and that one cannot yet speak of one Yugoslav nation.[30] The present régime has removed Great-Serbian oppression and allows no antagonisms to flare up, but the conflict between the Serbs and the Croats may still be smoldering under the surface. Small Yugoslav nationalities and national minorities receive favorable treatment, perhaps without parallel in history, but their position is often complicated by the fact that part or the majority of their compatriots live outside Yugoslavia in unfriendly states.

The official policy is to ignore the divergencies, expecting that a régime of tolerance and the growing economic integration will eventually eliminate them. Since 1950 the unifying factors have been increasingly stressed and the particularist tendencies minimized and discouraged, but there is no indication that the Government might intend to repeat the unfortunate experiment of the late King Alexander of enforcing an artificial concept of Yugoslav unity which does not yet exist.

Despite the lack of national unity, New Yugoslavia is much more firmly established than First Yugoslavia. Not only is there a longer tradition of common statehood but there is also the memory of the War of National Liberation in which members of all the Yugoslav nationalities fought together against the occupiers. The War of National Liberation was the crucible in which real Yugoslav unity was formed. Its history and its myth, now taught to all Yugoslav children, establish the sentiment of unity in the growing generation. The ex-Partisans, generally people in the prime of life who occupy the leading positions in the country, maintain strong links among themselves through the Communist League and through the associations of veterans and invalids.[31] Two unifying elements are particularly strong: the Communist League which includes representatives of all the groups among its 750,000 members and among its leaders and the Army which is no longer a Serbian preserve but a pronouncedly all-Yugoslav institution. These powerful cementing factors are considerably more important than the fading memory of wartime antagonisms, although the latter may be still quite strong even if not openly voiced.

Furthermore, there are no major centrifugal forces based on national division. The Serbs, having lost their privileged position, have perhaps the most cause for dissatisfaction, but they remain staunch supporters of the Yugoslav idea and take most pride in the achievements of the Federa-

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[30]This opinion is confirmed by official terminology in which reference is often made to the *peoples* of Yugoslavia.

[31]The unity of the old team has been clearly revealed in the lenient treatment of Djilas by the Central Committee of the Communist League in January 1954.

. Discrimination against the Croats has been removed and very few of n would now entertain the idea of separation; the Slovenes fully realize . they could not continue their national existence outside Yugoslavia; Macedonians have many reasons to be satisfied and would rather attract remainder of their nation than secede; the minorities receive on the le very favorable treatment.

On balance, it seems that the multinational Yugoslav state is firmly blished despite the fact that the process of integration has not advanced far and could conceivably be disturbed by an international conflagra- . The two latest crises in Yugoslav international politics, the conflict the Cominform and the problem of Trieste, served as powerful rally- events and demonstrated Yugoslav unity. It is quite possible that in the several national sentiments may develop into strong localisms in a stronger, all-embracing Yugoslav patriotism.

Evaluation of the role played by the Marxist doctrine cannot be more tentative. The platform of "national equality" and of "the right to determination including that of separation" was decisive in securing port for the Partisan cause. The Yugoslav Communists never seriously rtained the second principle which had been forced upon them by the intern, but the principle of "national equality"—within the frame- of Yugoslavia—has been successfully implemented and can now be con- red as the basis of New Yugoslavia. But is this principle still being ap- l on account of its Marxist derivation as distinct from a commonsense raisal of Yugoslav realities? It has now become fashionable in Yugo- a to stress the flexibility of Marxist theory and only few items of the nal program have remained unaltered. The fact that the solution of national problems is among them seems due more to its success than to correctness." It would be extremely difficult to find an alternative to the y of national equality to suit the conditions of multinational Yugo- a.

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'ERSITY OF ABERDEEN

LITERATURE ON THE MARXIST MOVEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA (1872-1944)

by Ivan Avakumovic

THE STORY of the rise of Marxism in Yugoslavia has never been told although over eighty years separate us from the first translation of the "Communist Manifesto" into Serbian, and a whole decade from Marshal Tito's entry into Belgrade. Even today the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) possesses no history, official or otherwise, apart from a survey presented by Marshal Tito at the Fifth Party Congress in 1948 (*Political report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,* English ed., Belgrade, 1948).

The reasons for this gap are numerous and varied. The Marxist movement was so insignificant up to 1918, that, with one exception, it did not attract the attention of scholars to whom the Middle Ages, the struggle against the Turks and the Habsburgs, and the transformation of Serbia into a parliamentary democracy, presented a more exciting and fertile field for research. Nor did the fact that the KPJ was declared illegal in 1921 and its headquarters moved abroad make it any easier for historians to study the Yugoslav section of the Comintern.

This state of affairs was reversed after the Second World War. The Communist régime, accused by its opponents of being an alien imposition and of having no roots in the history of the Yugoslav peoples, devoted much energy and expense to the study of Marxism and of the working-class movement, with the result that Yugoslav historiography today presents a fairly impressive array of published work on the subject.

A closer inspection of the postwar literature, however, provides a less satisfactory picture, which can easily be understood when one remembers the conditions under which the authors worked. They lacked bibliographical aids for the pre-1945 literature, most of which was widely scattered and had suffered much damage in the course of the two World Wars. The records of the leading Soviet institutions and organizations are still inaccessible, and almost the same reticence is also observed in Yugoslavia. Some of the most valuable material, the minutes of the central committee of the KPJ for example, have yet to be brought to light, while the correspondence of the leading party bodies is published only occasionally. To a lesser extent, the same attitude is adopted concerning documents from the Axis archives, an important source for the war years. They have chiefly been used at political trials of such anti-Communists as General Mihailović and Archbishop Stepinac.[1] Lastly, it should not be forgotten that unlike the study of the earlier periods of South Slav history, that of the Marxist movement is today the sole prerogative of Communists and fellow-travellers

[1] They were also used extensively in the case of the leading Croat Communist, Hebrang, accused of collaborating with the Ustaši during the war, and of being in favor of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Tito-Cominform dispute (M. Milatović, *Slučaj Andrije Hebranga,* Zagreb, 1952).

ir chief object has been, up to now at least, to write or rewrite history
iit the ideological needs of the present régime.

Among the more important projects undertaken is the work on a new
clopedia to appear under the auspices of the Lexicographical Institute
agreb. The first of the projected eight volumes has been promised for
. Its purpose is to replace and fill the gaps of the only other modern
clopedia, that which was edited by the late Professor S. Stanojević
reb, 1925-1929).[2]

The Lexicographical Institute is also planning a twenty-five volume
ography of articles which appeared in the South Slav press and per-
als from the beginning of the nineteenth century until 1945. The post-
period is already covered by the two bibliographies which the Biblio-
hical Institute in Belgrade publishes periodically. The first deals with
s and brochures, the second with articles in newspapers and periodicals.

The best known period in the history of socialism is undoubtedly that
s origins in Serbia. Two leading Serbian scholars, J. Skerlić (Belgrade,
) and S. Jovanović (second ed., Belgrade, 1920), have discussed in
detail the views and influence of S. Marković, the foremost Serbian
list at the time of the First International. Theirs are the most im-
nt works in a long bibliography of writings on S. Marković which ap-
ed in the Belgrade review *Naša Književnost* (1946).

Most of Marković's followers soon abandoned his views and founded
adical Party which played such an important role in Serbian and Yugo-
politics until Hitler's invasion in 1941. The Social Democratic move-
. was confined to small student circles and workers' associations whose
ry was written by one of its leaders, D. Lapčević, in *Istorija socializma
biji* (Belgrade, 1922), *Rat i srpska socjalna demokratija* (Belgrade,
)[3] and *Položaj radničke klase i sindikalni pokret u Srbiji* (Belgrade,
). To these should be added the selected works of its most prominent
bers, D. Tucović, D. Popović and R. Dragović, which were published
elgrade in 1949-50, 1951 and 1954 respectively. All these volumes con-
ntroductory and explanatory notes as well as useful bibliographies.

V. Korać's *Povjest radničkog pokreta u Hrvatskoj* in three volumes
reb, 1929-1933) is more detailed and informative than Lapčević's stud-
The author was prominent in the Social-Democratic Party in Croatia
esponsible as a member of the government for the establishing of the
-hour day in 1919. His first volume deals with the socialist organiza-
; the second is a history of the Marxist trade unions; the third is de-
inter alia to the non- and anti-Marxist workers' associations. They
the period up to 1922 and give a good account of the split between
rates and extremists in the Marxist camp after the Bolsheviks seized
r in Russia.

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[2] The four volumes of *Narodna Enciklopedija-Srpsko-Hrvatsko-Slovenačka* contain other information on Marxist newspapers, the programs of most of the Marxist founded before and after 1918, with short biographies of its leaders.

[3] I. Todorović's *Internacionalizam sindikalnog pokreta u Srbiji pre Prvog Svetskog* (Belgrade, 1953) is a more recent study on the subject.

The absence of any other reliable history for the other parts of present-day Yugoslavia and the fact that both Lapčević and Korać were opposed to the Third International, have induced the present régime to provide its own interpretation of the events before 1918. Some, such as N. Sarać's *Položaj radničke klase u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austro-ugarskom okupacijom, 1878-1914* (Belgrade, 1951), and D. Zografski's *O radničkom pokretu u Makedoniji do balkanskog rata* (Belgrade, 1951), appeared in the collection "contributions to the history of the labour movement in Yugoslavia." Others, chiefly collections of documents, were published by the historical section of the central committee of the KPJ.[4] These volumes, known as *Istoriski Archiv KPJ,* contain a selection of articles, party resolutions and stenographical notes of socialist conferences. They refer mostly to the period before the outbreak of the First World War.

The most valuable volume in this series is Tome II (Belgrade, 1950), a compilation of Communist documents which deals with the KPJ from its foundation in 1919 up to 1937. It is based almost entirely on resolutions passed by party congresses and conferences. These documents are reprinted from old party publications now in the archives of the central committee of the KPJ. Others, at present in the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow, could not be obtained. Neither is there any mention of the confidential correspondence between the successive secretaries-general of the KPJ and the Comintern. Nor does the volume provide any information on the members and fate of Yugoslav Communists composing the frequently changed central committee. In spite of these gaps, Tome II is a considerable contribution to the understanding of the KPJ during the interwar period and of great help to the discerning historian.

Following the example of the KPJ, the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (SKOJ) began publishing its own collection of documents, the first volume of which appeared in Belgrade in 1953.. A survey of its activities until the time of its dispute with the Cominform is provided by the report of its secretary, M. Neoričić, and some of the delegates at the Fourth congress of SKOJ in 1948 (Zagreb, 1950).

Information on other aspects of Communist activity may be gleaned from various studies, brochures and articles[5] which have appeared since 1945 and which are recorded in the publications of the Bibliographical Institute in Belgrade.

Occasionally Soviet publications have also devoted some attention to this period. The most detailed study is a series of articles on Yugoslav affairs in the sixty-fifth volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia (Moscow,

[4]The historical sections of the central committee of the Communist Party of Bosnia and Macedonia have published similar compilations dealing with the pre-1914 and later periods.

[5]Of these one of the most important is J. Marjanović's on the KPJ at the elections for the national assembly in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (*Istoriski Glasnik,* No. 1-2, 1950) A more detailed study of the electoral vicissitudes of all the political parties including the KPJ, and their performances in various parts of Yugoslavia was written by M. Kostić and appeared in the *Jubilarni Zbornik Života i Rada Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918-1928,* Volume II (Belgrade, 1929).

1931), while the most recent in *Voprosy Istorii* (No. 9, 1953) deals with the revolutionary movement in Yugoslavia in the years 1918 and 1919.

In 1937 the Communist International put Josip Broz-Tito in charge of its Yugoslav section and ordered him to carry out a thorough party purge. An account of his stewardship may be found in Tito's lengthy report to the Fifth Party Conference held at Zagreb in 1940 and published in the English edition of the periodical *Komunist* (No. 1., October 1946). It covers the history of the party since 1928 and gives an interesting glimpse of the increasing interferences in the affairs of the KPJ on the part of the Comintern.[6]

Among Tito's closest collaborators was the organizational secretary of the KPJ and the future head of the secret police, A. Ranković. His report to the party congress held in 1948 supplements Tito's and contains a list of Communist leaders purged. These two reports, together with Djilas's, Kardelj's and Pijade's, deal mostly with the KPJ between 1937 and 1948 and were published in a volume entitled *V Kongres KPJ—izveštaji i referati* (Belgrade, 1948). Additional information on the same period is provided by the reports presented at the local party congresses held at Četinje, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Skoplje and Zagreb following the meeting held in Belgrade.

More abundant is the literature on the war years. J. Badalić's bibliographical survey published in 1948 contained 200 pages, while N. Dimić's bibliography of books and articles on the struggle in Macedonia, where the partisan movement was weaker than elsewhere, exceeds 150 pages (Skoplje, 1953). Nevertheless there is no history of the war years as a whole, apart from *Pregled Historije Narodnooslobodilačke Borbe Jugoslavije* by T. Cubelić and M. Milostić (Zagreb, 1953). This book as a school textbook received a somewhat critical review in the leading historical journal *Istoriski Glasnik* (No. 1-3, 1953).

The Military-Historical Institute in Belgrade has published by far the largest collection of documents on Tito's partisans. More than half of the projected 43 volumes (*Zbornik*) have already appeared. They provide information on Communist activities in various parts of Yugoslavia and consist of manifestoes, military reports and orders, instructions by party bodies, etc. Extracts from enemy documents are also included. Other material has appeared in the organ (*Glasnik*) of the above Institute, in commemorative volumes such as *Stvarnanje i razvoj jugoslovenske armije* (Belgrade, 1951), in the studies by M. Jerković, M. Marković, R. Bulat, S. Sibl and others, as well as in the Communist press and periodicals.

Military and political matters are also discussed in the works of Communist leaders like Tito, Karadelj, Pijade, Ranković, Djilas and others, whose wartime speeches and articles were published after 1945. Of the diaries and reminiscences the most important are those by Tito's biographer, V. Dedijer,[7] and R. Colaković.

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[6]For the "nineteen twenties" see the chapter "Komunisticka Internacionala i KPJ" in the *Istoriski Arhiv KPJ*, Tome II (Belgrade, 1950).

One of the results of Tito's dispute with the Cominform was to lift somewhat the veil over the relations between Moscow and the Balkan Communist parties. Among the literature on the subject, M. Pijade's *About the legend that the Yugoslav uprising owed its existence to Soviet assistance* (London, 1950) is the best known in the West. Its value is lessened however by Pijade's polemical approach and desire to prove his thesis, plainly expressed by the title of the brochure, in which unfortunately he makes use of only a small part of the voluminous correspondence between the partisan headquarters and Moscow.[8] A more friendly atmosphere emerges from a compilation of official Soviet statements praising the efforts of the Yugoslav Communists up to the dispute with the Cominform. It appeared under the title *Rukovodioci i štampa SSSR o narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi i socialističkoj izgradnji u Jugoslaviji,* with an introduction by S. Belić (Belgrade, 1951). B. Maslarić's *Moskva-Madrid-Moskva* (Zagreb, 1952) are the reminiscences of a Yugoslav Communist who spent the war years in the Soviet capital and lived to write his memoirs.

The differences between the KPJ and the Bulgarian Communist Party over Macedonia are discussed in L. Mojsev's *Bulgarska radnička partija (kommunista) Makedonija* (Belgrade, 1948). The aid provided by Tito's emissaries in building the Albanian Communist Party and régime is the subject of V. Dedijer's *Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi 1939-1948* (Belgrade, 1949). S. Vukomanović-Tempo's *O narodnoj revoluciji u Grkoj* (Belgrade, 1950) and his article in the *Komunist* (No. 6, 1949) on which the former is based, attack the policy of the Greek Communists during and after the Second World War.

Of the many books which appeared in Serbo-Croat on the partisan movement, only one, B. Lanzić's *Titov pokret i režim 1941-1946* (Munich, 1946) is by a non-Communist. Its documentation and intelligent analysis make it indispensible to the student of recent Yugoslav history, who will find in it much valuable material not available elsewhere on many aspects of the national and civil war in occupied Yugoslavia.[9]

London, England

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[7]V. Dedijer is also the author of a book on the partisan printing presses (Belgrade, 1945). A study of the Communist press in wartime has been promised by the Publishing House of the Journalists' Association of Serbia (D. Milenković and N. Krsmanović, *Pregled štampe za vreme narodnooslobodilackog rata u celoj FNRJ*). *Napredna Stampa u Srbiji 1871-1949* (Belgrade, 1949) is the most detailed work on the subject which is now available for the Marxist press in Serbia.

[8]B. Lazitch's *Tito et Moscou pendant la seconde guerre mondiale 1939-1945* is more complete. It appeared as a supplement to the Paris fortnightly *B.E.I.P.I.* (No. 111, 1.6.1954).

[9]B. Lazić is also the author of *La tragédie du Général Mihailovitch* (Yverdon, Switzerland, 1946) which deals *inter alia* with the relations between the Chetniks and the partisans. Further information on the same subject may be culled from the reminiscences, apologias and obituaries of many participants. These appeared in the Serbian anti-Communist press: *Srbobran* (Pittsburgh), *Srpska Borba* (Chicago), *Sloboda* (Chicago), *Poruka* (London), *Srpske Novine* (Rome), *Sloga* (Perth, Australia), etc. A series of articles in the fascist periodical *Iskra* (Munich, 1953) describes the struggle between totalitarian elements at Belgrade University in the years 1938-1940.

NOTES

The most recent shifts in internal Czechoslovak politics as of December, 1954, have resulted in a new cabinet. There are a few new names, and a few transfers. We give the presently constituted list before further changes outdate it.

An asterisk indicates that the official is continued from the previous cabinet:

Premier: *Viliam Široký
First Deputy Premier: *Jaromír Dolanský
Deputy Premier and National Defense: *A. Čepička
Third Deputy Premier: Václav Kopecký (no longer Minister of Culture)
Fourth Deputy Premier: L. Jankovcová (formerly Minister of Food Industries)
Fifth Deputy Premier: V. Škoda (formerly Minister of Justice)
Interior: *R. Barák
State Planning: *O Šimůnek
Local Industries: *J. Kyselý
Health: *J. Plojhar
Building: *E. Šlechta
Foreign Affairs: *V. David
Finance: J. D'uriš
Internal Trade: F. Krajčír
Forests and Timber Industries: J. Krosnář (formerly Wholesale Trade)
Wholesale Trade: Božená Machacová-Dostalová
Without Portfolio: *Zdeněk Nejedlý
Engineering: *K. Poláček
Culture: L. Štoll (formerly Education)
Food Industries: J. Uher (formerly Agriculture)
State Control: *O. Beran
Fuel and Power: *J. Jonáš
Foundries and Mines: *J. Reitmajer
Agriculture: M. Smida (formerly Forests and Timber)
Justice: J. Bartuška
Education: F. Kahuda
Light Industries: *A. Málek
Without Portfolio: *J. Maurer
Communications: *A. Neuman
Manpower: *V. Nosek
Transport: *A. Pospíšil
Chemical Industries: *J. Púčik

A few of the changes are promotions, a few demotions. Some of the "promotions," e.g. to one of the numerous Deputy Premier posts, are synonymous with elimination from power, such as that of Kopecký, who was known for his extended post-prandial eloquence. General Čepička's position, as Gottwald's son-in-law, may be watched with interest. Dr. Bartuška was formerly Pro-Rector of the University and is succeeded in that office by a Russian-born mathematician, Professor Katetov. Maurer occupies the delicate position, formerly so effectively filled by Bedřich Geminder, of liaison with the Kremlin. Geminder accompanied Slanský to the firing squad.

Maurer should have an interesting career. Nosek has been a minor holdover for some time. The portfolio of Manpower would appear to carry responsibility for recruitment of forced labor and the utilization of political prisoner potential. This was a part of his work as Minister of the Interior. The job specifications on the present post perhaps call for higher specialization.

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The Polish Academy of Sciences has undertaken the publication of a comprehensive Dictionary of Old Polish (*Słownik Staropolski*), based on printed and unprinted sources in the vernacular up to 1500. It is planned to run to five volumes of five fascicles each, to appear at the rate of two fascicles a year in large format. Three fascicles have thus far appeared. The price set per fascicle is $2.10 (Rb. 8.35). It should be completed by 1966. Address: Prasa i Książka, 31 Koszykowa, Warsaw.

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The Library of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has been renamed the James Thomson Shotwell Library in honor of the President Emeritus of the Endowment, Prof. James T. Shotwell. The Library, well known to specialists in the area of international relations, plans to expand its holdings to about 10,000 volumes, to be of greater service to the staff of the Endowment, of the United Nations and to government officials. It is presently situated at United Nations Plaza at 46th Street, New York City.

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Elmhurst College, Elmhurst, Illinois, announces the establishment of the New Hungarian Studies Foundation which is intended to support and develop the unique Department of Hungarian Studies at the College. An annual publication is projected, an endowment and the erection of a library-museum building is planned. Three trustees of the Foundation have already been named: Prof. Joseph Remenyi of Western Reserve University, Dr. Stephen Szabò of Cleveland and Prof. August J. Molnár, chairman of the Department of Hungarian Studies at Elmhurst.

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It is a pleasure for the JOURNAL to record that the American Political Science Association will hold its next annual meeting at the University of Colorado, in Boulder, on September 7-9, 1955. We had nothing to do with the decision. We wish only to applaud and welcome.

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The International Peasant Union, so far as is evident, the only group of Central Europeans in the emigration which can and does effectively and sincerely cooperate, held its fourth Congress October 1-3 in New York City. There were almost 300 delegates from the parties representing the peasant population of the twelve nations of Central Europe now under Russian domination. Inasmuch as these nations were, and continue to be, predominantly peasant in their socio-psychological structure, the presence of their representatives, all with fairly recent connections with their homeland constituencies, was significant and from almost every point of view hopeful. The November-December, 1954, *Bulletin of the International Peasant Union* contains the record of the Congress and the text of most of the speeches.

BOOK REVIEWS

MORAVCSIK, GYULA, *Bizánc és a Magyarság*. Budapest: Akadámiai Kiadó, 1953. Pp. 118.

Professor Gyula, Moravcsik, who is the author of *A magyar történet fizánci forrási* (Byzantine Sources of Hungarian History). *A magyar Szent Korona görög feliratai* (Greek Inscriptions of the Hungarian Holy Crown) and other monographs dealing with related topics, wrote a study, entitled *Bizánc és a Magyarság* (Byzantium and the Hungarians) which shows a deviation from his earlier works in that his latest work reveals the author's exposure to Soviet influences. This is manifested not only in his references to the Soviet scholar Levcsenko and to some Russian documents, but in the manner in which the economic and social interpretation of historical and cultural factors is offered. Institutionalized political power produces its own intellectual idiom: Soviet power exemplifies this to the nth degree. In order to be at peace with his environment and, if possible, with himself, and be cleared of any complicity in matters of "historical authenticity," Professor Moravcsik had to adopt this method; perhaps he accepted it as valid. In fairness to him, it should be said that he has conducted his research and organized it with as much objectivity as it was feasible under the circumstances. The study has informative value, and does not give the impression that propaganda has scored a decisive victory over facts or reasonable assumptions.

The introductory chapter is a survey of Byzantine history and culture, their impact on eastern, northern, southern and western peoples, and of their indirect effect upon the occidental world, mainly the renaissance, which, according to the author and other scholars, could not have developed as it had without the mediatory role of Byzantium. The major part of the book is concerned with the relationship of the Hungarians to Byzantium in various activities. Much of the material is built on speculation, but also on reliable and plausible data. The author points out that Byzantine political and cultural influence reached the Magyars before their settlement on the shores of the Danube and the Carpathian basin, that is to say before the conquests of Prince Arpád. Between the sixth and eighth centuries Greek missionaries converted some Hun, Onogur and Bulgarian tribes to the Christian faith, and it seems well founded to suppose that there were Magyars among the converts. There were military skirmishes and war-like actions between the two nations. Some of the equipment of the Magyars, such as the bridle, indicates Byzantine design, and one finds Greek letters in old Hungarian runic writings. While the boundaries of Hungary and Byzantium did not meet, Byzantine emperors and emissaries often refer to the Magyars whom they called "Ungroi." In Hungary the first Christian bishop was the Greek monk Hierotheosz; this was in the tenth century. In the final struggle between Roman and Greek Christendom for the conversion of the Magyars the Romans won when the reigning Prince Géza in 973 sent his representatives to Quedlinburg, thereby opening the doors of Hungary for Rome. However, Professor Moravcsik maintains that even after the acceptance of Roman Christianity, the architecture of some cloisters exhibited the influence of Byzantine art and spirit, and that the feast days of several Hungarian saints were celebrated in accordance with the Byzantine calendar.

During the Crusades from the viewpoint of Byzantine national interests Hungary was an important land. There was a period when a Byzantine-Hungarian union was planned and the Hungarian ruler, Béla III, expected to reign on the Byzantine throne, but the plan was not realized. Professor Moravcsik's study con-

tains much similar information which suggests a close contact between the two countries. Even after the dissolution of the Byzantine state, King Mátyás, the great Hungarian Renaissance ruler, favored Greek humanists, and in the Bibliotheca Corvina, established by him, there were Greek codices, including works of ancient and Byzantine authors. The study is completed with a bibliography, and with twelve reproductions related to the subject matter.

Western Reserve University JOSEPH REMENYI

OETTINGER, KARL, *Das Werden Wiens*. Vienna: H. Bauer Verlag, 1951. Pp. 260 S 58.

Oettinger's book is not only a remarkable achievement in the author's own right, who as historian of art applies his specfic categories to the history of civilization, but it also marks an epoch in Austrian historiography. Since A. Dopsch's *Grundlagen der europäischen Kulturentwicklung* (1923-24), no adept scholar of the academically predominant school of Austrian historians has dared approach the history of his country from the point of view of continuity. For very transparent reasons, evidenced in German nationalism, they have sided rather with the Renaissance thesis from Michiavelli to Gibbon which attributes the chances of European renascence to cycles of Teutonic destruction. Oettinger has checked his data with experts in many fields of Austrian history, and his work has been endorsed by foremost Austrian historians. No equally symptomatic book has appeared for some time. The new trend, embodied in Oettinger's book (dedicated to Otto Brunner, once one of the leading German nationalists in Austrian historiography, now full of praise for Oettinger's "completely new perspectives"), tends to emphasize that the spiritual "metanoia" of the Austrian intellectual is not as ephemeral as frequently believed, not simply dictated by political accommodation or expediency, but that it represents a deep-rooted new orientation of Austrian national thought in general.

The author applies his specific knowledge of medieval architecture to the problems of universal history, thereby getting the *leitfossil* for his research in each century which leads him from the later ancient ages to the early Habsburgs. From an analysis of the ground-plan of the Viennese church of St. Peter, always considered Carolingian by tradition and often assumed as standing on Roman foundations, Oettinger concludes that this is a Roman basilica dating from the second half of the fourth century, which, because of the survival of its basic structure down to the middle of the eleventh century (when the one-aisled Roman ground-plan was replaced by a three-aisled pillar basilica), classically symbolizes the continuity of a Viennese "residual city" in the southeastern corner of the former Roman castrum. Such a basilica presupposes a deliberately planned settlement with an organized urban community during the dark ages from the fifth to the eighth century, based upon a uniform ethnic stratum. Such a settlement would in its origins be mainly Romanic, and with its later German influxes would eventually emerge a commercial community (*Wik*), sustained by the never totally interrupted, never ceasing Danubian trade. We might add that this archaeological finding presupposes an organized ecclesiastical life, even if, as it were, isolated for intervals from the Mediterranean centers of Christianity.

The most revolutionary hypothesis, from the viewpoint of the long predominant school in Austrian historiography, concerns Oettinger's belief in a pre-Carolingian Slavonic settlement on Viennese soil. Again from the architectural remnants of a seigneurial curia on the steep slope of the Danube in the northeastern corner of the former Roman castrum mentioned by the chronicler of the thirteenth century, Oettinger concludes that a powerful Slavonic ruler of the seventh century

must have had his residence there; he identifies him with Samo, of whom Ps. Fredegar writes. This conclusion corresponds with two capitals from columns of Samo's curia (found as early as 1825), related to the contemporary Slavonic style of the Adriatic Littoral, as well as the Slovene name of Vienna, *Dunaj,* meaning the "castle on the Danube." The same topography is reflected by the name later adopted by the Maygars, who still call Vienna *Bécs,* meaning "on the edge," "on the steep slope." The second Slavonic name for Vienna, Czech *Videň,* obviously was connected with the earlier settlement around St. Peter; derived from the Roman name, this second Slavonic name for Vienna functioned as the linguistic bridge to the German name of today. Oettinger assumes the following genealogy (for which not long ago any Austrian historian would have been ostracized): Roman *Vindobona, Vindomana, Vendomina* (Jordanes 550); Romanic *Vendomna, Vendonja, Vendŭnja; Slavonic, Vędŭn'a, Vednja; and* German *Wenia* (881), *Vienni* (1030). Thus, Vienna in the seventh century had two Slavonic names, indicating two settlements: the commercial city (or *Wik*) and the castle (or *Bŭrg*), the one in the southeastern, the other in the northeastern corner of the Roman castrum. While St. Peter, the Roman basilica, belonged o the first settlement, the second oldest church of Vienna, St. Ruprecht, ascribed by Oettinger to the Carolingian prefect who resided in Samo's curia as his successor, belonged to the second settlement. However, from Oettinger's own premises there is no serious objection against attributing this second church of the second settlement also to the age of Samo, whose "tolerance" towards Christianity, even as a polygamous pagan (some kind of Rurik, but no St. Vladimir yet) is well stressed by Oettinger.

After Vienna had become Carolingian, it was organized as a frontier fortress first against the Avars, and later against the Morvins, who, however, according to Oettinger were able to hold sway over city and castle for a decade under Svatopluk (884-892). Although the exact date may be questionable, this is certainly the era when the church of Vienna was a Moravian church, and indeed one of the five Moravian bishoprics of the Moravian hierarchy under St. Methodius, metropolitan of Pannonia, and his successors (as I have shown in my essay, "St. Severin, Ideologie und Realität," *Wiener Geschichtsblaetter,* 1954, IX, 2-12). From the final incorporation of Vienna into the Teutonic empire of the Saxon and Franconian rulers, resulting in the amalgamation ("synoecism") of the two Viennese settlements, *Wik* and *Bŭrg* (after 991), the architecture of St. Stephan, Vienna's cathedral, gradually becomes the *leitfossil.* Although for centuries only a parish church of the bishop of Passau, its architecture ambitiously envisaged from the very start a much more splendid future. Each reconstruction of St. Stephan, the Romanesque under the Babenbergers and the Gothic under the Habsburgs, enlarged the building and opened new vistas transcending the ambitions of any parish church, even of a prosperous trading center on the frontier of the empire. Thus, St. Stephan, Oettinger's original field of scholarly work, truly is the symbol of Vienna, the creator of Austria, about which Oettinger promises a second book, "Das Werden Österreichs."

Andre Hill, Tappan, New York ERNST KARL WINTER

TADIĆ, JORJO, *Graća o slikarskoj školi u Dubrovniku VIII–XVI v.* Beograd: Srpska Akademija Nauka, Graća knjiga V, Istoriski Institut knjiga 3-4, 1952. Pp, x, 359; x, 284, 28 pls.

Jordo Tadić presents an important collection of more than 1200 texts which describe the various aspects of the artistic activity of Dubrovnik during the middle ages and at the time of the Renaissance. The author has made use of the previous

works, J. Gelcich' *Monumenta Ragusina,* Libri Reformationum (Zagreb, 1890 sq), and Kovač' *Nikolaus Ragusinus und seine Zeit,* Archivalische Beiträge, Jahrbuch des kunsthist. Institutes d. k. k. Zentralkommission f. Denkmalpflege (1917, I-IV, Beiblatt). The major portion of his work, however, is based on a systematic examination of the Dubrovnik archives, and also to a certain degree, of the archives of Cattaro. The documents are reproduced, for the most part, *in extenso,* but if it is a question of the mere mention of the name of an artist, the extract offered us always appears sufficiently explicit.

The collection of documents covers the period 1284 to 1601. Only the first three texts date from the end of the thirteenth century. The fourteenth century is better represented with 121 examples. The number of items included for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are 625 and 604, respectively.

All of the notarized *acta* published by Mr. Tadić are characterized by the presence of the name of an artist, or occasionally by the mention of an anonymous work of art. The author has declined to make a selection, and actually his compilation does not indicate a consistent interest in the history of art itself. By way of example, the first two numbers deal with the case of a theft committed against a certain *Nicholaus pictor.* The third number has reference to the purchase of a vineyard by another painter. Not until the ninth citation is there found an illustration directly concerning an artistic manifestation, in the discussion of the contract signed in 1313 between Michel de Bologne and the church council of Sainte-Marie Majeure for the decoration of the church. Such attention to detail is not, however, entirely out of order, since it provides a minute description of the general way of life of the artists of Dubrovnik, and furnishes the elements for a possible biography of the most prominent personalities, such as Ugrinović or Ognanović and their disciple Pierre Bogdanović, in the fifteenth century, and, in the following century, Pierre de Venise or Christophe de Ston.

But of course the work also allows one—and herein lies its real objective—to gain a precise understanding of the overall artistic evolution of Dubrovnik, in the field of painting as well as in that of the goldsmith craft, wood sculpture, or of glassmaking. The oldest examples, as we have already remarked, are relatively few in number. Often they refer to foreign masters called in by the council of a republic to establish themselves in their area and train students for a fixed annual indemnity of from 10 to 100 ducats. The majority came, it seems, from Italy, principally from Venice, Bologna and Siena; others are described as being Greek. Foreign contributions of some importance were also furnished by cities along the eastern coast of the Adriatic—Cattaro, Zara, Trogir, and the towns of Zeta—as well as by the inland countries, Serbia and Hercegovina. The art of Dubrovnik appears to us, from its origins, as a combination of influences which were to form, after one or two generations, a local school whose appearance coincided, moreover, with the political emancipation and economic expansion of Dubrovnik during the last third of the fourteenth century.

This brief resumé cannot encompass the interest of the documentation collected by Tadić. To conclude, one might draw attention to the well organized index and the intelligent selection of plates which accompany the work and prove even more, if it were necessary, the value of the publication.

Paris, France A. Frolow

Grüll, Georg, *Die Robot in Oberösterreich.* (*Forschungen zur Geschichte Oberösterreich,* Bd. I.) Wien: Böhlaus, 1952. Pp. 307. DM. 21.

Among the provinces of Austria, Upper Austria (Oberösterreich) holds a position of its own: here a cooperation has been established between the Christian-Socialist governor and the Socialist mayor of the provincial capital Linz, and it proved successful in many aspects other than in the cultural sphere. True, Upper Austria, and more specifically Linz, had been favored in some ways by the Nazi régime—much in contrast to the treatment dealt out to Vienna—although such preference did not prevent an active resistance movement as discussed in this JOURNAL[1] previously.

Considering the relative small size and the moderate wealth of this province, its achievements in the field of historical research are noteworthy; they are due largely to the activity of the archives of Linz. Thus Upper Austria has been given a truly remarkable economic history up to 1948 based on a wealth of little explored archivistic sources[2]; the volume deserves a close analysis in one of America's journals of economic history. The protagonist of the Protestant resistance movement in this province around 1600 has been made the topic of a biography that centers on the intellectual-religious problems of the age covering its ramifications all over the Calvinistic world[3].

The book under review[4] is the first of a series of monographs on the history of Upper Austria edited by the archives of Linz. It should be read against the broader background of the two books mentioned previously.

The author carefully traces the history of forced labor in Upper Austria, which remained an object of special distaste in the memory of the people long after it had been abolished, and in spite of the fact that here it never reached such extravagant proportions as it did, for instance, in the Slavic provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy (for a comparison cf. pp. 250f.).

The later Middle Ages and the early modern period brought forth an immense variety in forced labor obligations among which a remarkable example is provided by the fact that at the beginning of the eighteenth century the possession of books of the Lutheran creed was punished by such forced labor (p. 161f.). Forced labor is regularly to be found among the causes for the peasant revolts in Upper Austria. By the end of the sixteenth century the amount of forced labor was generally fixed as fourteen days during a year in this province, a regulation that brought hardship to some peasants, but meant relief for the majority. However, by the middle of the eighteenth century, scheming on the part of the nobility and the higher clergy again succeeded in raising the obligations, until after the collapse of the feudal régime the dynasty under the influence of a change in the intellectual climate took up the protection of the peasants.

The author might have paid attention to the importance and the meaning of forced labor also from the other side, and discussed what *Robot* was to those who were supposed to benefit from it. It is well known that the movement for its full abolition in the fourth and fifth decades of the nineteenth century originated with the nobles; they were hardly moved into this attitude by altruistic or philosophic motives exclusively.

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[1]Engel-Janosi, F., "Remarks on the Austrian Resistance, 1938-1945," JCEA, XIII (1953), 105-122.

[2]Alfred Hoffman, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Landes Oberösterreich*, Vol. 1. Salzburg, 1952.

[3]Hans Sturmberger, *Georg Erasmus Tschermembl*, Linz, 1952.

[4]In their books to be referred to later, J. Blum uses "Robot" also in English; E. Murr Link renders it "labor-service". In this review "forced labor" will be used, though it does not fully render the meaning of "Robot".

The author has made use of the available sources, published and unpublished; among the books referred to we find two by American historians: E. Murr Link, *The Emancipation of the Austrian Peasant, 1740-1798* (New York, 1949) and still more frequently Jerome Blum, *Noble Landowners and Agriculture in Austria, 1815-1848* (Baltimore, 1948) It is regretted that Grüll did not provide his book with an index.

Catholic University of America FRIEDRICH ENGEL-JANOSI

Jahrbücher der Albertus Universität zu Königsberg/Pr. Begründet von Friedrich Hoffman, edited by Prof. G. von Selle. Band II (1952, pp. 343); Band IV (1954, pp. 399); Band V (1955, pp. 401). Kitzingen/Main: Holzner Verlag. Published by the Göttinger Arbeitskreis.

The *Albertina* at Königsberg, from its foundation in 1544, has commanded an especially warm loyalty on the part of its faculty and students. The fact of its geographical location, as the eastern outpost of German culture, the most vulnerable to invasion and consequent submersion, undoubtedly heightened this natural loyalty. It is not therefore unexpected to see this spirit take the substantial form of these yearbooks so soon after the closing of the university's doors and the dispersion of its members by Russian conquest of East Prussia. Volumes I and III have not come to hand, but the three volumes here noticed are indeed impressive.

All three are characterized by a broad coverage, carrying notes, papers read at meetings, and monographs on a great variety of subjects: archaeology and numismatics, theology, music, philosophy, philology, international law, and archival studies. Each number carries appropriate necrologies. All are also enriched by systematic and thorough bibliographies of recent literature on East German studies, and reports of the year's activities of the members of the Göttinger Arbeitskreis. It is presumed, though not expressly said, that all the papers are by former students or professors of the *Albertina*. A few are posthumous publications and the present place of attachment of a few is not given.

Though the diversity of subject matter defies easy reporting here, a few of the articles are of sufficient interest to call for special notice. In Vol. II Bertold Baustaedt (d. 1941) gives a warm appreciation of the work of the great Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights of the early fifteenth century, Heinrich von Plauen; Helmut Motekat pictures the increased potential bent of intellectual life in Königsberg in the musty years of the Biedermeier as an unusual union of town and gown. Joachim von Braun relates the story of the rise, growth and production of the *Göttinger Arbeitskreis* from 1947 to 1952. It is in truth an almost fabulous story of determination, organizational spirit and directed competence. Not a few of the publications of the *Kreis* have been noticed in these pages, but their number must now reach over three score, and on a very high level of competence, though frequently and professedly *nationalgesinnt*.

In Vol. IV *inter alia* Gotthold Rhode discusses forced transfers of populations in history, with emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe. It is a rather skeletal treatment, as the author is content to relate the facts of the transfers—eastwards or westwards. It is a long list, but could easily have been longer. I do not, for example, find Maria Theresa's transfers of Czechs and Austrians mentioned. It may not have been violent enough. Herbert Kraus treats, from the point of view of international law, "Massenaustreibung und Völkermord", and suggests the United Nations might do more than it has to right the wrongs. It is certainly an international problem.

Volume V is intended as a memoir for the 150th anniversary of the death of Immanuel Kant, and a substantial part of the volume is devoted to studies of Kant's thought and influence in the areas of philosophy and art. Eberhard Menzel publishes a short monograph on the right of self-determination of peoples and the denial of the right to annex (*das Annexionsverbot*), in the effort to present the moral and legal grounds for German claims to the lands East of the Oder-Neisse line. There are several shorter historical notes, on sixteenth and seventeenth century questions such as Albert of Prussia's relations with Elizabeth of Brunswick-Lüneburg and Gustavus Adolphus' *Feldkanzlei* in Prussia in 1626-27, the *registrum* of which Walther Hubatsch publishes. The large manuscript volume has just come to light after precarious travel during the last years of the recent war, and is now in Göttingen. Hans Peter Kosack examines a recent Soviet map of East Prussia without approval of its accuracy, either cartographic or linguistic. Herbert Harzian gives a chronological review of meetings, pronouncements of various statesmen, publicists and political groups including Poles of the Emigration on the Oder-Neisse Line from February 1953 to April 1954. It makes curious reading.

This is a formidable array of learning and life, and the reader can but be impressed by the spirit that compels such sustained interest and loyalty.

University of Colorado S. Harrison Thomson

Kliuchevski, V. O., *Peter der Grosse und andere Porträts aus der russischen Geschichte*. Edited by Friedrich Braun, translated by Reinhold von Walter. Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1953. Pp. 138. DM. 620.

A title by Professor V. O. Kliuchevskii always stimulates interest and inquiry as to the nature of the work and the occasion for its appearance. As the editors explain, this small volume offers nothing that is "new." The three sketches presented of prominent Russian tsars have been extracted from the 1926 German translation of Kliuchevskii's *Kurs Russkoi Istorii*. The design apparently is to make at least part of this master work, which has in recent years become costly and difficult to obtain, available to a larger audience. The result is a series of analytical essays tht delight the reader and furnish a wealth of insight into many core problems of Russian history through an examination of the lives of three key personalities who ruled Russia over a period of nearly two centuries. Kliuchevskii's stature as an historian is so well known that comment upon him in this regard becomes repetitious. A reading of the present volume only creates further admiration for him as a scholar and writer, and a desire to pay him ever greater homage.

Kliuchevskii, as the editor of this volume points out, belongs to that rare group of scholars whose name is not only widely known beyond his native land, but whose works are still read. His "History of Russia," which has outlasted all revolution, is still a fundamental work for all who seek a reliable approach to Russian history. This most recent selection from his principal work only strengthens that conclusion. The sketches herein presented were, as was the larger work, originally conceived as lectures at Moscow University. Not until the author's last years, 1904-1910, were they committed to writing. As distillations of clear thought and observation on three of Russia's most important sovereigns they are among the most satisfying in Russian historiography.

Although the essays on Tsars Ivan Groznyi and Aleksei Mikhailovich occupy less than a third of the total space, they measure up to that on Peter in being thoughtful and illuminating personality studies. Kliuchevskii has succeeded in bringing the figures of Ivan and Aleksei out of the shadows more skillfully than

have any other writers in a comparable amount of space. The tragic childhood and youth of Ivan, his brilliance, sensitivity, and high degree of literacy are vividly described. Later we meet the embittered Ivan, burdened by responsibilities, tortured by loneliness, self-condemnation and an acute sense of martyrdom. As a study in the corruptive influence of excessive power this essay has few equals.

The sketch of Tsar Aleksei is an even more difficult accomplishment. Here Kliuchevskii's facility in dealing with complex and evasive issues is fully demonstrated. Few reigns in Russian history have had such long-range effects or been less understood than that of Aleksei. Kliuchevskii brings Aleksei's position as a precursor of reform into true focus, and, what is as rare, gives the personality of the tsar flesh and blood. Aleksei is shown as an able, lively and impressionable individual, cautious and pious by nature, yet who, when his passions are given rein, "knew not how to keep his tongue nor his hand in check."

While the recital of the principal events of Peter's career is now so familiar as to hold only mild interest for many readers, Kliuchevskii's analysis of Peter's character development and of the conditions that influenced the tsar's mental outlook are still original and erudite. Kliuchevskii saw the Northern War as the event that determined Peter's mode of life and the direction and tempo of his reform. The West was for Peter like an instructor from whom one seeks to learn, but from whom one is separated at the close of a school year. European modes and methods were a means to an end—Russian military security and economic well-being—not an end in themselves—emulation of the West because of its superiority in particular regards. The impact of the reforms on the masses "was like a vast whirlwind that created fears for all, yet remained a riddle for all" [p. 138].

This book is one of a growing series of shorter translated works on Russian history that enlighten as they entertain the reader. It should be of primary interest to the student and teacher of Russian history, a delectable "appetizer" to Kliuchevskii's larger work. One only hopes for more such translations—in English as well as other Western European languages—so that more of the rich historical scholarship of pre-revolutionary Russia will become better known and enjoyed.

University of California, Davis C. Bickford O'Brien

Dunsdorfs, Edgars, *Der Grosse Schwedische Kataster in Livland, 1681-1710,* Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens *Handlingar, del* 72. Stockholm: Wahlstrom and Widstrand Pp. 196. 12kr. 1950.

Edgars Dunsdorfs by exploiting the archives at Riga, Tartu, Dorpat, Stockholm, Uppsala, Tidö, and Erlangen has drawn together various materials treating *Der Grosse Schwedische Kataster in Livland 1681-1710,* and by so doing he has contributed to our knowledge of the economic and social history of Swedish Livonia during the last days of Swedish hegemony in the Baltic Provinces. For almost a hundred years after the withdrawal of the Swedes in the early eighteenth century, this Livonian Domesday Book—or land tax registry—in principle at least was the foundation that ruled Livonian agriculture. Notwithstanding its significance, no investigation has been made to evaluate the survey until Mr. Dunsdorfs' study of this important collection of sources. The main reason for the neglect was in part due to the dispersal of the materials in at least eight archives and also to the fact that there were no pertinent source publications to aid the investigator in his task. Thus Mr. Dunsdorfs was forced to do a considerable amount of spade work in this his study of the land registry.

The *Hakenrevision*—re-apportionment of the old eastern taxation units—were

carried out concurrently with the *Kataster,* and the study of them has proved fruitful to Mr. Dunsdorfs. From the *Hakenrevision,* the *Kataster,* charts, maps, tax books, and property deeds, the author has considered the *Grosse Kataster* as a source for writing the histories of Livonian land settlement, Swedish policy his study with a view towards answering: the number and size of the Livonian manors, the role of the manorial lords and the significance of the bailiffs, the extent of self administration of the manor, the number of farmers, the size of the farms and the number of inhabitants on each, the nature of the terrain, and the types of crops and cattle in the *Bauerhaken.*

On the basis of his study it was possible for Mr. Dunsdorfs to estimate the number of inhabitants in Swedish Livonia at the end of the seventeenth century as 142,000. This figure does not include Swedish military personnel, but if the wives and children of the soldiers are included the number reaches 152,000. Thus Mr. Dunsdorfs illustrates that the population was larger than has been previously estimated. Riga had about 10,000 inhabitants but the average for the Baltic cities was about 2,000. Systematically the author traces the value of the land, the goods and the chattel and the tax policy of the Swedes.

That portion relating agricultural history is especially well done. Not only does it present an insight into agricultural life in a Swedish colony, but adds considerably to our knowledge of Swedish economic policy at home and abroad. It was this policy in Livonia that gave rise to Count Patkul and the formation of a diplomatic league that was to expel Sweden from the southern shores of the Baltic. As the work will be consulted primarily for reference, it suffers from the lack of an index.

Coe College JOHN J. MURRAY

DORWART, REINHOLD-AUGUST, *The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Pp. 250. $4.00.

Of the three builders of the Brandenburg-Prussian state, the middle figure, Frederick William I, has been refused the title of "great." And yet, after reading Professor Dorwart's monograph, there can be little doubt that the idiosyncratic grandson of the Great Elector and father of the great Frederick deserves at least as much credit as the other two for achieving the seemingly impossible. To be sure, administrative history does not make exciting reading; but when one considers that in the early years of the Great Elector's reign public officials were still paid in kind, then the administrative achievements of the two decades, 1651-1660 and 1713-1723, are truly remarkable.

The task of building a state from the scattered Hohenzollern lands, most of them poor and thinly populated, was indeed herculean. The Great Elector laid the foundations; his namesake completed the structure. Perhaps, too, the materials at hand made it inevitable that this would be a military state. As has been said, other states created armies—in Brandenburg-Prussia the army created the state. Could not the author have pointed out the social, economic and political conditions which made possible this curious development?

When Frederick William I came to the throne in 1713, the parallel growth of civilian and military structures was, however, a weakness. Indeed, there were now two "states," and the two sets of officials were in frequent jurisdictional conflict. The consolidation in 1723 of the two boards, the military *Generalkriegscommissariat* and the civilian *Generalfinanzdirectorium* in the *General-Ober-Finanz-Kriegs-und-Domainen-Directorium,* was Frederick William's greatest achievement.

This General Directory, invented by the King's administrative genius, became the governing body of the whole kingdom under the presidency of the King. It was charged with both civilian administration (excepting justice, religion and education) and with military administration. The provincial boards and the functions of their agents were also similarly fused. The "Instruction" which established the General Directory, of which Professor Dorwart gives a full summary, is as he says, "probably the most important single document in the administrative history of Brandenburg-Prussia before the era of Stein," (p. 199). The streamlining of government is well illustrated by the excellent charts provided by the author which show the development of the administrative system from 1500 to 1740.

It is, however, significant that Frederick William was less successful in his attempts to reform the courts. In the words of Hintze, an editor of the *Acta Borussica*: "Justice was the stepchild of the military and police state." Efficiency and taxation are more important than justice in a power state.

Professor Dorwart is to be congratulated for this scholarly presentation of a complicated subject, and for the rehabilitation of a monarch whose superficial aspect can be so easily ridiculed. Perhaps his study would have been helped by putting some flesh on the administrative skeleton. For example, tax figures might show greater efficiency as a result of the creation of the General Directory.

Princeton University ELMER A. BELLER

FABRE, JEAN, *Stanislas-Auguste Poniatowski et l'Europe des lumières*. Paris: Institut d'études slaves, 1952. Pp. 746.

Publication of a book on Polish history is not an everyday occurrence which could simply be registered or mentioned in a brief note. In this case it is no exaggeration to speak of a monumental work. Not only the length of the story but also its solid foundation justify the use of such an epithet.

Professor Jean Fabre of the University of Strasbourg lived for several years in Poland before the second world war as a member of the Institut Français and devoted much of his time to investigation of various facets of Polish social and intellectual history in the eighteenth century. As a pupil of Paul Hazard he was primarily interested in the circulation of ideas. He set himself the task of uncovering personal and literary contacts by which Poland, shattered by intense political feuds and foreign interventions, was linked with the "enlightened" West, notably France. From the Polish side he received not only encouragement but a good deal of assistance both in the search for documents and in interpretation of such intricate points as only the native mind can properly grasp. Two distinguished historians, Marceli Handelsman and Władysław Konopczyński, can be regarded as the godfathers of the book under review which had been drafted during their lifetime but came from the press only after they had passed away, the former in 1945, the latter in 1952. Two other Polish scholars, Stanisław Kot and Stanisław Wedkiewicz, are also mentioned gratefully in the preface.

The central theme around which the book has been built is the wide range of intellectual interests evidenced by Prince Stanisław Augustus Poniatowski who by the election of 1764 was called to wear the royal crown, and to preside over the successive partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The final word on the place of Stanisław Augustus in Polish history cannot be said without a thorough examination of his part in both internal and foreign affairs. But a judgment supported exclusively by the study of the king's political role—many severe verdicts on him had been pronounced both by his contemporaries and

spokesmen of subsequent generations—would reveal only some traits of the ruler's personality as well as the darker and more depressing aspects of his epoch. Professor Fabre did not undertake his wide research in order to rehabilitate Stanisław Augustus as a statesman and national leader but to shed light on the intellectual developments in Poland when it became weakened dangerously by the "Saxon lethargy", as well as by the internal strife, and when, with the more distant nations as silent onlookers, it resisted feebly and ineffectively the aggressive designs of its three neighbors. It goes without saying that political events could not be arbitrarily separated from the trends of social and intellectual life, and that the book gives far more than a comprehensive picture of literary and scholarly pursuits of the Polish intellectual élite.

Introduced by a sketch of life in Poland under the Saxon kings the story passes smoothly into biographical details. The author's attention concentrates on such aspects of Stanisław's rise to prominence as his family background, training and travels as well as his maturing under the impact of current ideas. In the third and fourth parts which constitute the body of the book, Professor Fabre portrays not only the principal figure but also the "lights", illuminating in the second half of the eighteenth century the Polish scene. In the gallery of portraits there appear both thinkers born abroad and attached in the course of their career to Poland, and scholars or littérateurs of Polish origin who by their endeavors checked, especially from 1773 to 1791, the decadent and disruptive elements. The narrative becomes more and more involved, and only readers familiar with both the progress of the Enlightenment in Europe and with the stratification of Polish society can fully evaluate the author's efforts to give to Poland its deserved place among the leading nations on the continent. The fifth and the last section of the book is comparatively short. In writing it, the author wished to present in broad lines both the patriotic attempts to avert the ruin by a constitutional reform, voted on May 3, 1791, and the king's ambivalent position in the catastrophe for which he had been censured by many eminent leaders and authors.

It would not have been an easy task to produce such a detailed and fully documented monograph as Professor Fabre's book in the era of intellectual cooperation and of unhindered exchange of information. The war interrupted the work twice: in September 1939 when the author retreated from Warsaw with only a portion of his notes and excerpts, and in the summer of 1944 when much of his materials left behind at the time of retreat perished in the destructive onslaughts on the Polish capital. Professor Fabre did not lose either courage or interest in the work, reassembled scattered notes, filled the gaps, and then told the story on about the same scale as originally intended.

The book helps to understand the Polish enigma, the political decline and dismemberment at the time when intellectual life there had from both native and foreign sources pulsated soundly and quickly. Professor Fabre appeals to a much wider audience than specialists in Polish history. Poland of Stanisław Augustus was not the fountainhead of revolutionary ideas. The king was not as patronage-minded as Frederick II or Catherine II who were anxious to add splendor to their recently built residences by inviting men of distinction and of international reputation. But Poland was not a mere recipient or passive partner in the endeavors to lift the level of human life by promoting intellectual progress, religious tolerance, and scientific research. No serious scholar working in the Age of Reason can by-pass Professor Fabre's book without committing a grave sin of omission.

Columbia University OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK

MARRARO, HOWARD R. ed., *Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Instructions and despatches, 1816-1861.* 2 vols. New York: S. F. Vanni (Ragusa), 1952. Pp. 683, 781.

Professor Howard R. Marraro has devoted many solid years of his scholarly activity to the collation and presentation of source materials pertaining to Italo-American affairs and diplomatic relations. He has pioneered in opening up a relatively new field of historical research, a field, it must be added immediately, still largely in urgent need of fruitful intensive cultivation. Professor Marraro's numerous interpretive monographs, articles, notices, and, of course, the larger works dealing with the diplomatic and political relations between the United States of America and the disunited States of Italy during a good part of the nineteenth century could, in the work still to be done in this field, serve at once as source, model, and inspiration for the younger generation of students interested in these problems.

The present two-volume collection of documents, with its precious Introduction (I, 15-88) amounting to an almost autonomous historical essay on the subject of Italo-American relations and its patient, illuminating, and exhaustive footnote references, once again illustrates not only the obvious range of Marraro's work but also its interesting possibilities for further exploration. In a way, this is a specialist's collection of documents, of diplomatic and consular "instructions and despatches" relating to American affairs in so far as they touched upon a relatively "backward area" of nineteenth century Italy. But it is exactly their apparent "antiquarian" character that gives them a special interest. The documents gathered are transcripts or copies of originals in the National Archives in Washington, D. C., carefully supplemented with others from the Neapolitan and other Italian *Archivi di Stato*. Professor Marraro humbly intimates their principal possibilities and the good uses they may be said to possess (I, 3-4). These documents indeed not only present a picture or, perhaps more accurately, the materials for one, of the social, political, and economic conditions in the Kingdom of Naples during a very important period of Italian history, but also some excellent sources for an understanding of the attitudes in Italy and of the "official minds" at home from the time of Madison to that of Lincoln.

It is, however, as a running commentary on Italian and particularly South Italian affairs from the Congress of Vienna to the culmination of the Risorgimento that these diplomatic and consular reports to the American Government have their most immediate value. The American representatives in the Neapolitan Kingdom, whether they were well-known or obscure, almost without exception possessed much intelligence, acute powers of observation, and fine capacity to garner facts and formulate judgments. On the whole they understood and interpreted quite well the complicated series of developments of which they were at once mere spectators and, unofficially, often sympathetic participants. J. R. Chandler, to cite only one outstanding example among others, the last American Minister to the Neapolitan Bourbon Court at Naples in 1858-60, took the full measure of the tremendous events unfolding in the Southern Kingdom particularly during the *annus mirabilis* of the epic Garibaldian adventure. Chandler's despatches (II, 372-593) constitute an as-yet unexploited body of materials that throws an interesting light on the Italian revolution in the making. While Carafa, in official protests to the Sardinian and the British Governments, was angrily and impotently calling the expedition of the Thousand "an act of barbarous piracy' consummated by "a band of brigands" with the connivance and aid of those

States (II, 495-99), Mr. Chandler was hopefully reporting to Cass that the Neapolitan appeal to the Powers of Europe was still an unknown, but, he shrewdly added, "Governments move slowly, Garibaldi moves rapidly. It may be easy for one or two powers in Europe to dictate to a King but it is difficult to dictate to a people" (II, 511). In November 1860 the American Minister in Naples closed his mission with a great sense of personal and, in so far as he represented American opinion on the Garibaldian liberation of the South, official satisfaction. Ironically, as he made the final report on the ending of the Italian "civil war" which resulted in the incorporation of the Italian South into a stronger national unity, the American Union found itself on the eve of its own gravest ordeal involving the fundamental question of unity.

In making these documents readily available for study and integration Professor Marraro has done a fine service fot American and Italian scholarship. He has, moreover, offered students of comparative history interesting new sources. These documents on the relations between a new Nation, the United States, still on the tortuous ascending arc of a great historical development and an old "Nation" the Kingdom of Naples, at the declining and vanishing point of its own long existence are rich fare for all serious students of the nineteenth century.

New York University A. William Salomone

Omodeo, Adolfo, *Die Erneuerung Italiens und die Geschichte Europas, 1700-1920.* by D. Mitzky and G. Weiss. Zurich: Artemis-Verlag, 1952. Pp. 808. DM. 19.

Those who are unfamiliar with the Italian original will be grateful for this translation of the sixth revised edition of *L'Etá del Risorgimento Italiano* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1948). The Swiss edition includes, in addition to an appreciative foreword by Professor Kaegi of the University of Basel, a handy register of the birth and death dates and occupations of everyone mentioned in the book.

The late Omodeo (1889-1946) was one of Italy's most distinguished historians. A native of Palermo, veteran of World War I, moderate anticlerical, liberal democrat, and staunch anti-Fascist, Professor Omodeo occupied successively the chairs of early Church history and modern history at the University of Naples. Unlike many late nineteeenth century historians, he maintained with Benedetto Croce that absolute objectivity is unattainable and that political and religious passion are proper attributes of the historian, for "only with them can he understand history." Like Croce again, Omodeo believed in a "religion of liberty.' and insisted that history and philosophy go hand in hand. During the era of Fascism these two scholars collaborated in the publication of *La Critica,* and had it not been for Omodeo's untimely death he would have headed the *Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici,* founded in Naples by Croce at the end of the last war. After the overthrow of Mussolini in 1943 Professor Omodeo became rector of the University of Naples and edited a cultural review, *L'Acropoli.* He also entered politics as southern leader of the short-lived but influential Action Party, and for a brief period was Minister of Instruction.

Most of Omodeo's historical publications fall into three categories. The first includes controversial biographies of Jesus (1913) and St. Paul (1922), and critical studies of the early apostolic age (1920) and the mystical Gospel of St. John (1930). In his second field of interest, early nineteenth century French intellectual history, Omodeo wrote a book on Joseph de Maistre (1939) and an incomplete study on French culture in the age of the Restoration (1946). In the field of the Risorgi-

mento his chief works, beside the title under review, include the *Leggenda di Carlo Alberto* (1940); *Vincenzo Gioberti e la sua evoluzione politica* (1941); *Figure e passioni del Risorgimento italiano* (2nd ed., 1945); and an uncompleted political biography of Cavour. All his works are based on a critical examination of original sources. His studies of the political history of the Risorgimento helped pave the way for Cesare Spellanzon's monumental *Storia del Risorgimento Italiano,* still in progress.

The first edition of *L'Etá del Risorgimento Italiano* appeared in 1931 and was designed primarily as a textbook. Later editions broadened the book's scope so that it finally resembled a text only in minor ways. Omodeo consciously revolted against the nationalistic historiography of the Fascists and such "neo-Guelphs" as Vincenzo Gioberti, who had insisted on an Italian "primacy." In his preface Omodeo states that his main purpose is to present the history of the Risorgimento in its European setting; often, however, he appears to be writing a history of Europe that culminates in the Risorgimento.

Probably the best fusion of the two themes occurs in the chapters devoted to the period before the French Revolution. He points out that the Italians who participated in the general eighteenth century European movement for rational self-improvement, liberation from ancient prejudices, and the study of new forms of life and legislation were still isolated individuals, "unable to assume the leadership of events and gain ascendancy over the masses."

Omodeo's discussion of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era tends to stand in juxtaposition to that of Italian history but this does not prevent the author from pointing out how the French upheaval laid the basis for the Risorgimento by reconstructing Italian society on the basis of the revolutionary principles of the Napoleonic Code, offering military and administrative training to the Italian people, and injuring irrevocably the temporal power of the papacy. Because of all this, the Italians could not participate in the insurrections against Napoleon.

The author is successful in his fusion of Italian and European developments between 1820 and 1846. During that period the Risorgimento unfolded in union with the European liberal trend. The long period of exile of many Italian patriots strengthened their common ties with other peoples so that "all the men of the Risorgimento from Mazzini to Cavour, from Garibaldi to Settembrini, were conscious of working and suffering not just for Italy but for a universally human ideal valid for all peoples." Omodeo places emphasis upon the importance of Gioberti's work in stimulating in many ways the political thought of middle-class Italians in this period. The author's judgment of Mazzini is also penetrating. Among the causes of Mazzini's failures were his "scarcely political" intrasigence, his refusal to sanction diplomatic alliances with foreign countries, his excessive preoccupation with popular uprisings, his errors in attacking simultaneously on too many fronts, his inability to arouse the peasant masses, and his blunder in arousing the religious hostility of the Church, thus preventing the emergence of a mass republican movement. Nevertheless, the "prophet" contributed mightily to the formation of an Italian national consciousness, inspired idealism in the minds of a determined minority, and helped arouse European opinion to a realization of the existence of an Italan problem.

Italy naturally dominates the scene in Omodeo's presentation of the period 1849 to 1870. The author obviously admires the skillful leadership of Cavour, but he also takes pains to point out the importance of Victor Emmanuel II's activities in the unification, actions which often were at variance with those of his prime min-

ister, especially during Garibaldi's expedition in 1860. Omodeo is less successful than either Luigi Salvatorelli or the late Robert C. Binkley in showing how the formation of the unitary monarchy in Italy was but one aspect of federative and unitary politics.

Inevitably the period after 1870 is anticlimactic, but Odomeo seeks to maintain the Risorgimento motif in his analysis of the manner in which Italian leaders after 1870 sought to solve the problems brought about by unification, and in his discussion of Italian irredentism, which achieved its goal in the First World War. The author apparently considers Italy's annexations at that time to have been entirely justified. One wishes that he had offered a more penetrating discussion of Italian diplomatic interests in the Balkans and Africa. Much of the discussion of general European history in this period is spotty, and both its economic and intellectual aspects are largely ignored. These omissions, however, do not prevent the author from offering a good analysis of Italian political developments.

All in all, Odomeo's study is highly readable, perceptive and balanced in its judgments, and admirably compact in its summation of modern Italian political history.

Vanderbilt University CHARLES F. DELZELL

LANGOTH, FRANZ, *Kampf um Oesterreich: Erinnerungen eines Politikers.* Wels (Austria): Welsermühl, 1951. Pp. 396.

The author of this remarkable book has to be introduced to the reader. Franz Langoth, nationalist member of the Upper Austrian diet before 1914, became Grossdeutscher lieutenant-governor of the land of Upper Austria in 1918, entrusted with the police administration. Under Chancellor Dollfuss he was discharged from the function but continued to play a semi-official role as negotiator between government and the National (then actually National Socialist) opposition.

Under the German occupation of Austria, Langoth became mayor of Linz, member of the Reichstag and—last but certainly not least noteworthy—member of Freisler's atrocious Volksgerichtshof. Further personal references are Messrs. Hitler, Göring and Himmler. As Langoth proudly observes, he was repeatedly the dinner guest of the Führer who apparently appreciated him particularly (p. 243). Göring called him very cordially "Father Langoth" (p. 245), a name which has stuck to him. Mr. Himmler topped Hitler and Göring by appointing "Father Langoth" honorary SS Oberführer.

After so many honorable activities, the post war years spent in an American detention camp and the charges made by the commission for the preparation of serious war crime trials against Langoth were a sad aftermath. Since the Austrian federal President Dr. Renner ordered the termination of further war crime proceedings against the author in 1950, the end was still a comparatively happy one, though of course Langoth was not as fortunate as the surviving Nazi victims in the concentration camps of Dachau and Buchenwald who "received their rich reward." (p. 301).

The political philosophy of "Kampf um Osterreich" ties in well with the external facts of Langoth's life. A rabid champion of the Anschluss under the Swastika, he questions National Socialist responsibility for the July Putsch, 1934. "Who murdered Dr. Dollfuss anyway? This has never been fully clarified", he states on page 166. Yet, on page 167 the clarification is happily at hand. "The rebels certainly did not intend to kill the chancellor." Except for this mishap and the ensuing further shedding of blood the Putsch "possibly might have been a very

fortunate event for the fatherland" (p. 171), namely the Austrian. Anyway, the death of the murdered chancellor must be considered a blow for Austrian National Socialism since Dr. Dollfuss "in his nimbleness" would have arrived at an understanding with Nazism (p. 175). In contrast to this evaluation, the personality and action of his successor Dr. Schuschnigg are rejected outright. Unfortunately the reader of these memoirs is painfully aware that the author's criticism of both Dollfuss' and Schuschnigg's constitutional policies is not always as unjustified as Langoth's subjective right to such criticism.

It is almost needless to say that this criticism blames Austria for the alleged breach of the July agreement of 1936 and the infamous Diktat of Berchtesgaden in February 1938. Similar sentiments place chief responsibility for the outbreak of the last war on the Austrian emigration under Hitler, "the thirty eighters" (p. 251).

The significance of this book lies by no means only in the revealing expression of such sentiments and their publication of Upper Austria of 1951. Of very real and, so far as trustworthy, very factual importance are the records of the secret negotiations between Langoth and his associates as representatives of the at first legal, then either semi-legal or outright illegal national movement, with foremost Austrian government officials on one side and German Nazi commisars on the other. Particularly some of the minutes of the negotiations with Chancellor Dollfuss, Dr. Gleissner the present governor of Upper Austria, security director Count Revertera and Habicht, the "Inspecteur" of the NSDAP in Austria, are of the greatest significance. They all center around the problem of appeasement, festering in the desperate conditions of Austria in the years preceding the German invasion.

Whether one likes it or not, this book represents a primary source of major importance for the understanding of the national movement in Austria under the authoritarian Dollfuss and Schuschnigg regimes from 1933 to 1938.

Rutgers University ROBERT A. KANN

WITTRAM, REINHARD, *Drei Generationen: Deutschland, Livland, Russland, 1830-1914*. Göttingen, Deuerlichsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1949. Pp. 360. DM 12.80

Originally it was for his children only that Professor Wittram had planned to write the book *Drei Generationen*. Based on letters and other family materials, it deals with the emigration of a German student, Johann Friedrich Wittram, to Livonia and describes his life there, that of his Livonian born wife, and the lives of their families. Though published, in 1949, for wider distributon, it remans a family memorial. To the personally unconcerned historian many of the descriptions will have more literary than historical value.

The social milieu is that of the intelligentsia or professional class (*Literatentum*). We hear little of the attitudes of the other two German groups mentioned, the nobility and the *Bürgertum*, and nothing of Estonians and Latvians who, according to the author, were chiefly divided by corporate distinctions (*ständische Unterschiede*) from the Germans; neither do we hear from the Russian side. The actors live in a parochial world of their own; their attachment is to Livonia, its soil and, notwithstanding loyalty to the Russian autocracy, its existing politically autonomous status. Aside from daily demands, their chief concerns seem to have been the preservation of their old status and traditions. Germany, which they occasionally visit, is a foreign country. German language and intellectual traditions form a spiritual *Heimat*, but the real Germany is a stranger. Especially after 1871, the centralized national state and the growing materialistic society adapting itself to modern conditions became increasingly foreign and disappointing to the Livonian

Literatentum, which retained patriarchal ways and felt that it served, together with its own interests, the cultural standards of the region.

Battle against change was, indeed, the aim of the society which the author describes. Although the relations of its members, aside from those among one another, are hardly touched, we learn that they thought disdainfully of the social demands of their day. Living themselves between two or three nations, they likewise resented native national aspirations; they opposed russification, learned but poorly the Russian language (while they did speak the local tongues), and bitterly fought for the perpetuation of German schools. But a feeling of doom pervades their thoughts and actions. We find not one single person among them who offered a creative solution for the future.

The book, limited in scope and interest as it is, is well written; the society which is described comes to life; we gain an insight into some of their peculiar problems. A few sidelights are shed on events in the world, such as the Herrnhut religious revival, the Crimean War (at least in so far as it touched Livonia), the revolution of 1905 in Riga, and the russification of the Baltic provinces.

University of Delaware WALTHER KIRCHNER

HÖHN, REINHARD, *Scharnhorst's Vermächtnis.* Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag, 1952. Pp. 387. DM 16.80.

Professor Höhn has given a tempting title to his excellent study of the ideas and activity of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the greatest of the Prussian military reformers. What is the "legacy' 'of Scharnhorst to the Germany of our own day, which it is now certain will again be armed? A "political" army devoted to a democratic state? A state organized to meet military needs, however they be conceived?) Both possibilities lie within the range of Scharnhorst's thought.

Scharnhorst, like Baron vom Stein, was not a Prussian subject by birth. After he entered Prussian service, he was employed chiefly in tasks of military education and the elaboration and application of a doctrine designed to adapt French military innovations for the Prussian army and state. Scharnhorst sought to wrest the monopoly of command from the landed aristocracy and to bring in the sons of the bourgeoisie to be trained as a new type of officer, rationally educated, rooted in history and living tradition, deeply devoted to a state which served their interests. He also desired to establish the enlisted personnel upon a new basis of voluntarism and enthusiasm within general military service; this, too, he would found on the service of the state to the common man. These changes he was convinced had become necessary because the old kind of discipline and tactics, inherited from Frederick the Great, had utterly failed in the face of the changes in warfare resulting from the French Revolution. Such changes were only possible if the state were reorganized as Stein advocated, in the form of an alliance of the crown and the burgeoisie. But where some of Scharnhorst's predecessors in the advocacy of reform—Berenhorst and Bülow in particular—were willing to abandon dynasticism and convert Prussia into a bourgeois republic in order to save her from defeat and destruction, Schanhorst saw his goal rather as the incorporation of the fundamental elements of republican strength into the structure of a modified Prussian monarchy, based on the participation rather than the subservience of the people. He had no opposition on principle to dynastic monarchy, and anticipated that a direct clash between republicanism and dynasticism would lead to the victory of the old guard, who would conciliate Napoleon before they would share power in the Prussian state with the bourgeoisie.

The crown never really accepted this program except during the crisis which ended with Napoleon's downfall. The Prussian army under Roon and Moltke subsequently became the core of Prussian conservatism. From Scharnhorst it retained only the shell of his military innovations, not the kernel of his political thought. Was not the great reformer himself at fault, therefore, in approaching fundamental problems of the political structure of society from the point of view of the needs of the army, rather than the reverse? Since Höhn does not indicate any answer to this question, a crucial aspect of Scharnhorst's legacy remains unclear.

State University of Iowa HERBERT H. ROWEN

TIMM, HELGA, *Die deutsche Sozialpolitik und der Bruch der Grossen Koalition im März, 1930. (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der Politischen Parteien, Heft 1.)* Düsseldorf: Droste-Verlag, 1952. Pp. 215. DM 12.80.

To assist in the present-day political education of the German people so that they may achieve a truer historical understanding of German parliamentary democracy, the Minister of the Interior of the West German Republic has set up a Commission of leading German historians, including among others, Professors Braubach, Conze, and Schieder, to supervise the publication of scholarly material on the history of German parliamentary experience and political parties since 1948. The plan calls for three series of publications dealing with: one, important phases of the origin and development of German parliamentary life, two, individual problem studies such as the volume under review, and three, political individuals, groups, and parties, of which one volume on Stresemann by Dr. Gerhard Zwoch has already appeared.

The individual problem which Dr. Timm attacks in doctoral-dissertation fashion is embraced in the title of her work. The collapse of this last great coalition, based on parliamentary majority rule, led to Brüning's rule-by-decree, based on the authority of the president and Article 48 of the Weimer Constitution, and then to Hitler. In view of these consequences it is considered an important task to attempt to discover why the coalition collapsed and why party government was unable to master the critical economic and political situation.

The search leads Dr. Timm to an examination of the role which social policy (Sozialpolitik), characterized by the fight over unemployment insurance, played in the party relationships within the great coalition, a problem which in turn leads her in the first part of the work to a detailed analysis and description of the development of trade-unionism, social legislation, and Social Democratic party (SPD) policy to 1928, and in which she demonstrates the significance of the social legislation of the Weimar Republic to the economy and to the political and economic organization of the workers.

The second part of the work, opening with an analysis of the world economic situation in 1928 and its economic and financial manifestations in Germany, describes the struggle to form and maintain the great coalition in the face of the many difficulties—economic, financial, political,—of the period 1928-30. The third part provides the dénouement in the struggle to maintain not only the coalition, but parliamentary democracy itself.

It appears that the weakness of the coalition from the beginning was due to the fact that the Social Democratic party (SPD), the political representative of a socialist organization of the economy, was fundamentally in conflict with the German People's party (DVP), the political representative of a capitalist organization of the economy. Dr. Timm cautions however, against an oversimplification of the

conflict by the use of such slogans as capitalism vs. socialism, middle class vs. working class. (p. 196).

This conflict, she points out, was a conflict of principle concerning the organization of economic and social life. The SPD gave first priority to the social aspects of its economic policy creating a fight over the reform of unemployment insurance. In opposition the DVP gave first priority to economic policy itself as the only sound measure of social policy. This difference of principle could be bridged from time to time by agreement on foreign policy objectives, such as reparations and Rhineland evacuation; but, with the realization of these objectives, it again emerged.

During the years 1928 to 1930, the political parties gradually became groups representing economic interests only. The death of Stresemann removed the last obstacle to this development in the DVP while in the SPD the trade-unions attained domination. By March, 1930, the conflict between the SPD and the DVP, between socio-economic reform and the maintenance of a capitalistic economy, had become a fight for and against the parliamentary system itself.

Dr. Timm blames the DVP for the collapse on grounds that in its social intransigence it broadened the conflict of principle to a fight against the democratic Weimar Republic; and she blames the SPD for not preventing the collapse on grounds that the worker's organizations, narrowing their political vision to a similar intransigence of principle, underestimated, or did not recognize in time, the dangers to democracy which the collapse of the coalition would mean.

The need of the hour demanded an effective plan to meet the devastating economic crisis for which a strong democratic coalition policy was necessary. But the SPD's attempt to defend its social policy, to alleviate the effects of the economic crisis on the workers, and, at the same time, to change the capitalistic system, deprived its policy makers of the will and ability to support measures designed to overcome the economic crisis. Over the distribution of burdens, the fulfillment of reparations, the economic crisis, and the party conflict, the coalition collapsed.

Cited in her bibliography are the minutes of the proceedings, of the SPD *Parteitage,* the Reichstag, and trade-union Congresses; files of important German newspapers; periodical writings on economics, finance, socialism and social reform; memoirs of participants, and other special studies of the period of the Weimar Republic. The work is instructive, informative, and most valuable to the specialist; but its value-judgments will provoke controversy even among non-Germans.

University of California, Santa Barbara, California HENRY M. ADAMS

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD and VERONICA M. TOYNBEE, edd., *Hitler's Europe (Survey of International affairs 1939-1946).* Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp XVI, 730 and 4 maps. $14.50.

CARLYLE, MARGARET, ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1939-1946.* Vol. II: *Hitler's Europe.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp. XVI, 362. $6.10.

The volume *Hitler's Europe* in the war-time series of the *Survey of International Affairs* must be regarded as one of the strongest links in the chain: *The World in March 1939* (edited by Arnold Toynbee and Frank T. Ashton-Gwatkin), George Kirk's two volumes, *The Middle East in the War* and *The Middle East, 1945-1950,* and William H. McNeill's *America, Britain and Russia, their Co-operation and Conflict* (volumes already published) and *The Eve of the War 1939, Ini-*

tial Triumph of the Axis and *The Realignment of Europe* (still to be published). In his 10-page introduction Professor Toynbee basically reduces the causes of Hitler's failure, besides stressing certain traits of his character, to his unwillingness to fully mobilize the war potential, of his toleration of incessant squabbles among his power-drunk lieutenants and to his thinking of the subjugated nations in colonial terms only and never as potential allies.

The volume is divided into six parts. Parts I and II, on the political and economic structure of Hitler's Europe, are written by Clifton J. Child (Part I) and Patricia Harvey, with contributions on the German treatment of the Jews by James Parkes and a chapter on food and agriculture by W. Klatt. The following parts likewise mirror the teamwork of the experts preparing the *Survey*. Part III (Italy) was written by Katherine Duff and Elizabeth Wiskemann, Part IV (France) by Alfred Cobban and Sir Desmond Morton, Part V (The occupied countries in Western Europe) by Viscount Chilston; the authors of the final part on the occupied and satellite countries in Eastern Europe are Sidney Lowery (Poland, the Ostland and Finland), Clifton J. Child (The Ukraine), Elizabeth Wiskemann (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania) and Elizabeth Barker (Greece).

In 1951 at Marburg, in addressing the Twenty-first Convention of German Historians on "Problems and Methods of Research on Contemporary History," Professor Michael Freund of Kiel University declared that the primary task of German historians was to create conditions favorable for future historiography. There can be no doubt that in sifting and correlating an enormous amount of widely scattered first- and second-hand source material the authors of *Hitler's Europe* have often hewn new paths in jungle territory which so far no other historians of English-speaking countries have dared to do. The authors have truly done pioneer work and rendered inestimable service, especially to teachers of contemporary history, by marshalling within a few pages information which has already been and will increasingly become the topic of many books. The chapters on the political and the economic structure of *Hitler's Europe* must be singled out as marvelously executed and as real contributions to a deeper understanding of the period. The amount of reliable detailed information and the judicious judgment which is the result of a complete mastery of pertinent information deserve the highest praise.

In view of the long-established and hardly ever challenged authoritative standing of the *Survey* it is not a pleasant task for a reviewer who in many respects feels greatly indebted to the authors of the volume as a whole, to have to raise certain questions regarding their approach to the sources of the period in the chapters dealing with various parts of Europe and especially with Eastern territories. There are, in this reviewer's opinion, serious limitations to approaches which were (and for forthcoming volumes probably still are) based to a large extent on the outstanding clipping archives of Chatham House, rated as first-class sources for intelligence purposes at the time of their collection. The question must now be asked, Is it unreasonable to expect that a work which by its superb indices has reference value, should in the ninth year after the end of the war leave no war-time second-hand source unchecked and should pay more attention to research work already done on many topics discussed in the war-time series of the *Survey*? It seems that quite often a proper balance has been lost between trusting and using accidental contemporary second-hand sources of different value and reliability (as they are abundantly represented in the clipping archives) and relying on the utilizing the results

of the first decade of post-World War II specialized research. The cuttings are trusted to such an extent that, for instance, on p. 497 (note 3) the writer quotes the German weekly *Das Reich* from an extract in the *Sunday Times* without any attempt to check the accuracy of the quotation or even to determine the original publication date in *Das Reich*. It is not sufficient to compare printed contemporary secondhand sources with the memoirs which have flooded the German book market during the last years. Most of them had to be written without access to documentation and serious criticism has been advanced against not a few of them by competent reviewers. The absolute reliance on Gisevius' testimony in many places of *Hitler's Europe* is a case in a point. A bibliography of the literary sources quoted in the volume (which is unfortunately missing) would also show that in the book published in 1954 practically no German books published later than 1951 are cited. On the pages dealing with the Netherlands (pp. 494-509) there is no hint that the history of the German occupation is being written by the Dutch Institute of War Documentation and that already a large number of exceedingly valuable monographs on various aspects of the occupation period mentioned in the section have been published. Likewise in the chapter on occupied France no hint is given of the work of the Comité d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale.

The foregoing remarks about the use of sources may be corroborated by closer scrutiny of Part VI. It would have been preferable not to separate the section on "The Ukraine,' which has been placed between "Bulgaria" and "Yugoslavia," from the sections of the book dealing with Poland and the Ostland as the territories which in the course of the eastern war were brought under direct German control. In these as in foregoing sections of the book the documentation collected for the Nuremberg trials has been exploited to the fullest extent and good use has been made of certain unofficial German legal and German Government publications. However, the translation of "Fuehrungsstab Politik" as "Operations Staff on the Political Side" p. 245, note 7), by not giving the German term in parenthesis and by not explaining it, borders on unintelligibility although it is an improvement over the translation in *I. M. T. Nuremberg* (International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals) Vol. 25, p. 329: "Leading Staff Politics." Unfortunately, certain limitations in the use of sources become painfully visible in Part VI. The neglect of original Finnish sources is easily understandable, but it is utterly regrettable that—as an inspection of the quoted sources makes it evident—*Slavica* (*et Scandinavica*) *non leguntur* by the scholars preparing one of the most ambitious and comprehensive outlines of contemporary history. And it cannot be said that in Part VI the use of materials in Western European languages is as discriminating as it should be; for instance, an article abundant in inaccuracies such as André Visson's "Germany and the Ukraine" (*New York Herald Tribune*, July 23, 1941) is quoted without any warning sign.

The fabric of the Ukrainian Section of the book may be used as an example of the too limited approach. The sources quoted in this Section of *Hitler's Europe* are:

I. M. T. Nuremberg (see above); Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression; U. S. A., Military Tribunals; releases of Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (Ministry of Propaganda), Nachrichten- und Presse-dienst (German Foreign Ministry) and Transocean (German Radio News Agency); U. S. Department of State, *Bulletin* (1946) and *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, 1939-1941; Gisevius, *Bis zum bittern Ende;* Goebbels, *Diaries;* Hitler, *Mein Kampf;* Kleist, *Zwischen Hitler und Stalin;* Lang and Schenck, *Portrait eines Menschheitsverbrechers* (Rosenberg); *Das Recht der besetzten Ostge-*

biete (Alfred Meyer, ed.) and the following papers: *Deutsche Ukrainezeitung, Frankfurter Zeitung, Hamburger Tageblatt, Pester Lloyd, Das Reich, Revaler Ueitung, Svenska Dagbladet, Voelkischer Beobachter and Krakivski Visti* (July 1, 1942 issue). One single issue of the *Deutsche Ukrainezeitung* (dat. February 20, 1943), quoted twice on p. 634, seems to be, purely by accident, the only source used from the area itself under discussion, and the one issue of *Krakivski Visti* is the exceptional hint to a source in a Slavic language.

Due to the fact that the I. M. T. materials are its principal source, the section on the Ukraine is basically an account—and it should be said, an enlightening account—of the divergence of opinions and the running feud in the Nazi hierarchy on matters of Ukrainian policy. But while "resistance and repression" in the chapter on France take up almost 30 pages, "resistance and repression" in the Ukraine —spontaneous resistance as well as resistance directed, encouraged and controlled from the other side of the front-line—is barely touched upon. With so many aspects of the war on the eastern front still obscure, a deeper digging into original sources would have been greatly rewarding.

While due attention is paid in the volume at several places to population movements in the Polish area in connection with Germanization aims, the treatment of German cultural policy in the East is inadequate. The important role of the Eastern ideology in the National Socialist doctrine is underestimated; but it led during the war to the early establishment of such centers as the Reichsuniversität Posen, the (Posen) Reichsstiftung für deutsche Ostforschung and the (Cracow) Institut für deutsche Ostarbeit (with branches in Warsaw and Lwów). And for German anti-Polish measures in the educational field, as recorded on pp. 553-554, better sources are now available than the *New York Times* of February 21, *The Times* of April 5 and the *Daily Telegraph* of January 9, 1940.

British and American centers of Slavic research are so excellently equipped with original source material that no valid excuse can be made for their complete neglect by the British center for the study of contemporary history; to make use of these hitherto neglected sources would mean a further improvement of one of the indispensable tools of research and teaching. And this is the one and only exception which must be taken with regard to the corresponding Vol. II of the *Documents on International Affairs 1939-1946* which, like the preceding documentation, supplements the *Survey* in an admirable manner.*

The Library of Congress FRITZ T. EPSTEIN

GARTHOFF, RAYMOND L., *Soviet Military Doctrine*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953. Pp. 587. $7.50.

Dr. Garthoff, The Rand Corporation, and the publisher of this pioneer work are to be congratulated for having brought out the first serious analysis of Soviet military doctrine to appear in the West. Although since 1944 it has been clear to political scientists and historians alike that the Soviet armed forces are a principal factor in the world balance of power, western scholarship has so far ignored the doctrines motivating those forces, and providing the framework within which they have been applied.

Part I of the study examines the dialectical basis of Soviet military doctrine and its integral relationship to the aggressive framework or "combat image" of Sov-

*Both volumes are remarkably free of printing errors; however, in *Hitler's Europe* on pp. 38-39 it should read General von Tresckow (instead of Treschow) and Adolph Reichwein (not Reichswein).

iet policy in general. Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov is quoted as having said in 1929: "If war is a continuation of politics, only by other means, so also peace is a continuation of struggle, only by other means." In view of the relative success of periodic Soviet propaganda campaigns dealing with "peaceful coexistence," Mr. Garthoff has performed a valuable service in soberly highlighting the permanently aggressive framework from which such shifting winds of Soviet political doctrine are exported. Part II, representing half the total volume of the book, examines the Soviet principles of war, comparing and contrasting them with familiar Western concepts. Both explicit and implicit doctrines dealing with the offensive, maneuver, and initiative, massive concentration over and against economy of force, momentum of advance and concentration afterward, annihilation, reserves, unity in the cooperation of all arms, and the importance of the rear are examined in great detail, and with some unfortunate repetitiousness. The differences in Soviet thinking between military science and art, particularly the especial concept of an "operating art," as well as Stalin's "permanently operating factors" are also exhaustively treated.

In Part III, the author gives a general, almost cursory, survey of the operational and tactical doctrines of each of the arms and components of the Soviet ground, air, and naval forces. In the two appendices, the author first supplies a collection of valuable organizational charts, and then in "The Tril by Arms: June to December 1941" provides a brilliant analysis of both Soviet and German operations, and of the Soviet blunders which almost ended in military disaster. Here, in what to the general reader will surely remain one of the highlights of the entire book, Dr. Garthoff compares Soviet theory and practice, and analyzes the deficiencies in both which resulted in the staggering Soviet losses from June to December 1941. Finally, an exhaustive bibliography, which alone runs to nearly 60 pages, and an index, are valuable adjuncts to the study.

A major criticism of this study (and one which has frequently been leveled at *Rand* studies generally) is the thinness of its historical perspective. Although the author admits that "the influence of the Imperial Russian Army and doctrine is very considerable," this historical past is dismissed with scarcely two percent of his analysis. Similarly the author's approach excludes the influence of Soviet economic and technological developments on the army and its doctrine, although the five-year plans were formulated, and later justified to the Russian peoples in explicitly military terms. Except for the Introduction, Part I, and the Appendix on *Operation Barbarossa,* almost no conclusions are drawn throughout the study, and no comparative, over-all assessment of Soviet and Western military doctrines is made. Partisans of air and naval forces will be quick to point out that the study is mainly concerned with Soviet ground forces. This focus of attention, however, is fully justified by the pre-eminent position of the Red Army in the Soviet internal power structure, and by the fact that, so far as doctrine is concerned, the dominant role of the ground forces has recently been confirmed in a series of articles in *Red Star* dealing with nuclear weapons and developments. The value of the study to specialists is severely limited by the fact that Dr. Gartoff's sources were practically all cut off by 1946, at which time the Soviets were analyzing their military strengths and weaknesses. The lessons learned, and publicized in *Voynnaya Mysl'* and equally high-level Soviet publications, were not available. Dr. Garthoff's study is thus not an adequate basis for generalizing about the present status of Soviet military doctrine, particularly with reference to the employment of operational armor, flexibility of command, and mobile warfare generally—especially the meeting engagement, which, although basic to any mobile warfare, is dismissed in a few lines.

Despite these shortcomings Dr. Garthoff's courageous study provides a reliable insight into the working of the Soviet military mind, and the integral relationship between Soviet military and political doctrine. As such the book deserves to be widely read and studied by the political scientist and statesman as well as by students of contemporary military history and science.

Falls Church, Virginia PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

KOUSOULAS, DIMITRIOS G., *The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939-1953.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1953. Pp. xi, 210. $4.00.

In this volume, the author has attempted to trace, in broad sweep, both the position of Greece in world affairs from the beginnings of World War II to the achievement of the new Tripartite Pact between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia (February 28, 1953), and the history of Greece itself, through the tragic era of the war and immediate postwar period to its present development of relative recovery and stability. Essentially, his work is divided into three basic parts, the first of which deals with "the Brewing Tempest" of the war, and is concerned with the Italian attack upon the invasion of Albania, and ultimately with the Fascist-Nazi aggression against and occupation of Greece.

Part II deals with Greece under Nazi Rule, in which the country suffered under the triple occupation of German, Italian and Bulgarian forces, but it also treats of Allied policy with respect to the Balkan region generally and to Greece in particular, and closes with the liberation of Greece and the outbreak of revolution in Athens in December 1944. In connection therewith, the author provides a brief account of the development of "the underground" in Greece based upon the organization of EAM/ELAS, under the domination of Communist elements, which was to lead to grave complications in the immediate postwar period. While the author is, perhaps, less successful in his treatment of the Greek national claims (Part III, "Bitterness is the Reward,") concerning the Dodecanese, Northern Epirus, and Cyprus, his account of the attempt to subvert Greece and to overthrow the constitutional system in Greece through Communist-inspired guerilla warfare (1946-49) and of the successful resistance of the Greek people, with the material and moral support of the United States, the United Kingdom and the United Nations, is brief and to the point. If Greece were "a testing ground," as the author rightly holds, the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, on March 12, 1947, in connection with the Greece problem, proved a turning point, not only in Greece, but in the development of American foreign policy. Greece not only met the test successfully, but moved toward stability at home, and ultimately (February 15, 1952) became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

While Mr. Kousoulas has not exhausted the available sources in telling his story, as a whole he has told it well. Along with other works on Southeastern Europe, this one should be of service in studying both Nazi and Soviet foreign policy and methods for seizure of power.

Arlington, Virginia HARRY N. HOWARD

KAPS, JOHANNES, ed., *The Tragedy of Silesia, 1945-46.* Translated by Gladys H. Hartinger. Munich: Christ Unterwegs, 1952-53. Pp. 576.

This stout and well-produced volume is an exact reproduction in English of the German *Tragödie Schlesiens 1945-46 in Dokumenten,* which appeared simultaneously from the same press. So far as this reviewer could see, the only difference is

that in the appendix the maps sketching the course of hostilities in the winter and spring of 1945 are given in color in the German edition. A comparison of the English rendering with the original shows that, though free, it has been faithfully made.

The whole work falls into a number of parts. Part I gives a brief account of the history of Silesia down to 1945, and a longer one of the conditions obtaining at the onset of that year—in all some eighty-four pages. Then begins the book proper, which is composed of documentary reports of the overrunning of the Oder land by the Red armies, selected from the eye-witness accounts published in six volumes as *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Erzdiocese Breslau in den Schicksalsjahren 1945-51*—a still unprinted survey of the whole subject.

Forty pages deal with the actualities of fighting, and these are well served by the maps at the end of the book. Then we have the series of reports, full of personal hazard and suffering—at first a few of a general nature but from page 145 factual accounts according to the area: first from Upper Silesia (Section III), then from Middle Silesia (Section IV), and finally from Lower Silesia (Section V). Two short chapters on the Martyrdom of the Priests and on Concentration Camps complete the grim story—the latest sample of the kind of thing that border countries (Zwischenländer) have had to face through the ages.

The picture here painted is designed to appeal both to the understanding and to the emotions. No one can fail to be moved by its poignancy, since millions of innocent people were made helpless victims of violence and disinheritances. Nor does it help to make the rejoinder that precisely the same things had been inflicted on Poles and Russians a few years earlier. The devastations thus perpetrated surpass in fury and extent anything Europe had experienced before—a telling comment on our twentieth century civilization. This reviewer has only one remark to make on a book which must be read to be appreciated: the pages dealing with the invasion itself tend in places to lay the blame for it all too much on the Poles and too little on Moscow. On this point, of course, controversy will rage for a long time.

University of British Columbia WILLIAM J. ROSE

WARBURG, JAMES P., *Germany. Key to Peace.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Pp. xix, 344. $4.75

This is a selective history, with commentary, of American policy toward Germany from the midst of the war into the midsummer of 1953. The volume leads up to a plan for an over-all German settlement (originally submitted to the incoming Republican administration) as the "key" to peace, or alternatively, in case of a Soviet refusal, as a means of strengthening Western alliances in the face of an uncompromising Russian threat, clearly advertised through such a refusal. The author gives evidence of much first-hand experience and study, as well as of a close knowledge of the pertinent documents and bibliography. A few typographical lapses appear, such as having the Quebec Conference at which FDR and Churchill initialed the Morgenthau Plan occurring both in 1943 (pp. xviii, 245) and correctly in 1944 (p. 15).

Mr. Warburg early was a dissenter from official American policy, or lack thereof. "If, in our German policy, we are motivated by hate, we shall be unjust; and if we commit injustice at the beginning, we shall overcompensate for that injustice in the end," he warned. He recurrently deplores any policy based on the assumption that there are "good" and "bad' nations, whether applied to Germany then

or Russia now. He seems somewhat unjust, however, in not duly taking into consideration the fact that the responsible official cannot be so detached as the private observer. The concept of Germany as a "bad" nation, whether justly or wisely adopted, existed as a matter of fact among vocal groups and the public in general. Our statesmen could not escape its coloration nor ignore the resulting pressures in dealing with Germany.

Warburg's settlement for Germany calls for the restoration of the pre-1937 territories (except East Prussia and the Saar Basin, the latter to be under a UN mandate followed by a plebiscite). This would remove the major threat of irredentism in Germany. Simultaneously, it would deprive Russia of the power to tempt Germany through a promise of the return of lost territories. The reunited Germany would be kept disarmed and neutral for five to ten years. If universal disarmament failed to materialize, Germany thereafter would be free to rearm and make alliances of her own choice. Various political and economic stipulations accompany the above proposals.

Mr. Warburg does not appear to be overly confident that Russia will accept the plan. In refusing, however, she would stand out clearly as the enemy of peace. With the issues thus defined, the West will see no further alternative except unity and an intensive pursuit of a balance of power. The plan has the virtue of giving us the initiative. Whether a Soviet refusal would have the expected clarifying and consolidating effect in the West remains doubtful.

Montana State University OSCAR J. HAMMEN

POP, NICOLAE, *Kirche unter Hammer und Sichel.* Berlin: Morus Verlag, 1953. Pp. 148. DM 5.80.

This is a well documented, factual, and on the whole unbiased description of the process whereby the Christian churches of Rumania were subjugated to the Communist régime during the years 1945-1951. It deals principally with the fate of the Rumanian Orthodox Church, the Uniat Church, and the Roman Catholic Church, although the other curches are mentioned incidentally. The author is a Roman Catholic, but his attitude toward the other communions is judiciously fair.

It is a harrowing story, although its pattern is familiar from the almost identical policies pursued in this respect in the other communist-dominated lands.

The new pattern, adopted in the Soviet Union about the year 1939 and perfected during the term of office of the present Patriarch Alexi, has been applied to the Rumanian Church as well. This has been the case particularly since May, 1948, when Justinian succeeded Patriarch Nikodemus as the head of the Rumanian Orthodox Church. His election, in which the members of the government and of the Parliament participated, according to the new law, brought to the leadership of the Church a man who not only assumed a "positive" attitude toward the government, but who was actually a member of the communist party (pp. 50, 127), He has since become almost a dictator over the Church, and has brought it completely under the control of the state.

The next step in the régime's ecclesiastical program was the "reunion" of the Uniat Church which was predominant in Transylvania. Since no bishop of that body permitted himself to be used for the purpose, the procedure, patterned after that used by Patriarch Alexei in engineering the "reunion" of the Ukrainian Unitat Church with the "Mother Church," was followed. Thirty-eight parochial clergy (out of the total of some 1600) gathered at Cluj (Oct. 1, 1948) and under

police pressure voted the reunion. Thereafter the Uniat Church was officially proscribed, having been absorbed in the Orthodox body, although it still lives underground in considerable strength.

The last stage of the official ecclesiastical policy was the "nationalization" of the Roman Catholic Church. It was cut off from contact with the papacy; the papal nuncio, the American O'Hara, was ordered out of the country; its twelve bishops were jailed or sent into concentration camps; and a "national" Church, subject to the state, was organized instead.

This procedure, which involves very extensive and severe persecuting measures, is followed, with local but inconsequential variations, in every country where the Soviet power predominates. The case of Rumania is only a concrete example of what is happening under similar circumstances everywhere else.

Hartford Seminary Foundation MATTHEW SPINKA

SHORTER NOTICES

SCHREINER, ALBERT, *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Aussenpolitik 1871-1945. Von der Reichseinigung bis zur November-revolution.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1952. Pp. 463. DM $4.80.

This book is based on lectures given at the University of Leipzig, in the Russian zone of Germany, from 1947 to 1949. The author appears to be a Communist and while he goes through the motions of objective historical writing, the product is propaganda directed primarily against the German Social Democratic party. If *Die Grosse Politik* is cited from time to time, the principal authorities used are Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. There is no indication that the author has read any works in English, French, or Italian.

Schreiner starts from Marx's prediction after the war of 1870-1871 that the German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine would drive France into the arms of Russia and lead to a new war and he castigates the Social Democrats for not insisting on self-determination being allowed the unhappy provinces. He also criticizes them for supporting the appropriation bills for the German army and navy, as well as for their declaration of solidarity with the imperial government in August, 1914. Finally, Schreiner berates the Social Democrats for making only a conservative political revolution in November, 1918, instead of a proletarian revolution in the Bolshevik style.

Schreiner's second thesis is that German foreign policy was designed by bankers and big business in the interest of *Monopolkapital,* the Bagdad Railway and German activity in Morocco being cited as proof. Not only was war the inevitable consequence, but in 1919 "those responsible for German policy were for war and wanted it at that moment" (p. 290); the Russian mobilization provided "the long-wished-for excuse" (p. 295). It was the "insatiable" (p. 368) demands of *Monopolkapital* which kept the war going to the bitter end. Even in defeat the ruling classes preferred to save what they could by accepting the terms of the Allies rather than join up with Soviet Russia. In passing, it may be noted that Schreiner twice refers to Trotsky's "treacherous" conduct in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk (pp. 416-417).

Obviously, Schreiner's book is not history, but from time to time it makes points which historians will have to consider. His second volume will be read with interest.

Alexandria, Virginia BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT

KADLEC, JOSEPH, *"Masaryk a Gorki"* in *Svět Sovětů,* Prague, November 19, 1952.

Mr. Kadlec' paper is a good example of the Communist attempts to tinker with history. Masaryk, the greatest personality in Czechoslovakia's modern history, is one of the victims of this "Operation Rewrite." Step by step he is being characterized as a mercenary tool of western capitalism and imperialism, the deadly enemy of freedom, the people and democracy.

The Masaryk-Gorki friendship, which up to now was one of the most popular features of all Czech Masaryk biographies, has suddenly lost its appeal. Gorki, who met Masaryk on the Italian island of Capri in 1913, became very much interested in "Russia and Europe," a book that Masaryk was writing at that time. Mr. Kadlec is eager to show that the relationship of these two men had nothing to do with friendship. Masaryk drew heavily from Dostoevski's work in his reflections on Russian life. This is why he did not understand that the 1905 revolution was the beginning of a socialist Russia. Gorki, on the other hand, has always fought Dostoevski's reactionary ideas. The "artificially" created fairy-tale about friendship is due to mere ignorance of facts, says Kadlec. One should only remember that Masaryk objected to Gorki's visit to Czechoslovakia. Why? Simply because he was afraid that Gorki's presence would strengthen the Communist Party.

It is interesting to follow Mr. Kadlec' logic. First he talks in terms of "high probability" that Masaryk and Gorki did not agree. Then the probability changes into certainty, and finally it becomes "obvious". Since their disagreement was obvious, is it not equally obvious that the whole story about the great friendship must be an old and vicious lie? The paper unfortunately ends at what might seem to be a midway point.

It is to be hoped that Mr. Kadlec will find time to "discover" that Masaryk and Gorki were always bitter enemies. This is the only possible outcome in mutual dealings of such diametrically opposed characters: the honest socialist Gorki and the hypocritical capitalist Masaryk. Too bad that Mr. Kadlec was not permitted to quote George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-four* as a motto for his "research." Under the heading of "Ignorance is Strength" Orwell says, a.o.: "The most important reason why the past has to be constantly tinkered with, is the necessity of maintaining the faith in the Party's infallibility."

Cornell University FRANK MEISSNER

Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. Bonn. Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 1953. 2 vols. Pp. 494, 896.

TURNWALD, W. K., ed., *Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.* Foreword to English ed., F. A. Voigt; transl. Gerda Johannsen. Munich: Association for the Protection of Sudeten German Interests, 1953. Pp. 308.

These two collections of grisly accounts are pointed in two directions. The first, *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa,* consists of statements made by German citizens in East and West Prussia, Brandenburg and Silesia, of both sexes and all ages and states, describing their vicissitudes in the chaotic and brutal days from the winter of 1945, when the approach or arrival of Soviet troops forced them to leave their homes in precipitate haste, or subjected them to the humiliations and indignities and frequently physical maltreatment which so often accompany the progress of a conquering army. There is not a great variety of theme in these accounts. Bestiality is not basically resourceful. A good deal of the account is devoted to the chaotic conditions left by the German armies as they fled westward. One wonders who would wish to read much of these 1400 pages at a time.

The *Documents* edited by Dr. Turnwald are a selection of 116 of the 383 in the original German two volume *Dokumente zur Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen* (1951), and thus pointed against Czechoslovakia since May, 1945. It is not clear on what basis the selections were made. There is certainly very sharp emphasis on

Czech brutality and vengefulness. The precision of memory for dates, hours and names of the deponents, making statements five or six years after the events, is so remarkable as to raise questions of veracity or perhaps prompting. The language map of Bohemia and Moravia (facing p. 752) does not correspond to the 1930 census, as it is represented. There is a valuable selection of official Czechoslovak edicts which were issued over President Beneš' signature in the summer of 1945 which were to govern and regularize the handing of the property and persons of the Sudeten Germans.

When one considers the sentiment clearly evident in these accounts, the evidence for deep animosity between Slav and German, and then reflects that the same expellee group which publishes these records of terror and atrocity is also calling for the return of the Sudeten, Silesian and East Prussian Germans to their respective homelands, one is frankly puzzled. Why, if the two peoples hate each other so fiercely, should they be forced to exacerbate that animosity by heightened propinquity. One would think they would be glad to stay away from the scene of such pain and humiliation.

S. H. THOMSON

Die Sowjetregierung und der Österreichische Staatsvertrag: Bericht und Dokumente, 1943-1953. 2nd enlarged edition. Göttingen: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung, 1953. Pp. 58. DM 8.

This little book reflects what is more or less the position of the Austrian Government on Austro-Soviet relations, in so far as that position can be freely expressed. Nothing new or startling is recorded here. The interminable delays which the Russians introduced into the negotiations for an Austrian treaty are catalogued in sufficient detail and it becomes clear enough that they regard it not as an issue to be decided on its own merits but as a part of the total European "settlement." The section on Russian economic policy in Austria is a fairly detailed indictment of these policies which represent little more than bald exploitation, although the Austrian case in the question of former German holdings is rather overstated, and the case of the U.S.I.A. stores, which undeniably do sell many commodities more cheaply than they are available on the Austrian market, is almost completely slighted. There is a large appendix of documentary support for the Austrian position, most of it, however, consisting of reprints from the *Europa-Archiv* and the *New York Times*. What appears really regrettable to the present reviewer is the fact that the authors thought it necessary to include a chapter purportedly dealing with "The Soviet Union and the Austrian Frontiers," but in fact being a restatement of the old chauvinist claims to the South Tyrol and a rebuttal of Yugoslav claims to the upper-Drava valley. It is also at least a slight shock to find nostalgic allusions to the missed opportunities of restoring some kind of *Donauföderation* on the very first page. On the whole, this is not ineffective propaganda document, but presents the issues much too consistently in terms of black and white to command much scholarly interest. There are maps, but they are so badly drawn that they are almost unusable.

University of Colorado PAUL P. BERNARD

SCHÜTZ, WILHELM WOLFGANG, *Die Stunde Deutschlands—Möglichkeiten einer Politik der Weidervereinigung.* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954. Pp. 140. DM. $4.80.

This small pamphlet, discussing the possibilities and preconditions for a peaceful reunification of Germany, is interesting both for its content and the personality of its author. Mr. Schuetz has been for some time an advisor to the Federal Minister in charge of All-German questions, Mr. Kaiser.

The author is not arrogant enough to pretend that there exists an easy formula for the solution of the foremost problem of German politics, but discusses rather carefully the over-all international situation as it reflects on German unity. Most interesting is his emphatically stated belief that neither the support of the Western

powers nor the sympathy of world public opinion, however indispensable in themselves, will be enough to help the fatherland to its reunification, but that the decision hinges on the readiness of the Soviet Union to permit such unification. "Hence Germany needs her own *Ostpolitik*" (p. 103). Coming from the author who appears to be truly anti-communist and a declared enemy of all neutralism, such a statement and its elaboration deserve careful attention as expressing probably the opinion of many Germans of similar bent.

Altogether Mr. Schuetz's twenty-one "theses" are not far from the suggestions which Walter Lippman has made for a number of years in regard to the German problem. There is, here however, a plea for an independently conducted German foreign policy which will be heard more and more stridently from many quarters, once the London agreements are ratified. The author, who believes in the necessity of such an independence, is well aware of its potential dangers. Hence he concludes by earnest warnings to his compatriots not to lapse into the disastrous attitudes of their recent past.

University of Colorado HENRY W. EHRMANN

PAGEL, KARL, ed., et al, *The German East.* Berlin: Konrad Lemmer Verlag, 1954. Pp. 151. Illus.

Originally published as *Deutsche Heimat im Osten* in 1951, the present attractively illustrated volume is apparently intended for the English speaking public which might be interested in German claims to the area east of the Oder-Neisse and East Prussia. The authors of the separate chapters are well known scholars in their specialties, and the editor, Professor Pagel, is the author of a recent readable history of the Hanseatic League (see this JOURNAL July 1953, p. 184).

The whole work covers this area from prehistoric times to the present under headings of Expansion, Achievement, Development of Culture, the Hanseatic League, Church, Agriculture and Trade. As told here it makes a formidable story. Yet it is fundamentally a depressing book. What is essentially asserted is that the only source of efficiency, culture, enterprise, development and Christianity in this great area was the Germans who came in and brought all these to a barren and benighted land. There is therefore much nonsense and falsehood in the history here recounted. But the spirit behind the nonsense is a more serious matter. To think that things can be put back to where they were in 1939, or preferably 1941, without causing what those conditions caused all over again seems fantastic. This is not the place to revise Jalta. That has already been done. But it is necessary to point out that it seems futile to ask for the support of the western world for the reconstitution of a territorial entity which by its very nature is dangerous to peace.

S. H. THOMSON

LEHMANN, RUDOLF, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Niederlausitz,* Bd. 2, Mitteldeutsche Forschungen, 2. Münster/Köln: Böhlau-Verlag, 1954. DM. 20.

In 1925 Professor Lehmann published a bibliography of Lower Lusatian history which was intended to be inclusive to that time. The present volume is a continuation of the earlier volume, and covers publications from 1926 to 1945 with a few titles of articles and monographs that have appeared up to 1950. A few titles of works appearing before 1925 do appear in this listing. Perhaps they were overlooked in the preparation of the first volume. I do not have that volume at hand.

The arrangement of the work is conventional, in twelve sections: general, Heimatkunde, prehistory, history, local history, administration, economy, cultural and religious life, etc. Over 3100 entries are listed and 40 pages of indexes make the use of the bibliography easy. The Slavic titles, Polish, Lusatian and Czech, are very few. These publications, of some significance in all three languages, may not have been available to the compiler during these two decades, whose own scholarly work in this area has been prodigious.

S. H. THOMSON

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